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The objective of this dissertation is to provide a critical 
analysis of the debate between modernists and postmodernists. 
This involves an analysis of the work of Juergen · Habermas 
which focuses on the role that he has played in this debate. 
I argue that there is an alternative to the dichotomy between 
modernism and postmodernism. In presenting this alternative I 
develop a conception of "the aftermath of modernity" which 
takes seriously postmodern critiques of modernism while 
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keeping intact certain key enlightenment ideals. I approach 
this problem from the perspective of the idea of enlightenment 
which I examine conceptually, sociologically and historical. 
My conclusion is that in order to pursue the ideals of 
enlightenment in th~ aftermath of modernity it necessary to 
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tolerant of radical difference. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In a social, political, cultural and theoretical 
atmosphere that is either succumbing to, or embracing 
wholeheartedly, fragmentation, superficiality and disparity, 
Juergen Habermas has consistently defended unity, depth, and 
comprehensiveness. In short, Habermas has been, in the most 
traditional sense, a philosopher par excellence at a time when 
philosophy itself has become a questionable enterprise. 
Another way of stating this would be to say that Habermas has 
bucked recent theoretical trends--the refusal to systematize, 
unify, or commit to positions--through an appeal to the 
highest developments of 18th, 19th and 20th century thought 
and their tendency to construct theoretical totalities. Yet 
another way of putting this would be to say that Habermas has 
thoroughly embraced the Kantian critical project at a time 
when it has become popular to separate it into its 
constitutive parts and then pick and choose elements that 
serve the ends of less ambitious endeavors. In short: Habermas 
has risked being a theoretician--a critical theoretician--at 
a juncture in intellectual history when being a theoretician 
in the tradition of Hegel, Marx and Weber has fallen into ill 
repute. 
The antithesis to Habermas' grand theory project is most 
clearly represented by writers that can be loosely organized 
under the banner of postmodernism. This includes the 
theoretical off spring of Nietzsche, Freud, and of course 
Heidegger. But who precisely falls into the postmodern camp is 
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not as simple as it may seem. Obvious members are self 
proclaimed postmodernists such as Lyotard and Baudrillard; 
less obvious, and considerably more problematic, are thinkers 
such as Derrida, Foucault, and Levinas. While they clearly 
share the same lineage as the straight forward postmodernists, 
and likewise share their suspicions concerning unity, totality 
and even depth, they also depart from the others in ways that 
I consider to have important ramifications: philosophically 
and politically. 
My aim in setting up this somewhat contrived dichotomy is 
to delve into the modernism/postmodernism debate--a debate 
that has already raged on for quite some time--from a 
perspective that questions the initial terms of the debate. 
Such an approach obviously owes a strategic debt to 
postmodernism, regardless of how it is characterized. But it 
also, as I will attempt to demonstrate, owes an equal, if not 
greater, debt to the tradition of critical social theory: 
which is as modern as theory gets. My aim, then, is to provide 
a characterization of the theoretical and practical 
significance of what I will hereafter refer to as the 
aftermath of modernity. The purpose of developing this concept 
is to depart from what I consider to be an often fruitless, at 
times acrimonious, and at worst reactionary debate. I will 
attempt to show the futility of being theoretically paralyzed 
for fear of being "metaphysical" and practically stilted for 
fear of being "irrational." In a nutshell: I will pit Habermas 
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and his "postmodern" enemies against one another, once again, 
in a effort to survey somewhat different territory than the 
current debate is able to accommodate. Rather than defending 
one side or the other I will attempt to look beyond the 
modernity vs. postmodernity dichotomy. 
This project, stated as such, goes beyond what can be 
achieved in the following work. In fact, I will attempt to 
shed light on only one key issue in what I envision to be a 
project that could go in a number of directions and could 
broach a number of questions. The issue that I will pursue is 
enlightenment: a topic that has long been Habermas' pet 
project. In doing so I reveal without hesitation an affinity 
for his work. I would go so far as to say that Habermas raises 
all the right questions and provides plausible answers to the 
bulk of them. Having stated this, however, I want to be clear 
from the outset that my support for Habermas is far from 
unqualified. In fact, he has tended to move in disappointing 
directions in his reproaches to thinkers he considers to be 
postmodern. These responses are not entirely unfounded; 
nonetheless, they are far from being fully supported either. 
At the root of his positions and reactions with respect to the 
questions of postmodernism is his stalwart defense of the 
Enlightenment. As such, his work will be center stage in this 
book. With Habermas I would like to defend a notion of 
enlightenment; against Habermas, however, I will attempt to 
show the importance of constructing this notion outside of the 
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parameters of the "unfinished project of modernity." Hence, I 
will be approaching the question of enlightenment in a manner 
that doesn't dismiss the valuable insights that have developed 
in postmodern of theory. In brief: I will be exploring the 
prospects for enlightenment in the aftermath of modernity. In 
order to so I will examine Habermas' normative work on 
communicative action--including discourse ethics--and his 
critical analyses of poststructuralism. 
In recent years poststructuralism has replaced positivism 
as the most formidable nemesis of critical social theory. A 
great deal of Habermas' work in the 1980's focuses on the 
philosophical backdrop and social-political repercussions of 
poststructuralist criticisms of Western rationality. This was 
initiated with an essay titled "Modernity vs. Postmodern~ty" 
(1981) in which Habermas makes the controversial claim that 
the poststructuralist representatives of anti-modern thought 
are "young conservatives (1981, 13). His most complete 
evaluation of poststructuralism is found in The Philosophical 
Discourse of Modernity (1987). Here Habermas concentrates on 
how Modernity's counter discourses (such as romanticism and 
Marxism) evolved into post-discourses that rely heavily upon 
Nietzsche's analysis of modernity. 
I will be discussing these issues in some detail in the 
chapters that follow. Before describing the manner in which I 
intend to proceed, however, it is useful to briefly review 
Habermas' characterization of the relationship between the 
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terms modernity and postmodernity. The term modern, he notes, 
has been used at various times in the history of the West. It 
was first applied to the post-pagan Christian period that 
emerged in the 5th century c. E. Other points at which the 
term was widely used include the 12th and 17th centuries in 
France as well as during the Italian and German Renaissance. 
The common denominator between these periods is that each 
marks a break from an old era and signifies the expectations 
of a new epoch. Habermas' main concern is with the concept of 
modernity that is schematized in terms of the dissolution of 
structures that were characteristic of the medieval epoch. 
This, of course, involves a number of stages that span from as 
early as the 14th century on into the 19th century. For all 
practical purposes, however, modernity came into its own 
during the 16th and 17th centuries. 
Initially the newness of the modern period meant a return 
to the "grand old days", referring to the golden age of 
antiquity. this is exemplified in the art and literature of 
the Italian Renaissance. Later, as a consequence of the French 
Enlightenment, modernity came to refer to a newness that was 
independent of the past. A spirit of progress and self-
determination was prompted by advancements in science and 
liberalization in the religious, political and economic 
spheres. This futuristic orientation of the enlightened 
conception of modernity is of particular importance to 
Habermas (1981, 3-4). 
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The term postmodern emerged in the late 1950's and was 
used to describe anti-establishment trends in art. These 
trends themselves are continuous with late modern phases such 
as surrealism and dadaism. The term has enjoyed much wider 
circulation in the 70's and 80's. Currently talk about 
postmodern architecture, art, film, etc. is all the rage and 
speculation on postmodern science, philosophy and politics is 
increasing. While the term itself has a meaning that is as 
fluid as the reality which it is used to characterize, the 
common theme is that there is nothing new under the sun. The 
"post" indicates that we are beyond the modern-enlightenment 
myth that something can be created out of nothing. In 
contrast, postmodern "things" (art, literature, philosophy, 
etc. ) tend to patch together disparate objects, themes, ideas, 
etc. with the intent of breaking up the facade of unity, 
coherence and progress that modernity has attempted to 
present. 
Late in the 18th century, when modernity apparently was 
in full swing, its first wave of critics appeared. For the 
sake of convenience I will encapsulate this movement under the 
general rubric of Romanticism and its offshoots. The concern 
of romantic thinkers was that rationalization, for all its 
scientific and economic merits, generates dehumanizing side 
effects; it excludes from the human experience such things as 
imagination, emotions, spirituality, and aesthetic 
sensibilities. Romantic modernists renounced the reverence for 
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antiquity, replacing it with an idealized view of the middle 
ages. Their intention was to revitalize what they perceived to 
be a loss of the internal aspect of human experience. Habermas 
claims that this resulted in a modern vision which extracted 
itself from its own historical context. "In the course of the 
19th century, there emerged out of this romantic spirit that 
radicalized consciousness of modernity which freed itself from 
all historical ties." The immediate ancestors of the romantics 
Habermas labels "aesthetic modernists"; they in turn 
anticipate contemporary postmodern thought (1981, 4). 
The feature that defines aesthetic modernism (from 
Baudelaire to Dali) is its altered sense of historicity. The 
past was portrayed as something to leap out of, rather than 
build upon. "Avant-garde" became the theme which supplied the 
prescriptive force for an engaged approach to life that 
proceeds toward an undefined, indeterminate, but utterly new 
future. This extreme effort to break from the continuity and 
progress that marked status quo modernism was the reactive 
product of an increased awareness of the limitations 
established by traditional norms. According to Habermas, the 
attitude that accompanied this vision was that of a naughty 
child. Aesthetic modernism fed upon the act of breaking rules, 
resulting in its inability to establish anything with 
politic al substance. This is most evident in the "failed" 
avant-garde movements of the middle 20th century. The 
surrounding questions are concerned with whether the creative 
8 
energy of modernity is spent. If so, is this a consequence of 
the infiltration of system into lifeworld which results in the 
lifeworld being "colonized" and exploited for the sake of 
system imperatives? This in turn raises a further question. As 
Habermas puts it: "Thinking more generally, does the existence 
of a post-avant-garde mean there is a transition to that 
broader phenomena called postmodernity?" (1981, 4-6). 
The immediate consequence of the crisis produced by this 
historical juncture is "nee-conservatism": a return to 
religious and traditional values that supposedly will resupply 
the meaning that has been swept away during the evolution of 
modernity. Habermas notes several ways in which this is 
problematic. Conservative critics of modernity have no way of 
accounting for social and economic advancements that have been 
made. This is because their analysis fails to grasp the extent 
to which negative cultural phenomena are tied to the mode of 
production. The cultural crises that they identify are a sign 
of a much deeper problem that falls from constitutional 
incongruities in the modern lifeworld. "I would describe this 
subordination of the life world under system imperatives as a 
matter of disturbing the communicative infrastructure of 
everyday life." Habermas' point is that the central problem of 
the late phase of the modern epoch is a disruption of 
communicative rationality caused by the modern productive 
mode. It is not repressive norms that have stilted modern 
creativity; on the contrary, the breakdown in the structures 
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of the lifeworld has inhibited the production and transmission 
of values and norms that are essential to maintaining the 
modern vision. As such, Habermas contends, the ideals of 
enlightened modernity need to be reappropriated and applied 
critically to the prevailing conditions that have brought 
about all the talk of postmodernity. 
The feature of modernity that is central to Habermas' 
modernism falls from the differentiation of the rational 
substance of traditional religion and metaphysics into three 
distinct spheres: science, morality and art. These three 
spheres correspond to the three types of validity that 
Habermas identifies as being raised in a formal discourse: 
truth, rightness, and truthfulness. Rational differentiation 
(which takes place within the modern lifeworld) gives rise to 
discourses that pertain to knowledge, justice and taste. The 
ideal espoused by Enlightenment thinkers was that these 
discourses could be institutionalized in such a way that they 
would provide the foundation for a rational society. 
Unfortunately this has not taken place. The three spheres have 
come under the control of experts who administer knowledge 
based power independent of the general public. Rather than 
symmetrical public discourse we have experts producing 
monologues that shape our thinking on the issues which they 
address. Contrary to the neo-conservatives, however, Habermas 
refuses to see this phenomenon as an inherent repercussion of 
modernity. Rather, he claims, it is a function of 
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communicative distortions that are associated with the 
capitalist economic mode. The normative content of modernity 
need not be renounced simply because it is distorted by a 
contingent productive mechanism. Hence, the solution to the 
crises of late modernity is to be found in the structures 
which constitute the modern lifeworld, not some indeterminate 
postmodern future (1981, 8-9). 
Habermas develops his case by filling out the critique of 
aesthetic modernism. Rather than pursuing the Enlightenment 
goal of integrating art into public life, art movements, due 
to the outlandishness of their product, have become more and 
more detached. As such, art is negated as a distinct component 
of cultural life, rendering it impotent. When the boundaries 
separating the discursive spheres that constitute the modern 
lifeworld are obliterated, when moral and scientific 
discourses are renounced in favor of the expressive discourse 
of art, the potential for collective transformation of society 
is eliminated. In response, Habermas offers this proposal: 
I think that instead of giving up modernity and its 
project as a lost cause, we should learn from the 
mistakes of those extravagant programs which have tried 
to negate modernity. Perhaps the types of reception of 
art may off er an example which at least indicates the 
direction of a way out (1981, 11). 
Enactment of this proposal requires that language games be 
established which center on art. Art can then be reintegrated 
into the lifeworld, making it once again publicly accessible. 
Discourses that are concerned with expressive validity claims 
will set a precedent for reintegrating discourses concerning 
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knowledge and justice. As such, art can pave the way toward a 
reactivation of the normative content that is stored in the 
modern lifeworld. 
While an interesting proposal on a strictly theoretical 
level, Habermas recognizes that it falters practically. "If I 
am not mistaken, the chances for this today are not very good. 
More or less in the entire Western world, a climate has 
developed that furthers capitalist modernization processes as 
well as trends critical of cultural modernism. The 
disillusionment with the very failures of those programs that 
called for the negation of art and philosophy has come to 
serve as a pretense for conservative positions" (1981, 13). 
Habermas' pessimism on this count is underscored by his own 
analysis of the conditions that prevail in advanced modern 
societies. In a sense, then, his philosophical and political 
commitments to modernity begin from a position of frustration 
if not futility. The sorts of normative discourses that are 
necessary to break the strangle hold of capitalism are 
fundamentally precluded by that very set of limitations. 
The position that I will attempt to develop is that two 
intertwined levels of normativity have developed during the 
modern epoch: the level that Habermas refers to which ensures 
that validity claims are addressed rationally and fairly, and 
the level which enables activities to be conducted by 
individuals and collectives that are strategically positioned 
within the power /knowledge configurations which constitute 
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advanced capitalist societies--preserving the communicative 
asymmetries that maintain their advantages. The fact that this 
bilevel set of norms is formally contained in the structures 
of the lifeworld serves as a smoke screen which cloaks a 
communicative structure that is not so much distorted as it is 
fine tuned to protect the interests of those whom have learned 
and mastered the norms which ground modern action related to 
political power and economic hegemony. So long as the illusion 
that the way to generate change is to engage in discursive 
practices which follow the letter modern normativity is 
maintained, those individuals and groups that aspire to bring 
about change in accordance with these rules will be 
effectively subdued. They will be rendered impotent by system 
imperatives that have effectively cornered the lifeworld 
which provides their foundation. One needs simply to look at 
activist groups that are in existence today to confirm this. 
While participants enjoy rich discourse and establish 
solidarity among themselves, they rarely make an impact simply 
through dialogue. By relying on the questionable normative 
content of modernity to ground his theory, Habermas by his own 
admission renders a complementary set of political practices 
implausible. 
This criticism is one that is fostered by Habermas' own 
analysis of advanced capitalism. He is acutely aware of the 
way that the communicative paradigm of capitalism has seeped 
into all spheres of late modern life. He does not, however, 
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proceed with an assessment of the discourses that enable this 
to occur. On the contrary, he persistently returns to the type 
of analysis that was first introduced in his earliest work. An 
ideal model of healthy social and 'political communication is 
used as a standard against which existing communicative 
patterns are measured. This facilitates the detection of 
distorted communication which is an initial step in a process 
tailored toward bringing it under the regulation of agreed 
upon standards of legitimacy. If, however, the discourse is 
already regulated by a set of norms which are inseparable from 
modern norms, then an alternative approach to discursive 
practices that is less indebted to the "talking cure" needs to 
be developed. 
The points that I have sketched in this introduction will 
be elaborated in the book that follows. My objective is to 
take one of Habermas' central claims--that a politics of 
emancipation is by necessity a politics of enlightenment--and 
explore the conditions of its development such that the 
dubious status of modern normativity is rigorously questioned. 
My aim is to think through the problems of such a politics in 
lieu of a waning modernity. In doing so I will provide a 
thorough critical analysis of Habermas' conception of the 
relationship between the ideals of the Enlightenment and the 
development of modern societies. I will argue that Habermas 
unnecessarily links the concept of enlightenment to modern 
social, political and economic developments. This is an 
14 
important issue if, as postmodernists have contended, some of 
the basic structures of modernity have fallen into 
dissolution. While I am not prepared to embrace postmodernism, 
a number of issues raised by critics such as Jean-Francois 
Lyotard and Fredric Jameson need to be taken into 
consideration. In my analysis of these figures--with respect 
to the question of enlightenment as well as Habermas' 
modernism--! will argue for a middle position which will be 
characterized as the "aftermath of modernity." This 
characterization will enable a critique of Habermas' 
Enlightenment positions with respect to several key political, 
cultural, and theoretical debates. These are loosely organized 
under the banner of neo-conservatism. In response to his 
modernist approach, I will consider the preliminary features 
of a politics of enlightenment which is compatible with the 
aftermath of modernity. In doing so I will appeal to several 
recent French philosophers (primarily Foucault, Derrida and 
Levinas) who, I believe, avoid the modern/postmodern 
dichotomy. My aim will be to preserve a conception of 
normativity and a strong sense of emancipation, along with 
Habermas' commitment to the Kantian ethical project. I will 
contend that in order to keep these concepts both 
theoretically and politically viable it is necessary to move 
beyond the limits of Habermas' conception of modernity. 
In the first chapter I will situate my project in terms 
of a dialectic of enlightenment that has been developing for 
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over 200 years. The point of departure for this discussion is 
Kant's famous essay, "What is Enlightenment." I argue that 
this, as well as several other of Kant's "occasional" 
writings, provides a firm philosophical basis for further 
discussion of the question of enlightenment. This question 
will be followed historically through the 19th century and 
proceed to the seminal work by Max Horkheimer and Theodor 
Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment. In this work I identify 
two strains of enlightenment thought: one which is more 
compatible with Habermas' vision and another that points in 
the direction of a form of enlightenment that moves beyond the 
parameters of modernity. I will proceed to show how this 
alternative to the traditional, Habermasian, conception of 
enlightenment is both plausible and, to a certain extent, 
compatible with Habermas' own analysis of advanced modern 
societies. This chapter concludes with an analysis of the 
political possibilities that emerge in the wake of modernity. 
Chapter two deals extensively with issues surrounding 
the modernism/postmodernism debate. I begin by detailing 
Habermas views on the development of modern societies. 
Particular attention is paid here to the way that Habermas 
characterizes the normative content of such societies. As a 
foil to this I discuss the work of Lyotard and Jameson. In the 
course of doing so I distinguish between what will be ref erred 
to as descriptive postmodernism and "normative" postmodernism. 
This enables a fuller characterization of the political 
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possibilities that lie outside of the modern/postmodern 
dichotomy. I conclude the chapter by arguing that both the 
modernist and postmodernist views miss something crucial about 
the current historical-political climate and why it is more 
relevant to ref er to this atmosphere as the aftermath of 
modernity. 
In chapter three I take up Habermas' version of the 
politics of enlightenment: his theory of cornrnunicati ve action. 
Here I argue that the normative aspirations of this theory, in 
their most abstract form, can indeed be separated from the 
capitalist mode of production. When the theory becomes more 
concrete, however, particularly with respect to law, morality 
and emancipation, This separation falters. My contention is 
that philosophical distinctions between what could be called, 
in conventional marxian terms, base and superstructure, run 
the political risk of integrating into a normative theory the 
very distortions that the theory is designed to mitigate 
against. I conclude with a discussion of the prospects for 
going beyond foundationalism in the direction of a 
historically fortified materialism. 
Chapter four addresses specific examples of the politics 
of enlightenment that Habermas forwards, arguing that when 
examined in the context of real political action it tends 
toward fortifying a quasi-liberal status quo. This is 
exemplified in several debates that Habermas has participated 
in concerning the issue of neo-conservatism. Beyond this I 
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attempt to gauge the way that a Habermasian politics of 
enlightenment would pertain to watershed political events of 
contemporary relevance. 
In the final chapter I develop my own position on the 
politics of enlightenment. I argue that the key to such a 
politics is to be found in Habermas' theory of the lifeworld. 
My claim is that this theory is incompatible with his version 
of communicative action. I suggest an alternative to this that 
opens further political possibilities. In conclusion I argue 
for a radically egalitarian form of communicative action that 
is based on Habermas' discourse ethics and recent French 
philosophy. 
CHAPTER I 
DIALECTIC OF DIFFERENCE: 
ENLIGHTENMENT AND ITS OTHER 
Enlightenment, whether considered as an historical 
process or a philosophical concept, has sparked a great deal 
of debate in contemporary social theory. Numerous events have 
occurred in the 20th century--the rise of Nazism, the war that 
didn't end all wars, the development and deployment of nuclear 
weapons, the flagrant exploitation of "third world" nations, 
and the rise and fall of "communism" just to name a few--that 
have prompted questions as to whether the objectives stated by 
Kant in 1784 have been, or are being realized: 
Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-imposed 
immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one's 
understanding without guidance from another. This 
immaturity is self-imposed when its cause lies not in 
lack of understanding, but in lack of resolve and courage 
to use it without guidance from another. Sapere Aude! 
"Have courage to use your own understanding!"--that is 
the motto of enlightenment. 
The all important question for social theorists is whether the 
atrocities of the current century are a sign of immaturity or 
a function of the very maturation process that Kant so 
enthusiastically lauds. If the former is true, and further 
enlightenment is the solution, then enlightenment must be a 
basic tenet of any social theory. If the latter is the case, 
then social theory must cut against the grain that has been 
constituted by "enlightened" thought. 
18 
19 
The poles that I have characterized, although ~onstrued 
a bit too simplistically, represent, in a sense, the 
theoretical presuppositions of two prominent schools of social 
thought: critical theory and poststructuralism. Critical 
theorists feel that the project of Enlightenment must be 
continued by reconceptualizing it in a manner that is 
compatible with existing conditions. Poststructuralists, in 
contrast, are less willing to accept the traditional concept 
of Enlightenment in any form. Oddly enough, both schools are 
committed, in one way or another, to working through this 
problem by rethinking the Kantian critical project. 
The publication in 1982 of the notes which were to be the 
third and final volume of Hannah Arendt's The Life of the 
Mind1 issued in the poststructuralist wave of scholarship on 
Kant's "political philosophy." This work focuses not so much 
on his more explicitly political writings, but rather on the 
Third Critique. The neo-neo-Kantianism to which Arendt's 
Lectures gave rise developed what could be ref erred to as the 
politics of judgement. 2In these fragments Arendt attempts to 
dismiss Kant's 'less than serious' dabblings in philosophical 
journalism in order to ferret out the political philosophy 
that he never quite wrote. She bases her analysis primarily on 
1Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, 
Ronald Beiner Ed., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982. 
2George A. Trey, "Rethinking th~ Public Sphere: Arendt's 
Shift from the Polis to the Politics of Judgment," Presented 
at the 1991 meeting of The Society for Social and Political 
Philosophy. 
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the notion of judgment developed in the third volume of the 
critical trilogy. This ·focus locates Kant's political 
philosophy in a rather paradoxical way. It would be hard to 
imagine a thinker more distinctively modern than Kant; yet the 
politics of judgment that Arendt gives impetus to in her 
lectures has taken on a surprisingly postmodern character. 3 
The expression of this is most notably found in the writings 
of Jean-Francois Lyotard. 
The main alternative to the postmodern Kant that the neo-
neo-Kantians have manufactured is the more conventional 
Kantianism developed by thinkers such as John Rawls and 
Juergen Habermas. Their attempts to write Kant's "fourth 
critique" concentrate on the second increment to the critical 
trilogy. In doing so they remain firmly within the modernist 
tradition that Kant, in a sense, initiated. While my 
sympathies lie with the ethical content of this more likely 
approach to a Kantian political philosophy, there is a 
tendency, in my estimation, to ignore important structural 
changes that challenge some of modernism's most cherished 
principles. This is most clearly evident in Habermas' work. In 
his efforts to revive the ethical-political content of the 
modernist tradition, he tends to dismiss the "realities" of 
the postmodern condition. While I am not wiiling to fully 
embrace either the descriptive or normative dimensions of 
3see David Ingram, "The Postmodern Kantianism of Arendt 
and Lyotard." 
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postmodernism, I do think that it is necessary--both 
philosophically and politically--to query with seriousness 
its threat to the tradition of enlightenment thought. In doing 
so I will take up several of Kant's writings which Arendt, 
citing Schopenhauer favorably, claims do not seem to be "the 
work of this great man, but the product of an ordinary common 
man" (Arendt, page 8). My aim is to trace a line from Kant to 
Habermas that explores the territory between nostalgic 
modernism and cynical postmodernism. 
The pivotal work in my analysis will Theodor Adorno' s and 
Max Horkheimer's Dialectic of Enlightenment. This remarkable 
book provides, in a number of ways, a context for the debate 
between the modernists and postmodernists on the question of 
enlightenment. I will explore this further by taking into 
consideration Michel Foucault's reflections on the question of 
enlightenment. My argument will be that enlightenment per se 
is not what Foucault is opposed to but rather a specifically 
modern, humanist conception of enlightenment that lends itself 
to a particular type of immaturity. This situates Foucault as 
one of those key figures whose work lies between the 
modern/postmodern dichotomy. From there I will proceed to 
argue that Habermas' most recent assessment of late-modern 
society comes to conclusions that are not incommensurate with 
Foucault's views. My aim in doing so is to provide a framework 
for discussions in subsequent chapters which will show that 
while late modern (advanced-capitalist or post-industrial) 
22 
societies are in concrete terms not postmodern, a theory of 
enlightenment that is sensitive to the conditions of late 
modernity must take into consideration counter-modern 
critiques. In doing so I will attempt to thematize the basic 
issues that are relevant to a politics of enlightenment 
appropriate to the aftermath of modernity. 
THE POLITICS OF ENLIGHTENMENT: PHASE 1 
In this section I will discuss three of Kant's essays 
which raise important issues concerning the conditions for a 
politics of enlightenment. 4 These writings inform the 
conception that I will develop later. Kant attacked the 
question of enlightenment most directly in his famous essay, 
"An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?". 5 In this 
short, but pithy, treatise,he develops a compelling case for 
the significant role that autonomy must play in a theory of 
enlightenment. Stating Kant's thesis once again: 
4 As Kenneth Baynes indicates, the politics of 
enlightenment, which draws out the political implications of 
Kant's moral philosophy, is not unequivocally supported by 
Kant's texts. "This claim concerning the unity of Kant's 
practical philosophy may seem suspect to those already 
familiar with his political theory. After all, Kant not only 
drew a sharp distinction between the realm of legality and the 
realm of morality, he also claimed that progress in the former 
does not insure any improvement in the latter." Kenneth 
Baynes, The Normative Grounds of Critical Theory: Kant, Rawls, 
Habermas, New York: SUNY Press, 1992 (page 12). In order to 
sustain the reading that I am forwarding it is necessary to 
highlight the "dialectical" side of Kant. 
5 Emmanuel Kant, "An Answer to the Question: What is 
Enlightenment," Perpetual Peace and Other Essays, 
Indianapolis: Hackett Press, 1983 (pp. 41-48). 
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Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-imposed 
immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one's 
understanding without guidance from another. This 
immaturity is self-imposed when its cause lies not in 
lack of understanding, but in lack of resolve and courage 
to use it without guidance (41). 
While on the surface this might appear to be a radically 
individualistic view of autonomy, a closer look shows that 
Kant has a subtle understanding of the conditions that must 
obtain in order for autonomy to be a viable possibility. He 
thematizes this in terms of a strong principle of freedom--a 
freedom that takes shape in the context of changes occurring 
in both the political structures and the moral fabric of an 
emerging modernity. "But that the public should enlighten 
itself is more likely; indeed, if it is only allowed freedom, 
enlightenment is almost inevitable." 
We see in Kant's thinking the development of a 
dialectical conception of enlightenment. On the one hand, 
autonomy or self-determination requires a substantive, 
concrete form of freedom. One can surmise that for Kant this 
involves secular authority, market economies, republican forms 
of government and a separation between state and civil 
society. On the other hand, in order to see clearly what is 
required to bring about a substantive form of freedom, 
subjects must already be autonomous. From an a-historical 
point of view it would appear as though Kant's initiate theory 
of enlightenment turns into a dilemma. But from the 
perspective of developing forms of life, the dilemma dissolves 
into a field of genuine social and political possibilities. 
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These possibilities, which are dependent upon necessary a 
priori conditions, find their conditions of sufficiency within 
a newly emerging realm of political discourse. 
However, insofar as this part of the machine also regards 
himself as a member of the community as a whole, or even 
of the world community, and as a consequence addresses 
the public in the role of a scholar, in the proper sense 
of that term, he can most certainly argue, without 
thereby harming the affairs for which as a passive member 
he is partly responsible (42). 
As such, the dialectic of enlightenment is located within the 
public sphere of bourgeois society. 6 
Kant further historicizes his position by pointing out 
how 
one of the sure signs of enlightenment is the realization that 
enlightenment is not a state to achieve, but rather a process 
to participate in. This highlights the importance that he 
attributes to public debate as a vehicle for generating 
enlightenment. A vibrant public sphere seems, for Kant, to be 
the most important structural constituent of the dialectic of 
enlightenment: at the social and political level it provides 
for a critical transformation of impediments to substantive 
freedom; at the individual level it provides a forum in which 
personal integrity and mutual respect can be fostered. 
6 Baynes notes that Kant draws an important distinction 
between validity and genesis. Validity is an a-historical 
criteria whereas genesis view the political moment in terms of 
past development and future possibilities. For Kant, the 
apparent development of a free and open public sphere plays an 
important role in social-political genesis. I'm particularly 
interested in the range of possibilities that this opens up. 
Exploring these seem to overcome Kant's remarks about the 
political viability of a race of devils. 
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Together these two aspects of the public sphere enable a 
strong sense of solidarity as well as a contextualized model 
of autonomy. 
The theory of enlightenment developed thus far is 
principally conceptual. While I have focused upon Kant's 
appreciation of the historical embeddedness of the possibility 
for enlightenment, as a theory of .enlightenment, these 
contingencies are underdeveloped. In order to see more 
clearly the philosophy of history that is in the backdrop of 
this conceptual schema, it is useful to turn to Kant's sketch 
in "Idea for a Universal History With a Cosmopolitan Intent." 7 
Here he develops a series of theses that serve to illustrate 
the telos of enlightenment. Kant introduces this essay by 
bringing into play the noumenal/phenomenal distinction that is 
so important to his epistemology and moral philosophy. In this 
context he frames it in terms of the course of history in 
relation to the autonomous subject. Humans don't plot out a 
desirable course for history and then construct a plan of 
action that will lead to the determined objective. Rather, the 
natural process of history, in conjunction with the 
determinate aims of discrete communities of actors, moves in 
the direction of fulfilling enlightenment ideals. 
The spark for this process is conflict and antagonism, 
followed by progressive resolution; it is fueled by the 
7 Immanuel Kant, "Idea for a Universal History With a 
Cosmopolitan Intent," Perpetual Peace and Other Essays, 
Indianapolis: Hackett Press, 1983 (pp. 29-40). 
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transcendent rationality to which Kant continuously appeals. 
Institutionally this process is objectified in political and 
social structures which are repeatedly transformed as they 
outlive their usefulness. Morally it builds toward a concept 
of right that facilitates the flourishing of human freedom. 
The ultimate logic of this, Kant suggests, leads us to a 
concept of internationalism based on shared values and 
preserved by a system of universal law. In other words, 
history moves toward a cosmopolitan state premised on general 
conditions of toleration and cooperation. Hence, Kant provides 
a philosophy of history that serves as the normative-empirical 
foundation for a strongly emancipatory theory of 
enlightenment. 
The utopian aspirations of this theory are reflected on 
more freely in "To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch." 8 
In this essay Kant develops a set of principles that focus on 
the maintenance of peace between sovereign nations. Based on 
the preceding discussion, as well as comments to that effect 
in the present essay, it can be inferred that Kant sees the 
ultimate condition of enlightenment to be harmonious 
coexistence on a global scale. Before discussing several of 
the key tenets of perpetual peace, it is important to note 
that the more conservative side of Kant is on display in this 
essay. He is suspicious of unlimited democratization; assumes 
8 Immanuel Kant, "To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical 
Sketch," Perpetual Peace and Other Essays, Indianapolis: 
Hackett Press, 1983 (pp. 107-143). 
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a very Hobbesian theory of human nature--one which doesn't do 
service to his own rich conception of the dialectical 
relationship between the noumenal and phenomenal 
constituitives of human being; and that coercion is necessary 
if politics and morality are to be squared. 9 In spite of this, 
Kant summarizes several of the most important features of his 
theory of enlightenment in a provocative manner. The ones that 
will concern me here deal with the relationship between 
universal morality and contingent political institutions. 
Kant sets up the discussion of perpetual peace by 
opposing his views to the "pragmatics" of political 
functionaries and their disdain for the visionary aspirations 
of theorists. This situates the ideal of peaceful coexistence 
in terms of the dialectic of enlightenment by pitting forces 
of conservancy against the radical possibilities that contest 
the established common sense. The former reduces humane 
existence to the determinations of the phenomenal realm; the 
latter recognizes the need for noumenal transcendence, made 
concrete in the political sphere, in order for conditions of 
enlightenment to be secured. 
The state of peace must therefore be established, for the 
suspension of hostilities does not provide the security 
of peace, and unless this security is pledged by one 
neighbor to another (which can happen only in a state of 
lawfulness), the latter, from whom such security has been 
9 I say that Kant is being a reactionary in that he makes 
concessions to the current power structure at the expense of 
exploring more fruitful ideals. This clearly runs contrary to 
his own definition of enlightenment, resorting to a cynicism 
that fails to take the possibility for enlightenment serious. 
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requested, can treat the former as an enemy (111). 
Kant's point is that the impulses of self-preservation will 
not suffice to sustain conditions of peace. Perpetual peace 
requires the rule of law. This appeal to the transcendental-
universal aspect of his moral theory illustrates the way in 
which the ethical abstraction embodied in the categorical 
imperative can be brought to bear in an institutional context. 
While the specific status of the relationship between noumenal 
ideals and phenomenal practices remains underdeveloped, it is 
clear that he sees this possibility as necessary for 
formulating a politics of enlightenment. 
Kant attempts to specify more precisely the institutional 
form that this would need to take. His two key points pertain 
to the establishment of republican governments at the national 
level and some type of international confederation of nations. 
The first of these doesn't demonstrate a great deal of 
political imagination; the second, however, points to 
important limitations of the nation state at the outset of its 
development. In order to achieve peace at all, there must be 
a network of relations established between all political 
entities. This addition marks an important development over 
the Hobbesianism of his view of the social contract. Relations 
between nations would have to be grounded in the concrete 
political expression of the categorical imperative. 
In summary I would like to stress the following points. 
First, for Kant it seems possible for one to uphold moral 
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principles outside of the context of an enlightened society. 
In fact, the possibility for moral self-determination must 
precede the setting up of just institutions. What is crucial 
for Kant's dialectic of enlightenment is that the possibility 
for moral self-determination begins to converge with the 
development of modern political institutions. Second, a 
concrete form of autonomy is needed in order for this 
convergence to take place. In other words, the transcendental 
moral subject must find her/his place in the phenomenal world. 
Kant situates the possibility for this in terms of a 
philosophy of history which has as its end the achievement of 
enlightened societal structures and relations. Finally, this 
end can only be fulfilled within intersubjective networks that 
are sustained in order to generate solidarity. Kant's appeal 
to the public sphere and the importance of internationalism 
specifies this need. While I recognize that my interpretation 
of Kant is contestable, 10 I want to emphasize that if the 
radical side of Kant is ferreted out, his views on 
10 See for example Herbert Marcuse, "Philosophy and 
Critical Theory," in Critical Theory: The Essential Readings, 
David Ingram and Julia Simon-Ingram eds., New York: Paragon 
House, 1992. Marcuse writes the following: "Kant had, of 
course, written essays on universal history with cosmopolitan 
intent, and on perpetual peace. But his transcendental 
philosophy aroused the belief that the realization of reason 
through factual transformation was unnecessary, since 
individuals could become rational and free within the 
established order" (page 7). If Marcuse' s point is simply that 
Kant saw enlightenment to be attainable within the confines of 
the bourgeois order that seems right. My analysis has 
attempted to set up Kant's views in terms of their critical 
potential for getting beyond that paradigm. 
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enlightenment offer a wealth of resources. 
THE POLITICS OF ENLIGHTENMENT: PHASE 2 
My argument thus far has been that Kant, in a sense, 
develops a notion of a dialectic of enlightenment that is 
relevant to my present concerns. His analysis, however, is 
weak on a number of scores. The most flagrant of these is his 
naivete concerning political-economy. For Kant, the economy 
played no role in the normative structure of society. His 
focus is almost exclusively on civil society and the state. 
Critical theorists after Kant, however, became increasingly 
aware of the contradictions between an enlightened society and 
the capitalist mode of production. Hegel, for example, saw 
that the logic of capitalism entails a state of perpetual 
unrest in that expansionism and fierce competition leads to 
warfare. And of course Marx's contribution to this scarcely 
needs to be mentioned. Where both Hegel and Marx uncritically 
followed Kant concerned his teleological view of history. As 
Kenneth Baynes puts it ... 
Kant's predictions about the course of historical and 
political events have not fared any better than Marx's. 
Nature has produced neither just political orders nor a 
condition of international perpetual peace. If Kant's 
teleological conception of history is unjustified, what 
consequences does this have for his assumptions about the 
unity of practical philosophy? 11 
It is this question that prompts the next phase of the 
12. 
11 Baynes, The Normative Grounds of Social Criticism, page 
31 
politics of enlightenment. 
When Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno wrote Dialectic of 
Enlightenment12they were overwhelmed with the phenomenal 
events that seemed to undermine the viability of a politics 
based on rationally grounded transcendental morality: the 
aforementioned developments which have left a black mark on 
the record of 20th century "enlightened" societies. The way 
that one interprets these events will largely determine how 
one is disposed toward the question of enlightenment. If the 
Enlightenment leads directly to these atrocities, then 
critique must mitigate against Enlightenment norms; if, on the 
contrary, these events are radical deviations from the norms 
of the Enlightenment, then critique should attempt to defend 
the validity of these norms and consider ways in which they 
can be brought to bear on existing social and political 
conditions. This is the set of problems that Horkheimer and 
Adorno attempt to analyze. I will now address their 
interpretation of the dialectic of enlightenment. 
While critics of the Enlightenment can be found at nearly 
every juncture of its development, the type of critique most 
pertinent to the concerns of this book was first formulated by 
Horkheimer and Adorno. They state the following thesis: "myth 
is already enlightenment; and enlightenment reverts to 
mythology" (DOE, xvi). It is this proposition that prompted 
12 Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, John Cumming trans. New York: Continuum, 1972 
(hereafter DOE). 
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them to radically reformulate the project of critical 
theory. 13 An important catalyst for this reformulation was 
their observation that the process of social organization, 
driven by the development and intensification of rationality, 
so effectively subdues nature that humanity, being a natural 
entity, falls victim to its own progress. This is exemplified 
by the impulses of the Enlightenment: 
For the Enlightenment, whatever does not conform to the 
rule of computation and utility is suspect. So long as it 
can develop undisturbed by any outward repression, there 
is no holding it. In the process, it treats its own ideas 
of human rights exactly as it does the older universals. 
Every spiritual resistance it encounters serves merely to 
increase its strength (DOE, p. 6). 
Enlightenment turns against the original intention of 
rationally emancipating individuals from mythological world 
views. By failing to reflect critically upon its own 
historical development, the Enlightenment becomes encased in 
a mythological fortress that protects it from the harsh truth 
of its own reality: that it creates a technological despotism 
which deprives individuals of their personal identity, linkage 
13 See Helmut Dubiel' s Theory and Politics: Studies in the 
development of Critical Theorv, Benjamin Gregg trans. 
Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985 (pp. 69-81). Dubiel recognizes 
three phases in the theoretical development of the Frankfurt 
circle. The phase with which I am concerned he labels "the 
critique of instrumental reason." This is distinguished from 
the previous phases--the first of which focuses on formulating 
Marxist materialism in light of early 20th century economic 
conditions and the second which develops an interdisciplinary 
approach to social studies--by distancing itself from question 
of political-economy and developing a quasi structuralist 
critique of Western rationality. The particular historical 
events that most concerned Horkheimer and Adorno were the rise 
of fascism, Stalinism, and the vulnerability to 
authoritarianism that they detected in the allied countries. 
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to nature, and spirituality. 
In defense of these claims Horkheimer and Adorno provide 
a comprehensive critique of the entire tradition of Western 
rationality. 14 From the outset, Enlightenment, under any name, 
has simply articulated the presiding myth via the language of 
rationality. 15 As such, there are notable similarities between 
mythological and enlightened thought. Both, to a certain 
extent, attempt to provide a unified picture of reality; they 
share the objective of mastering nature; and each structures 
itself on the basis of power hierarchies. Mythology and 
Enlightenment are both motivated by a deep fear of the 
unknown, driving each to the conclusion that mysterious 
elements of reality must be subdued through explanation. It 
was a specific type of explanation--scientif ic--that gave rise 
to the historical Enlightenment. Horkheimer and Adorno 
indicate a number of consequences that fall from this. The 
most important of these pertain to modes of communication and 
14 Seyla Benhabib notes that this project results in a 
paradox. "The critique of Enlightenment becomes as totalizing 
as the false totality it seeks to criticize." Critique, Norm, 
and Utopia: A Study of the Foundations of Critical Theory, New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1986 (p. 168). Habermas, in 
The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, echoes this 
criticism. I tend to think that this problem has been over 
emphasized. Horkheimer and Adorno don't explicitly renounce 
the enlightenment tradition; rather they analyze its failure 
to live up to its own normative standards. For a valuable 
defense of their position see Larry Ray, "Foucault and the 
Decomposition of the Historical Subject." Philosophy and 
Social Criticism, Vol. 13, 1989, (pp. 69-110). 
15 Horkheimer and Adorno point to pre-socratic 
cosmologies, as well as Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysics, 
as examples of this (DOE, p. 6). 
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social organization (DOE, pp. 8-18). 
Modes of communication are dependent upon forms of 
discursive language. In mythological discourse the language is 
symbolic: the signifier and signified are united in the 
symbol. Or, to put this in another way, processes of reference 
are perceived to create a unified whole. This unity translates 
into social unity as the meaning and truth objectified in 
language plays an important role in corporate ritual practices 
that are repeatedly used to create a sense of communal 
cohesion. As distinctions between literal and figural 
discourse came to be drawn, the former, without recognition of 
fictional residue, was deemed the language of truth. This 
began in ancient Greek philosophy and reached its pinnacle in 
enlightened positivism. The theme that is common to all phases 
of this history is a compulsion to assert humanity's 
superiority over nature. Consequently, discursive development 
reflects a desire to describe, understand, and ultimately 
dominate nature. Hence, the signifier ceases to provide social 
coherence by representing a shared truth and meaning. Rather 
than symbolizing the horizontally organized communality of 
humanity and environment, it becomes a manipulative implement 
which serves the compulsion to vertically administrate social 
and natural reality (DOE, 17-18). 16 
16 In contemporary semiotic theory this point would be 
characterized in terms of the discrepancy between signifier 
and signified. Insofar as the two never meet, there is no 
sign. hence, there are merely chains of signification which 
can have either a hierarchical or relational organization. 
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As I mentioned, Horkheimer and Adorno contend that the 
discourses of rationalistic philosophy, and later of 
enlightened science, retain a number of characteristics 
typically associated with their mythical antecedents. The most 
significant remnants are the power associated with linguistic 
mastery, the use of technical vocabulary to systematize and 
totalize, and the development of linguistic apparatuses that 
facilitate the hierarchical ordering of subject matter. 
whereas in pre-rational societies the priest, as the possessor 
of symbolic meaning, was the most powerful member, now the 
scientist, whose discourse is laced with facts and figures, 
reigns. While operating under the guise of neutrality, the 
ideology of scientific rationality permeates all spheres of 
social existence. This is achieved, the authors claim, through 
the proliferation and dissemination of scientific language. 
Language itself gave what was asserted, the conditions of 
domination, the universality that they had assumed as the 
means of intercourse of a bourgeois society. The 
metaphysical emphasis, and sanction by means of ideas and 
norms, were no more than hypostatization of the rigidity 
and exclusiveness which concepts more generally compelled 
to assume wherever language united the community of 
rulers with the giving of orders. As mere means of 
reinforcing the social power of language, ideas became 
all the more superfluous as this power grew, and the 
language of science prepared the way for their ultimate 
desuetude (DOE, p. 22). 
To summarize, Horkheimer and Adorno claim the following: 
Horkheimer's and Adorno's point seems to be that the inability 
to produce symbolic unity necessarily in hierarchical, 
dominative structure. I would challenge this view by arguing 
for a more communitarian form of disunity. This would involve 
appealing to a historically fluid life world as the social 
basis of discourse. 
36 
mythical discourse precedes and influences metaphysical 
discourse, which precedes and influences scientific discourse. 
While passionately seeking to purge itself of all mythical and 
metaphysical characteristics, enlightened science fails to 
reflect on its own discursive evolution. As such, the remnants 
that I mentioned above translate into a new social mythology 
involving an unqualified faith in reason, an uncritical 
acceptance of market relations, and an overenthusiastic 
reception of full scale capitalism (DOE, p. 20-23). 17 
Horkheimer and Adorno go on to claim that the 
mythological foundation of enlightened modern society is a 
dogmatic aversion for theory. Thinkers in the Enlightenment 
tradition are, in a sense, non-thinkers. They no longer feel 
compelled to theorize about the good or the nature of reality. 
Now it is simply the matter of learning the laws of nature and 
mathematics and applying them to the facts. This procedure, 
according to Horkheimer and Adorno, is conducted under the 
jurisdiction of a totalizing presupposition: that all of the 
natural order can be systematically understood and exploited 
for the "good" of humanity. As a result of rigid adherence to 
this presupposition, negative consequences go undetected. 
17 Horkheimer and Adorno are here playing on the Comtean 
stages of human understanding. We first understand things 
religiously or theologically, this develops into metaphysical 
or philosophical understanding; then finally, once our mode of 
understanding has sufficiently matured, we come to view things 
scientifically. Horkheimer and Adorno are attempting to refute 
the claim of progress that Comte wants to make. See selections 
from Comte in Ideas of History vol. 2, Ronald Nash ed., New 
York: E.P. Dutton and co. Inc., 1969, pp 8-10. 
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"What appears to be the triumph of subjective rationality, the 
subjection of all reality to logical formalism, is paid for by 
the obedient subjection of reason to what is directly given" 
( DOE , p . 2 6 ) · 
While the repercussions of this mind set for philosophy 
and science are significant, according to Horkheimer and 
Adorno, the influences on the way that everyday life is 
conducted are devastating. The same rigorous schemes of 
classification and ordering used to characterize natural 
phenomena are implemented in manufacturing facilities and 
social institutions. Individuals become cogs in the capitalist 
machinery. Conventions of expediency are enforced with such 
proficiency that behavioral norms are rarely questioned. This 
is accomplished by carefully monitoring and maintaining 
individual components of the collective unit, ensuring its 
smooth operation. The basic truth undergirding the modern 
facade of individuality and freedom is that power rules. This, 
according to Horkheimer and Adorno, is the dark mythical 
undercurrent of Enlightenment (DOE, pp. 28-29). 
The preceding analysis would appear to put asunder the 
idea of a politics of enlightenment. Kant's dream of modern 
progress seems to have turned into a postmodern nightmare. 
Yet I would contend that the authors of Dialectic of 
Enlightenment don't depart from Kant's most basic ideals. 
They challenge the teleological view of progress by positing 
an alternative interpretation to the idealist meta-
narrative. 18 Likewise they root themselves in, and expand 
upon, the classical critique of political economy. 19 
Finally, they argue convincingly that the most important 
feature of Kant's optimism concerning the prospect of an 
enlightened society--that being the potential for human 
autonomy--is virtually impossible within the parameters of 
his analysis. This, however, does not amount to the 
dismissal of Kant's ideals. In fact they repeatedly appeal 
to principles such as self-determination, the need for 
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public discourse, and the basis for this that can only be 
provided for within the context of a vital community. While 
Horkheimer and Adorno are hesitant to frame this positively 
in terms of a politics of enlightenment, their negative 
appeal to these values clearly situates them within Kant's 
set of questions. 
All the same, the main essay of Dialectic of 
Enlightenment leaves the reader somewhat confused as whether 
18 As Adorno puts it: "Universal history must be construed 
and denied. After the catastrophes that have happened, and in 
view of the catastrophes to come, it would be cynical to say 
that a plan for a better world is manifested in history and 
unites it. Not to be denied for that reason, however, is the 
unity that cements the discontinuous, chaotically splintered 
moments and phases of history--the unity of the control of 
nature, progressing to rule over, and finally to that over 
men's inner nature. No universal history leads from sa~agery 
to humanitarianism, but there is one leading from the 
slingshot to the megaton bomb." Negative Dialectics, New York: 
Coontinuum, 1973 (page 320). 
19 Much of Adorno's and Horkheimer's work prefigures and 
surpasses Jean Baudrillard' s writings on the political economy 
of the sign. 
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western rationality and enlightenment are inherently bad or 
simply misdirected. An Adornoesque pessimism certainly 
prevails, giving the impression that reason and 
enlightenment are fraught with deep conceptual problems 
which translate into authoritarianism and domination. 
Nevertheless, the critique pursued is of existing forms of 
rationality and a specifically modern form of enlightenment. 
While the seeds of these forms are traced, in almost 
Heideggerian fashion, back to the golden days of ancient 
Greece, the concrete examples are all linked to a distinctly 
modern conception of science, as well as the modern mode of 
production. Unlike Heidegger, however, the authors don't 
clearly dismiss rationality and enlightenment in general. 
There is at the very least a restless ambiguity in the 
text. 20 This is intensified in light of the different 
attitudes expressed in the two excurses that follow. Given 
that the excurses were independently authored, it can be 
inf erred that the tension is explicable in terms of 
differences between the individual views of Horkheimer and 
Adorno. I will proceed under the assumption that this is the 
20 This ambiguity is pointed out in most of the critical 
literature. Helmut Dubiel sums the situation up as follows: 
"This judgment--which might be classified in terms of 
sociology of knowledge--about the conditions for the circles 
own work is radicalized in the 1940's to the point of 
nullifying itself self-referentially." Helmut Dubiel, Theory 
and Politics, Benjamin Gregg trans. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985 
(page 82). 
21 case. 
THE POLITICS OF ENLIGHTENMENT: PHASE 3 
As I mentioned above, during the course of this 
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analysis a model for critical-theoretical studies of society 
is formulated. This model can be developed in two directions 
that are relevant to the question of a politics of 
enlightenment. These two directions are delimited by the 
excurses that follow the main essay in Dialectic of 
Enlightenment. The first, authored by Adorno, views 
enlightened thought to be inherently suspect. The second, 
authored by Horkheimer, indicates that it is not 
enlightenment as such, but rather its perversion, that is 
the source of modernity's rationality related problems. In 
this section I will argue that Foucault develops Adorno's 
thesis while Habermas elaborates Horkheimer's. 22 
In the first excursus the author (Adorno) initiates his 
interrogation of Western rationality with the stunning claim 
21 The independent authorship of the excursuses is not 
acknowledged by Horkheimer and Adorno. Seyla Benhabib points 
this out in Critique, Norm, and Utopia (p. 20). 
22 I am not claiming that there is an historical 
connection that substantiates the relationships that I am 
attempting to establish. The fact that there is an historical 
connection between Habermas and Horkheimer and Adorno is not 
pertinent to the argument that I am presenting. My claim is 
simply that Dialectic of Enlightenment is a seminal work 
concerning the question of enlightenment and rationality given 
the circumstances of the 20th century, and that Foucault and 
Habermas address these issues from different perspectives--
both of which can be derived from Horkheimer's and Adorno's 
analysis. 
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that Homer's Odysseus is the prototypical bourgeois 
individual. He proceeds by offering an interpretation of The 
odyssey which contends that Odysseus' experiences initiated 
a continuous history of instrumental rationality that 
reaches full fruition in the Enlightenment. 23 This 
unaltered model for rational cognition is established by the 
cunning acts of the epic voyager. Odysseus faces a number of 
mythical-natural obstacles during his trek. The strategy 
that he develops for overcoming these impediments employs a 
submissive yet manipulative form of rationality. Nature is 
not confronted in a face to face struggle; it is 
outmaneuvered and subdued from behind (DE, p. 58-60). 
Adorno characterizes Odysseus' encounter with the 
Sirens as the paradigm for all succeeding applications of 
instrumental rationality. 
It is impossible to hear the Sirens and not succumb to 
them; therefore he does not try to defy their power. 
Defiance and infatuation are one and the same thing, 
and whoever defies them is thereby lost to the myth 
against which he sets himself. Cunning, however, is 
defiance in rational form (DE, pp. 58-59). 
Odysseus gains the upper hand, but not without consequence. 
In order to overcome the order of nature, he submits to 
self-imposed bondage (by strapping himself to the mast of 
the ship). For Adorno, this represents the inevitable 
23 Instrumental rationality is the use of reason in a 
strictly purposive fashion. The fundamental consequence of 
this is that the "praxis" of reason hones in on its end 
without considering the repercussion of its process. For a 
detailed discussion of this see Benhabib (1986, pp. 149-163) 
and Dubiel (1985, pp. 88-99). 
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paradox of instrumental reason. In order to win, one has to 
lose. It also provides a model for the type of human 
behavior that flourishes under the capitalistic economic 
structures of enlightened modern society. In order to get 
ahead, one has to submit to self-sacrifice and must be 
willing to sacrifice anyone that stands in the way. Adorno 
concludes that Western rationality is inherently plagued 
with this "negative dialectic." The historical Enlightenment 
simply intensifies the irrationality that has always 
infected reason, producing the above mentioned social 
consequences (DE, pp. 55-60) . 24 
Habermas makes the point that this critique of 
enlightened thought is so comprehensive that it ultimately 
denies its own critical foundation. From the very beginning, 
Adorno claims, Western reason is tainted with the sinister 
paradox faced by Odysseus. Likewise, the possibility that 
rationality has any positive critical content is dismissed. 
Yet, to use Habermas' phrase, he retains a "residual faith 
24 Adorno writes the following: "Man's domination over 
himself which grounds his selfhood, is almost always the 
destruction of the subject in whose service it is undertaken; 
for the substance which is dominated, suppressed, and 
dissolved by virtue of self-preservation is none other than 
that very life as functions of which the achievements of self-
preservation find their sole definition and determination: it 
is, in fact, what is to be preserved. The irrationalism of 
totalitarian capitalism, whose way of satisfying needs has an 
objectified form determined by domination which makes the 
satisfaction of needs impossible and tends ·toward the 
extermination of mankind, has its prototype in the hero who 
emerges from sacrifice by sacrificing himself" (DE, pp. 54-
55) • 
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in a de-ranged reason (1987 b., p.186). As such, his 
analysis, like the tradition he criticizes, is rooted in a 
paradox: it uses the tools of Western rationality while 
denying that they can have any positive application. While I 
don't entirely endorse Habermas' assessment of Adorno, the 
general dilemma that he identifies needs to be contended 
with. If social theory is to take seriously Adorno's 
critique while still maintaining--at least theoretically--
its relationship to the ideal of collective emancipation, 
this problem needs to be addressed. I think that Foucault 
offers insight into how this might be accomplished. 25 While 
not a direct understudy of Adorno's Foucault's entire corpus 
of work represents a concern with the questions raised in 
the first excursus of Dialectic of Enlightenment. 26 As 
such, he can legitimately be characterized as picking up 
25David Ingram points this out in "Foucault and the 
Frankfurt School: A Discourse on Nietzsche, Power and 
Knowledge." Having discussed the theoretical similarities 
between the position taken by Adorno and Horkheimer in 
Dialectic of Enlightenment and the themes that dominate 
Foucault's work, and with reference to the paradox that I have 
alluded to, Ingram states the following: "Asserting the 
prerogative of reason against itself or imputing a rational 
authority to one's own declamations that are without absolute 
foundation appear to be contradictions that Foucault has 
sought to avoid." (1986, p.314). 
26 Foucault's first important work, Madness and 
Civilization, initiates a series of reflections on the 
c~nsequences of the rationalization of people's everyday 
lives. These ideas evolved and were refined throughout his 
career and are represented in nearly all of his writings. 
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where Adorno left off . 27 
In "What is Enlightenment" (1984), Foucault takes up 
the question addressed by Kant in the latter part of the 
18th century and, in a sense, by Horkheimer and Adorno in 
Dialectic of Enlightenment. He suggests that the question as 
to the inherent goodness or baseness of the Enlightenment is 
irrelevant. By focusing on the conceptual point that 
tormented Adorno, and the question as to whether 
enlightenment contains an "essential kernel of rationality," 
theory will be "blackmailed" by the Enlightenment (subdued 
by the dialectic of liberation and domination). The 
essential theoretical project is to identify the boundaries 
that are established by the Enlightenment attitude and to 
determine the points at which these limits are susceptible 
to pressure. "The point, in brief, is to transform the 
critique constituted in the form of necessary limitation 
into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible 
transgression" (WE, pp. 42-45). 
27 While for the purposes of this discussion an actual 
historical connection between Foucault and Adorno is not 
necessary, Foucault does view his work to be conducted in the 
spirit of critique that is characteristic of the Frankfurt 
Circle. In light of the Kantian questioning of the nature of 
enlightenment, which Foucault understands to be a questioning 
of the present, he states the following about his 
methodological heritage: "one can opt for a critical 
philosophy of truth in general, or one can opt for a critical 
thought which has the form of an ontology of ourselves, an 
ontology of the present; it is this latter form of philosophy 
which, from Hegel to the Frankfurt School by way of Nietzsche 
and Max Weber, has founded a form of reflection within which 
I have tried to work" (1986, p. 96). 
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It is naive, in Foucault's judgment, to think that a 
totalistic analysis of the repercussions of rationality on 
social existence (such as that conducted by Adorno) is even 
possible. Social theory should focus on grasping points at 
which change is urgently needed and attempt to determine 
tactics that are capable of achieving the desired 
altercation. Such a strategy would dispense with Adorno's 
sweeping generalizations while retaining the analytic acuity 
that enabled him to identify specific instances which 
confirm his hypothesis. Foucault describes this project as 
being genealogical in design and archaeological in method. 
"It is not seeking to make possible a metaphysics that has 
finally become a science; it is seeking to give new impetus, 
as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of 
freedom" (WE, p. 46). As such, the problematic element of 
Adorno's critique (its totalistic dimension) can be 
eliminated without sacrificing the critical wealth of his 
analysis (WE, pp. 45-47) 28 
In the second excursus of Dialectic of Enlightenment, 
Horkheimer suggests that the undistorted "kernel of 
rationality" that Adorno seems to think is nonexistent and 
that Foucault is unconcerned with might be worth pursuing. 
28 Foucault points out that there are some affinities 
between his approach to social theory and the objectives of 
the Enlightenment. For example, both insist that it is 
~ecessary to push forward with and both share the objective of 
increasing human freedom. Foucault contrasts rather sharply, 
however, on questions of science, progress, and rationality. 
While concentrating on the negative dimensions of Western 
reason, as manifest in Enlightenment morality, Horkheimer 
implies that this isn't the necessary end of reason. 
Horkheimer clearly rejects instrumental reason. 
Rationality of this sort, he claims, is in line with the 
Kantian conception of Enlightenment and reason. 29 The task 
of reason here is to systematize and put things in their 
proper order. This will ensure that humanity reaches 
maturity and preserves itself as a species. Horkheimer 
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agrees with Adorno that this organizational fetish is the 
most dangerous product of the Enlightenment, but suggests 
that critique should be directed specifically at rationality 
and enlightenment as conceived within capitalistic socio-
economic structures. It is the combination of a specific 
type of reason and a specific mode of production that causes 
the devastating consequences associated with the historical 
Enlightenment. It doesn't necessarily follow from this that 
reason is inherently. It is paradoxical, rather than 
predictable, that the Enlightenment should result in its own 
antithesis. This, for Horkheimer, occurred due to a fatal 
practical flaw: Enlightenment thought failed to fully 
incorporate the need for internal criticism. One can infer 
29 Here I think that Horkheimer would have done well to 
read Kant a bit more sympathetically. While there clearly is 
a sort of fetish to compartmentalize in the second critique, 
and even more so in the first, to limit an analysis of these 
rich texts to that dimension is to do so at the expense of 
appropriating the powerful moral content in a politically 
radical manner. 
from this that Horkheimer would accept an adequate concept 
of Enlightenment. By indicating that reason has assumed a 
perverse form, he leaves open the possibility that a more 
reflective rationality might be the answer to the problem 
created by its irrational opposite (DE, pp.85-93). 
This is precisely the position held by Habermas. His 
well known approach is to develop a normative theory of 
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action that is based on distortion free rational discourse. 
He situates this project vis-a-vis the dialectic of 
enlightenment in "The Entwinement of Myth and 
Enlightenment. 1130 Habermas attacks Horkheimer and Adorno 
for over generalizing and over simplifying the dialectic of 
rationality. By excluding from their analysis all but the 
most positivistic of sciences, neglecting the important role 
of reason in formulating standards of morality and justice 
during the modern epoch, and declaring that all contemporary 
art is simple entertainment, the fruitful contributions that 
the Enlightenment has made are ignored. In response, 
Habermas contends that the development of science has been 
driven by a rich internal dynamic, that enlightened 
conceptions of justice and morality tend toward universality 
and that the visions of avant-garde art have emancipatory 
possibilities. Habermas does not praise these qualities at 
the expense of the important critical insights provided by 
30 Juergen Habermas, "The Entwinement of Myth and 
Enlightenment," New German Critique, Fall (No. 18) pp. 29-43. 
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Horkheimer and Adorno. Rather, he takes their insights to be 
indicative of the need to rigorously apply critique to 
Enlightenment thought and social practices. In doing so, the 
normative content of modernity that remains undefiled by 
purposive rationality can be extracted and developed, 
continuing the dialectic of enlightenment. 
Habermas concludes by claiming that theory must accept 
the fact that myth and enlightenment are to a certain extent 
entangled. This does not mean, however, that social 
criticism should turn against rationality. Rather, it should 
accept, for pragmatic purposes, the presuppositions of 
rational discourse, allowing the efficacy of the better 
argument to shape social-political reality. "Only a 
discourse which admits this everlasting impurity can perhaps 
escape from myth, thus freeing itself, as it were, from the 
entwinement of myth and Enlightenment" (EME, page 30). 
At the programmatic level, Habermas and Foucault come 
down on the same foot. Both consider the aim of a politics 
of enlightenment to be that of generating critical insights 
that move in the direction of discourses of emancipation. At 
other levels, however, they are quite different. While 
Foucault sees little merit in what has taken place as a 
result of the historical Enlightenment, Habermas praises its 
contributions to Truth, Freedom, and Justice (the normative 
foundations of modernity). They differ significantly at the 
level of strategy as well; Foucault suggests the need for 
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transgression while Habermas seeks progression in the form 
of establishing a continuum with pure Enlightenment ideals. 
while both see the need for a notion of Enlightenment, 
Habermas' is unequivocally modern whereas Foucault moves in 
a postmodern direction. It is this direction that I will 
attempting to come to grip with in the pages that follow. 
Habermas' claim that there are unambiguously positive 
products of the Modern Enlightenment strikes me as being 
mistaken. The concepts of truth, freedom and justice to 
which he appeals are far more bound up in the capitalist 
economy of modernity than he cares to recognize. These are 
claims that I will develop in subsequent chapters. I will 
attempt to show that Habermas' own analysis of advanced 
capitalism in many ways confirms my position. It provides, 
in a sense, the prelude to a theory of the politics of 
enlightenment that moves beyond the normative structures of 
an unenlightened modernity. 
While the normative appeal of Habermas' communicative 
resolution to the impasse presented by the dialectic of 
enlightenment is strong, the force of Horkheimer's and 
Adorno's analysis causes one to question its viability. 
Furthermore, Habermas' most recent assessment of the late-
modern condition is even bleaker. He describes a scenario in 
which systems driven by money and power have come to 
permeate all spheres of human life. The following passage 
sums up his analysis: 
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The legal-administrative means of translating social-
welfare programs into action are not some passive, as 
it were, propertyless medium. They are connected, 
rather, with a praxis that involves isolation of facts, 
normalization, and surveillance, the reifying and 
subjectivating violence of which Foucault has traced 
right down into the most delicate capillary tributaries 
of everyday communication. The deformation of a 
lifeworld that is regulated, fragmented, monitored, and 
looked after are surely more subtle than the palpable 
forces of material exploitation and impoverishment; but 
internalized social conflicts that have shifted from 
the corporeal to the psychic are not therefore less 
destructive.~ 
In other words, a domineering modern system has chopped the 
modern lifeworld into bits and pieces, severely limiting the 
possibility for a politics of enlightenment. In spite of 
this, Habermas continues to insist, albeit in more localized 
form, that the appropriate strategy in light of this 
predicament is to form collectives of solidified 
consciousness that can establish patterns of communicative 
action within specifically politicized spheres. The aim is 
to "sensitize the self-steering mechanisms of the state and 
the economy to the goal oriented outcomes of radical 
democratic will formation" (PDM, 368). If Habermas' own 
characterization of advanced-capitalist society is taken 
seriously, however, then it would seem that the system is 
already beyond the point that it can be sensitized through 
reform movements. 
In this final phase of the politics of enlightenment we 
seem to have come full circle. On the one hand we have the 
31 Juergen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of 
Modernity, page 362. 
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noumenal factors that make it possible to theorize about 
ideal discourse; on the other we have the rational utility 
maximizers of advanced modern society who would make Kant's 
race of devils quake in their boots. While Habermas' attempt 
to mediate this discrepancy involves "building up 
restraining barriers for the exchange between system and 
lifeworld and of building in sensors for the exchange 
between lifeworld and system" (PDM, 364), I would argue that 
the more appropriate strategy is to break down or dismantle 
the structural barriers that prohibit the development of 
"radical democratic" political processes. In other words, if 
we are to thematize a politics of enlightenment that is 
appropriate to the aftermath of modernity, we can't simply 
rehash that which has brought us to the present impasse. 
WHAT IS ENLIGHTENMENT? 
The analysis that I have developed up to this point is 
provisional at best. My main objective has been to 
illustrate the claim that there is more than one way to 
develop a politics of enlightenment. The approaches 
suggested by both Habermas and Foucault have their 
respective merits and problems. I focus on these approaches 
for two main reasons: First, because Habermas' work is 
identified almost completely with the project of 
rehabilitating the idea of enlightenment after Horkheimer's 
and Adorno's critique; this is true to such a degree that 
the remainder of this book will focus on Habermas. Second, 
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because Foucault alludes to an approach to the question of 
enlightenment that moves away from the modernist conception 
that Habermas embraces. As such, he suggests the possibility 
of developing a theory of enlightenment that is compatible 
with conditions that I will refer to as the aftermath of 
modernity. Nevertheless, Foucault merely makes allusions 
whereas Habermas has a comprehensive theory. In the pages 
and chapters that follow I will aim at substantiating these 
allusions by way of a critique of Habermas that takes up the 
question of enlightenment in a serious fashion. This will 
require that I draw on a number of sources that may at 
first glance appear to run contrary to the objective of 
theorizing a politics of enlightenment. 
In order to begin thinking about such a politics I 
would like to turn to Derrida's essay "The Ends of Man. 1132 
I will argue that the title for this paper could just have 
easily have been, "What is enlightenment." In doing so I 
will attempt to show how Derrida's concluding remarks in 
this essay bear upon the fundamental Enlightenment values 
that Habermas so relentlessly defends, and to raise 
questions as to whether these are really the values that are 
seminal to enlightenment. 
I will begin, as does Derrida, with the question of 
internationalism. The context in which this paper was 
32 Jacques Derrida, "The Ends of Man," in Margins of 
Philosophy Alan Bass trans. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1982 (pp. 109-136). 
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presented, an international philosophical colloquium, 
prompts Derrida to consider the relationship between the 
political and the philosophical. His claim: "Every 
philosophical colloquium necessarily has a political 
significance." Further, he asserts that the international 
dimensions of this particular colloquium complicates its 
political significance. Finally, the specific events that 
were taking place at the time of this writing, "the weeks of 
the opening of the Vietnam peace talks and of the 
assassination of Martin Luther King," along with the fact 
that "the universities of Paris were invaded by the forces 
of order ... and then reoccupied by the students in the 
upheaval," further problematizes the question. What, then, 
does this have to do with internationalism, and, more 
importantly, what does internationalism have to do with 
enlightenment? The first aspect of this question, as Derrida 
indicates, presupposes the formation of national identities 
and assumptions about the conditions under which those 
identities can converge. These assumptions seem to be of an 
enlightenment bent: Derrida chooses to concentrate on 
certain democratic presuppositions which depend upon the 
nexus between a formal category and a practical orientation. 
This nexus is both the condition that gives rise to the 
possibility of internationalism--"the colloquium can take 
place only in a medium, or rather in the representation that 
all the participants must make of a certain transparent 
ether, which here would be none other than what is called 
the universality of philosophical discourse"--and the 
condition that brings about reaction when things begin to 
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get dangerous--"a declaration of opposition to some official 
policy is authorized, and authorized by the authorities, 
also means, precisely to that extent, that the declaration 
does not upset the given order, is not bothersome."~ 
Hence, internationalism is fundamentally communicative, but 
likewise is confounded both internally and externally by the 
limits of communication. 
With respect to the second aspect of the question, the 
relationship between internationalism and enlightenment, 
Kant's role becomes more explicit. In order to have 
enlightenment, we need to achieve perpetual peace, which 
necessitates the establishment of a world community. Kant is 
concerned with the role of law in the formation of such a 
community, but in the backdrop of his conception of law 
formation is an implicit appeal to the complex principle of 
democracy. Sorting through some of the loose threads here we 
can see the following set of conditions converging. 
Internationalism, as a political or even philosophical 
objective, presupposes some notion of enlightenment. At the 
same time it assumes some notion of nationality, which 
serves as the particular in relation to the international 
33 It should be quite clear how precisely this links up 
with Habermas' overriding goal in developing a theory of 
communicative action. 
55 
universal. This is mediated by a principle of democracy--
constituted at the nexus of form and content, theory and 
practice--which is driven by a set of principles that 
emerged within the context of the historical enlightenment. 
The field of enquiry circumscribed by this set of 
intersections establishes a context within which the 
question of enlightenment can be raised--by Derrida no less 
than Habermas. 
Returning to those enlightenment values to which 
Habermas constantly appeals--truth, freedom, and justice--I 
think it is safe to say two things: a) Derrida the 
philosopher doesn't oppose such values, but b) Derrida as 
the sort of postmodernist that Habermas characterizes34 him 
as being, does raise problematic questions about the "value" 
of these values. These questions revolve around how we "read 
us"--the way in which we interpret the limits and 
possibilities of collective social and political action. 
While I think that it would be wrong to say that Habermas 
doesn't carefully consider the possibility for social and 
political action, I also think he does so in a manner that 
confines these possibilities to a fixed understanding of 
what the term enlightenment can mean. The obvious reason for 
this is that the conception of enlightenment which rests at 
the base of his theory of communicative action requires a 
fairly straight forward understanding of the range of 
34 See George A. Trey, 1989. 
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possibilities for human aggregation. Following three points 
that Derrida makes at the end of "The Ends of Man" I would 
like to explore a somewhat different reading of collective 
action than Habermas' procedural approach allows. 
While Habermas is quite obviously interested in the 
conditions that must obtain in order for validity claims to 
be raised and redeemed, the analysis of these conditions 
forces him into the nebulous structures of the modern 
lifeworld. He accounts for these as linguistic structures 
and proceeds to consider the manner in which they lead to 
the production of meaningful utterances that can be put into 
play within specific forums of discourse. The relationship, 
in his analysis, between the lifeworld as the basis for 
discourse, and particular arenas of discourse, fails to 
consider any but a fairly conventional notion of 
enlightenment. This is the point at which Habermas resists 
reading collective action carefully enough. The 
appropriation of the linguistic basis of discourse within 
particular discursive formats is relatively unproblematic 
for Habermas. In a Derridean formulation, however, this is 
where semantic stability can be quite radically altered. As 
Derrida puts it, "it is a question of determining the 
possibility of meaning of the basis of a 'formal' 
organization which in itself has no meaning, which does not 
mean that it is either the non-sense or the anguishing 
absurdity which haunt metaphysical humanism." My sense is 
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that Habermas' concern with postmodernism is precisely this 
non-sense which Derrida is quite determined to distance 
himself from. At the same time he is careful not to retain a 
safe but implausible anthropology. While I won't attempt to 
spell out the full implications of Derrida's views on 
semantic indeterminacy at this point, I do want to emphasize 
that they seem to pose important questions concerning the 
relationship between the semantic mode of production that 
operates in Habermas' conception of the lifeworld and the 
value production that operates under conditions regulated by 
ideal speech. This, as I will discuss in the final chapter, 
raises challenges that must be addressed within the 
framework of the theory of communicative action. 
By introducing Derrida at this point I have simply 
intended to show that a serious enquiry into the prospects 
for enlightenment needs to take into consideration various 
possible approaches to the basic question of enlightenment. 
I will be pursuing these possibilities in the following 
chapters. Habermas may be right that the risk of exploring 
what lies beyond Enlightenment humanism is too great to 
consider. He likewise may be right that most of the 
theorists that "gesture" away from the Kantian project of a 
politics of enlightenment are risking the loss of 
enlightenment possibilities. At the same time, however, 
issues pertaining to culture, gender, and even class 
continue to play a marginal role in his analysis. For him 
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the basic form of enlightenment has already been determined 
by the normative developments of modernity. Derrida's 
counter-Enlightenment respect for alterity seems to be one 
way of keeping open the teleological question. In doing so 
it also preserves the question of enlightenment. 
My objective in this chapter has been to show that the 
question of enlightenment cannot be neatly compartmentalized 
as a subdivision of the debate between modernists and 
postmodernists. There is no compelling case to be made that 
a postmodern conception of enlightenment is impossible or 
even unlikely. I have argued that the common thread which 
runs through both approaches to the question of 
enlightenment can be traced back to Kant's writings on the 
subject in the waning years of the 18th century: a time when 
both the possibility for, and impossibility of, 
enlightenment was being expressed through new found freedoms 
as well as new forms of domination. This tension, which Kant 
was vaguely aware of, generated the dialectic of 
enlightenment that was taken up critically by Max Horkheimer 
and Theodor Adorno in the middle of the twentieth century. 
It is their essays which reintroduce the significance of 
grappling with the important questions that surround 
interpretations of the Enlightenment. I have argued, by 
appealing to the work of Habermas, Foucault and Derrida, 
that a number of resources must be brought to bear on the 
question of enlightenment if a fruitful theoretical model is 
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to be developed. 
rt is the development of this model that I will pursue 
in the chapters that remain. The issues introduced in this 
chapter--such as the modern/postmodern debate, the state of 
advanced capitalist societies, and the status of 
enlightenment norms--will be taken up in further detail. My 
intent in doing so is to thoroughly rethink the question of 
enlightenment in such a way that a concept of enlightenment 
that is relevant to the aftermath of modernity can be 
articulated. 
CHAPTER 2 
MODERNITY, LATE MODERNITY, POSTMODERNITY: 
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ENLIGHTENMENT 
The central question in chapter one concerned the 
conceptual status of "enlightenment." I argued there that a 
politics of enlightenment could be formulated without any 
necessary or absolute linkage to the historical Enlightenment: 
particularly the normative terms of the Enlightenment. The 
point in doing so was to show that enlightenment was not by 
necessity a product of modernity. This, of course, leads to 
complex issues concerning if and how modernity can be 
distinguished from postmodernity. In this chapter I will take 
up those issues directly. I will develop this along the 
following lines: 1) I will provide an analysis of Habermas' 
account of the development of modern societies up until the 
present; 2) I will then bring into play the views of several 
noted postmodernists that will serve as a critical foil to 
Habermas' defense of modernism; 3) finally, I will draw a 
distinction between descriptive and normative postmodernism 
that facilitates the development of the idea of the aftermath 
of modernity. 
Habermas on the Development of Modern Societies 
In Critique, Norm, and Utopia, Seyla Benhabib contends 
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that critical social theory must have two related components. 
The first, which she labels "explanatory-diagnostic, " utilizes 
empirical data, compiled through scientific research, to 
identify structural weaknesses in the existing social-
political system; the second, deemed the "anticipatory-
utopian" component, projects from this analysis a theory of 
transformation that aims at a more humane form of existence. 
Insofar as critical theory "addresses the needs and demands 
expressed by social actors," the second component must include 
a theory of action. With the advent of Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, critical theory all but lost this important 
feature--resigning it to quietism. 1 
Considering the historical circumstances faced by 
Horkheimer and Adorno, it is little wonder that critical 
theory reached a post-war stalemate. The "realities of the 
cold war, the moral and political horrors of Stalinism, and 
the conservative-restorationist tendencies of some Western 
democracies in the aftermath of WW II did not leave much room 
for hope. 112 Disillusioned by what they considered to be a 
pervasive instrumentalism that infects all forms of 
rationality, Horkheimer and Adorno lost faith in the 
scientific tools needed to develop the explanatory-diagnostic 
1986, p. 226. 
2 Ibid, p. 227. 
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phase of theory. 3 As such, their account of the concrete 
present (explanatory-diagnostic) did not give .rise to a 
remedial theory of social-political change (anticipatory-
• ) 4 utopian . 
3 As I mentioned in Chapter I, the analysis of post-war 
20th century society in Dialectic of Enlightenment is sobering 
to the point of leading one to quietism. The following samples 
form their most consequential subsequent works do little to 
dispel this deep pessimism: "The revolt of natural man--in the 
sense of the backward strata of the population--against the 
growth of rationality has actually furthered the formalization 
of reason, and has served to fetter rather than free nature. 
In this light, we might describe fascism as a satanic 
synthesis of reason and nature--the very opposite of that 
reconciliation of the two poles that philosophy has always 
dreamed of" (Horkheimer, 1974, pp. 122-3). "After the 
catastrophes that have happened, and in view of the 
catastrophes to come, it would be cynical to say that a plan 
for a better world is manifested in history and unites it. Not 
to be denied for that reason, however, is the unity that 
cements the discontinuous, chaotically splintered moments and 
phases of history--the unity of the control of nature, 
progressing to rule over men, and finally to that over men's 
inner nature. No universal history leads from savagery to 
humanitarianism, but there is one leading from the slingshot 
to the megaton bomb" (Adorno, 1973, p.320). Given the 
significance of Horkheimer's and Adorno's influence upon 
Habermas it is remarkable that he places so much stock in the 
rationality which his mentors so roundly criticized. Habermas 
would argue that both failed to recognize the reflexivity that 
developed in discourse during the modern epoch. As such, in 
systems where discursive communication is not systematically 
distorted (such as Nazi Germany--critical theory's paradigm 
case), norms of action can always be called into question in 
such a manner that reasons must be provided to support 
validity claims. I will take up Habermas' position later in 
this chapter. For his critique of Horkheimer and Adorno see 
chapter I. Also see Chapter V of The Philosophical Discourse 
of Modernity and Chapter IV of The Theory of Communicative 
Action. 
4 Habermas points out in "Psychic Thermidor and the 
Rebirth of Rebellious Subjectivity" that negative thinking, 
such as that of Horkheimer and Adorno, Doesn't have to result 
in lamenting the horrors of the present. The third key member 
of the Frankfurt school provides an alternative. "No doubt, 
Herbert Marcuse claimed negation to be the very essence of 
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Benhabib credits Habermas with reviving the two 
dimensional approach to critical theory. "In this respect, it 
is one of the great merits of Habermas' critical social theory 
to have restored that moment of genuine collaboration between 
philosophy and the social sciences, and to have developed an 
empirically fruitful explanatory-diagnostic theory of late-
capitalist societies. 115 By not ultimately passing judgment 
against reason, Habermas is able to utilize scientific 
analyses that cast the present in critical light without 
conceding a futuristic vision. In the section that follows I 
will focus on Habermas' account of advanced capitalist 
society. The questions that I will pursue are these: does 
Habermas' account of modern norms square with his analysis of 
thinking--as did Adorno and Horkheimer; but the driving force 
of criticism, of contradiction and contest carried him well 
beyond the limits of an accusation of unnecessary mischief. 
Marcuse moved further ahead. He did not hesitate to advocate, 
in an affirmative mood, the fulfillment of human needs, of the 
need for undeserved happiness, of the need for beauty, of the 
need for peace, calm, and privacy. Although, certainly, 
Marcuse was not an affirmative thinker, he nevertheless was 
the most affirmative among those that praised negativity. With 
him negative thinking negative thinking retained the 
dialectical trust in determinate negation, in the disclosure 
of possible alternatives" (Bernstein, 1985, p. 67). Marcuse 
has often been criticized for being hopelessly utopian. 
Habermas, nevertheless, applauds this up to a point. His 
primary disagreement with Marcuse pertains to the focal point 
of emancipatory rationality. For Marcuse, reason is embedded 
in human instinct (this view ties Marcuse to the same 
philosophy of nature that st if led Horkheimer and Adorno) 
whereas for Habermas it is to be found in communicative 
structures. See Habermas' and Marcuse's discussion of their 
respective views in "Theory and Politics: A Discussion with 
Herbert Marcuse, Juergen Habermas, Heinz Lubasz and Telman 
Spengler," in Telos, Vol 38 (1978-79) pp. 124-153). 
5 1986, p. 227. 
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the development of modern societies? And, does his final 
analysis of modern societies leave room for a politics of 
enlightenment? I will begin by examining Habermas' concern in 
the 70's with the question of political legitimation and will 
proceed to his more recent work where he develops a bilevel 
theory of society. 
While Habermas considers his project to be rooted in the 
marxist tradition, he recognizes the need to revise 
considerably the original critique of political economy. 
Marx's analysis of 19th century capitalism led to the 
conclusion that the economy would collapse under the pressure 
of its own contradictions, paving the way for an emancipated 
socialist future. 6To him it was inconceivable that political 
interventions would be used to off set self-contradictory 
patterns in the liberal market economy. 7This, however, is 
precisely what has happened. As a result, Marx's prediction 
6 This thesis is developed in a number of Marx's writings 
(many in collaboration with Engels). See for example Manifesto 
of the Communist Party, The Marx-Engels Reader, pp. 469-500. 
While Marx substantiates his theory with considerably more 
data in later works, such as the mammoth Capital, the general 
idea is conveyed effectively and enthusiastically in this 
pamphlet. 
7 See David Mclellan, Karl Marx: His Life and Thought, 
pp. 280-284. Here Mclellan provides an account of Marx's 
indebtedness to the bourgeois tradition of political-economy 
(Smith and Ricardo in particular). It seems quite clear that 
Marx never dreamed that the state would save capitalism 
through political intervention. This would run contrary to the 
enlightenment view (Smith's invisible hand) that things left 
to themselves always balance out. While Marx of course was 
highly critical of this theory, he didn't suspect that the 
political magnates operating the bourgeoisie superstructure 
would also recognize its limits. 
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that socialism and communism would replace capitalism has not 
. l" d 8 materia ize . 
It is generally agreed that Marx correctly assessed the 
crisis potential of liberal-capitalism; free market economies 
are undermined by their own dynamics. 9The 20th century 
scenario, however, is considerably more complex then the one 
faced by Marx, placing additional burdens on the social 
analyst. David Ingram sums this up as follows: 
For Marx, it was sufficient to show that so-called free 
exchange of equivalents in the market involved coercion, 
exploitation, and the promotion of class interests. But 
now that the state plays a leading role in manipulating 
the market, ideology critique can no longer take the form 
of a critique of the economy. Instead, it must focus on 
the legitimacy of political decisions that have been made 
through formal democratic channels. Justification for 
such a critique resides in the conviction that Western-
style democracies fall short of the standards of rational 
dialogue--equal access to publicity, freedom from 
systematically distorted communication, and so on--that 
they ostensibly embody (1987, p. 173). 
Habermas, in his reformulation of marxist analysis, focuses on 
the increasingly important role of the superstructure. 
Twentieth century capitalist economies are permeated with 
bureaucratic-administrative politics. As such: "A purely 
economic analysis is not basis for accurate prognoses. 1110 
8 Habermas considers Marx's fundamental error to be his 
failure to recognize the resilience of capitalism: 
"Capitalism's capacity to adapt is very great: it is an 
incredibly flexible order, which still possesses significant 
cultural and motivational reserves. It is surprising how it 
has been able to combine different forms of social 
integration." (Habermas: Autonomy and Solidarity, p. 64). 
9 See in particular Marx's Theory of Surplus Valu.e. 
10 Habermas: Autonomy and Solidarity, page 65. 
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This, of course, breaks sharply with classical marxism (the 
base/superstructure model): a necessary move given the present 
conditions. What Habermas retains of classical marxism is the 
conviction that theory and practice should not be sharply 
separated. "I'm convinced that the left in general, and the 
Marxist Left in particular, can claim one advantage over all 
other political forces. This is the belief in the possibility 
of introducing theoretical analyses with a middle or long-
range perspective into day-to-day politics (Dews, 1986, p.79). 
In the section that follows I will examine Habermas' 
assessment of liberal and advanced capitalism (explanatory-
diagnostic), using Legitimation Crisis (LC) as the main text. 
This provides an informative account of the conditions and 
tendencies prevalent in mature capitalist economies as well as 
the backdrop for his theory of social-political change 
(anticipatory-utopian) . Habermas argues that advanced-
capitalism, like capitalism in earlier forms, exhibits 
tendencies that will lead to crisis. He contends that the 
solution is a form of democracy premised on undistorted 
political discourse. My critical remarks will focus on the 
theory/practice issue. 
Habermas accounts for liberal-capitalism in terms of 
three criteria: The determining principle of organization, the 
possibility for social evolution and the types of crises that 
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develop. 11 The determining principle of social organization is 
located in the relationship between wage-labor and capital. 
This in turn is maintained through a system of prohibitive 
civil law. Economic activity is determined solely by the 
market; direction and maintenance are left to the "invisible 
hand." The invisible hand also serves as the primary social 
steering mechanism, resulting in a decentralized, 
depoliticized social structure. 12 Government is restricted to 
enforcing civil law, establishing minor economic regulations, 
satisfying needs that cannot be met by the private sector and 
11 Habermas uses these criteria for evaluating all 
societies. His analysis, which develops a "social-scientific 
concept of crisis" examines three increments of social 
evolution: primitive, traditional and liberal-capitalist (see 
chart in LC, p. 24). This exhibits Habermas' view that 
societies all evolve along similar lines which result in their 
either becoming Western-like or stagnating prior to that 
point. Benhabib is quite critical of this view. Developmental 
sequences cannot be determined with respect to social orders 
in the same way that they can in human individuals as their 
exists no determinate end to societies (I would contest that 
their is a determinate end for individuals also). As such, no 
conf irmable model by which existing societies can be measured 
for regressive or deviant developments is available. On the 
other hand, the future is always unknown and unknowable; there 
is no available data about futures which allows the theorist 
to do more than anticipate and project what will be. "To put 
the objection I am raising to Habermas in a nutshell: if the 
problem with early critical theory seemed to be that their 
conception of utopian reason was so esoteric as not to allow 
embodiment in the present, the difficulty with Habermas' 
concept is that it seems like such a natural outcome of the 
preset that it is difficult to see what would constitute an 
emancipatory break with the present if communicative 
rationality were fulfilled (Benhabib, 1986, 276-7). This is a 
crucial point. My central argument against Habermas will take 
this up in subsequent chapters. 
• 
12 I am of course referring here to Adam Smith's famous 
invisible hand metaphor. See Smith, 1937, p. 423. 
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structuring an environment that is conducive to accumulating 
wealth. The potential for social evolution is intensified in 
liberal-capitalism as the development of industry greatly 
increases productive capacity. Further, the relationship 
between the state and economy is refined and minimized. A 
"production morality" also emerges (Weber's protestant work 
ethic) which emphasizes accumulation of wealth while 
sidestepping the "traditional" mediations that limit the free 
movement of capital (LC, pp. 20-22). 
Crisis tendencies in liberal-capitalism are all linked in 
some way to the opposition between wage-labor and capital. 
Class domination is exposed when standards of living for 
laborers become intolerable. At this point social-structural 
deficiencies are manifest, resulting in a crisis which moves 
quickly from the economy to all components of the social 
system. Due to the rapidity with which crises reach system 
threatening proportions, liberal-capitalism evolves into 
advanced capitalism. A considerably larger role is now played 
by the administrative-political system, making previously 
explicit class domination less evident. 13 As such, 
13 This occurs in several ways, the most obvious of which 
is to "buy off the proletariat." Wages are much higher but the 
worker is still at the mercy of the industrial complex. 
Another way is through the shifts in class. Marx's model holds 
that classes are defined purely in terms of socio-economic 
status and that this is reducible to the distinction between 
owner and worker. In advanced-capitalism different 
distinguishing characteristics become more determinate. For 
example, the rise of "pink collar workers", women in low 
paying service jobs, indicates that gender plays an important 
role in exploitation in advanced capitalism. See Ben Agger, 
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legitimation deficits initially go undetected as the economic 
trauma that clarifies them is clouded by interventionary 
programs (LC, p. 23). 
Advanced-capitalism is based on three internal systems: 
the economic system, the administrative system, and the 
legitimation system. The economic system is foundational and 
is composed of three subsystems: 1) the competitive market 
system which is characterized by labor intensive production, 
low salary levels and a lack of rationalization; 2) the 
monopoly market system where production is capital intensive, 
labor is well paid and there is a high level of 
rationalization; and 3) the system that serves the needs of 
the government (military, infrastructure maintenance, etc.) 
which is both labor and capital intensive, supports a well 
organized labor force and is not highly rationalized (LC, p. 
34). 
The input for the economic system is labor and capital; 
the output is consumer products. It is at the output level 
that crisis tendencies appear due to breakdowns in 
distribution regulation. This results in a crisis in 
government finance, permanent inflation, public poverty and a 
disparate concentration of wealth. Insofar as the government 
plays a critical role in the administration of the economy, 
economic crises place pressure on the political administrative 
"The Dialectic of Deindustrialization: An Essay on Advanced 
Capitalism", in Forester, 1985, pp. 9, 10, 16-19. 
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system (LC, 45-46). 
The primary function of the political-administrative 
system is to replace the liberal market with a global 
regulatory strategy that seeks to sustain economic growth, 
establish a stable currency, minimize unemployment and 
maintain a balance of trade. 14 Doing so requires a number of 
interventions: the state coordinates international economic 
activities by forming blocks, facilitating imperialistic 
ventures and monitoring trade when unfavorable imbalances 
develop; the domestic economy is bolstered by government 
contracts for non-consumable products (military spending and 
certain types of technological projects), stimulating the 
economy by creating jobs (at a number of levels) and using raw 
materials; sectors of the population that are economically 
marginalized by the market receive compensation through 
social-welfare programs; both the material and immaterial 
infrastructures are maintained and improved; various levels of 
public education are made available so that productivity can 
increase across the board; and the costs of capitalism's 
negative side effects, such as unemployment and environmental 
pollutants, are covered (LC, pp. 35-36 and LPC, p. 647). 
The input for this system is public loyalty; the output 
is a range of administrative decisions that are executed 
through sovereign authority. Administrative failure leads to 
14 In addition to Legitimation Crisis I am drawing upon 
Habermas' essay "What does Crisis Mean Today? Legitimation 
Problems in Late Capitalism" (LPC). 
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a rationality crisis which generates a legitimation crisis as 
the "masses" retract their loyalty. "The legitimation crisis 
is directly an identity crisis. It does not proceed by way of 
endangering system integration, but results from the fact that 
the fulfillment of governmental planning tasks places in 
question the structure of the depoliticized public realm and 
thereby, the formally democratic securing of the private 
autonomous disposition of the means of production." At this 
level, crisis threatens the entire system (LC, pp. 46-47). 
These crisis phenomena are reflected in the socio-
cultural system which has as its input the output form the 
previous two systems. Disturbances produced by output crises 
in these systems lead to withdrawal of public support for the 
system as a whole which threatens its legitimacy. Insofar as 
the output of the legitimation system is social integration, 
crisis here leads to a motivation crisis: unwillingness on the 
part of the public to perform economically necessary tasks. 
Only a rigid sociocultural system, incapable of being 
randomly f unctionalized for the needs of the 
administrative system, could explain how legitimation 
difficulties result in a legitimation crisis. This 
development must therefore be based on a motivation 
crisis--i.e. a discrepancy between the need for motives 
that the state and the occupational system announce and 
the supply of motivation offered by the sociocultural 
system (LPC, p. 660). 
Habermas claims that this crisis sequence is a "consequence of 
the fundamental contradictions of the capitalist system." the 
economic system fails to meet the consumptive needs of the 
population and the political system is unable to compensate 
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through rational administrative decision making. This renders 
the system of legitimation (which is central to the 
preservation of the system in general) ineffective, creating 
a motivation crisis that cripples the socio-cultural system. 
Therefore, the crisis center is at the level of legitimation 
(LC, 48-49). 
Given the centrality of legitimation crisis in Habermas' 
analysis of advanced-capitalism, as well as his normative 
theory, further consideration is warranted. In "Legitimation 
Problems in the Modern State" (LPMS), Habermas documents the 
importance of political legitimation in the development of the 
• bourgeois epoch. A political institution's ability to 
establish societal norms depends upon its claim to legitimacy. 
For the modern state this is particularly important as 
democratization and the emergence of a public realm that is 
accessible to the masses places increasing demands on the 
means by which legitimacy is established and maintained. 
Whereas previously legitimacy claims were substantiated by an 
appeal to the authority of a higher order (god or church), now 
they must be redeemed as validity claims in a process of 
political discourse (LPMS, pp. 178-183). 
With the replacement of traditional means of legitimation 
by a rational-discursive mode, formal conditions of 
justification needed to be established. Two competing models 
emerged: state of nature theories and transcendental theories. 
The former argues that will formation is shaped by an original 
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social agreement, while the latter claims that it follows from 
a set of universal presuppositions. While in many respects 
these two theories are at odds, they share the view (which is 
all important for Habermas) that legitimation must be the 
product of consensus rather than an appeal to de facto 
authority. "In both traditions, it is the formal conditions of 
possible consensus formation, rather than ultimate grounds, 
which possess legitimating force." The objective is to 
establish a political order that would be agreeable to 
everyone on the basis of arguments forwarded in an arena of 
free discourse. This requires a communicative structure within 
which valid and invalid claims can be distinguished. "Only the 
rules and communicative presuppositions that make it possible 
to distinguish an accord or agreement among free and equals 
from a contingent or forced consensus have legitimating force 
today." Malfunctions in this communicative structure confound 
the norm producing capacity of the modern state (LPMS, pp. 
184-188). 
While the original ideal of the modern state was 
political minimalism, as the industrial revolution blossomed 
and the popular masses began to feel the contradictions of 
large scale capitalism, it became clear that the state would 
have to take a more active role (as I discussed above). This 
leads to a paradox which makes the late modern state 
precariously susceptible to legitimation crises. 
On the one hand, the definition of deficiencies and the 
criteria of success of dealing with them arise in the 
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domain of political goal-settings that have to be 
legitimated; for the state has to deploy legitimate power 
if it takes on the catalog of tasks mentioned above. On 
the other hand, in this matter the state cannot deploy 
legitimate power in the usual way, to push through 
binding decisions, but only to manipulate the decisions 
of others, whose private autonomy many not be violated. 
Indirect control is the answer to the dilemma, and the 
limits to the effectiveness of indirect control signal 
the persistence of this dilemma (LPMS, pp. 195-6). 
Insofar as the legitimacy of the state rests primarily on its 
ability to maintain the economy, it will remain intact only if 
one or the other of two sufficient conditions is met: l) that 
it continues to successfully suppress economic dysfunctions; 
or 2) that the modern standard of acceptable legitimation is 
lowered. Meeting the first condition is confounded by the 
dynamic of the economy; meeting the second condition is 
regressive and contrary to explicit modern ideals. Hence, a 
legitimation crisis is virtually inevitable (LPMS, pp. 195-
200). 
A legitimation crisis would make explicit the scope of 
administrative functions, exhibiting the lack of traditional 
legitimacy and issuing in an unprecedented mandate for 
discursive processes of legitimation. "Thus, the forcible 
shift of things that have been culturally taken for granted 
further politicizes areas of life that previously could be 
assigned to the private domain." This, for Habermas, sets the 
stage for either a re-politicized public realm of discourse or 
a regression to some form of totalitarianism (LPC, pp. 655-
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660) • 15 
Legitimation crises occur mainly because the general 
population has been excluded from "meaningful" participation 
in the political sphere. So long as the powers that be can 
disguise the lack of genuine democracy by administering to the 
consumptive wants and needs of the people, deep systemic 
problems remain latent (specifically the problem of class 
conflict--LPC p. 659). They will surface, however (Habermas 
argues), when the internal contradictions of the welfare state 
economy become manifest. As such, a remedy that establishes 
meaningful political participation must be developed or modern 
society will become vulnerable to totalitarian domination. 
If this is correct, a legitimation crisis can be avoided 
in the long run if the latent class structure of advanced 
capitalist societies are transformed or if the pressure 
for legitimation to which the administrative system is 
subject can be removed. The latter, in turn, could be 
achieved by transposing the integration of inner nature 
in toto to another mode of socialization, that is, by 
uncoupling it from norms that need justification (LC, 
p.94). 
Insofar as the former is obviously preferable, the 
anticipatory-utopian dimension of theory must point toward a 
system in which dialogical participation provides 
15 When asked why advanced-capitalist countries have not 
yet experienced legitimation crises, Habermas' response is 
simply that we tend toward crisis; it cannot be determined at 
what point irremedial economic dysfunctions will emerge as 
actual crises. He does, however, identify the following 
phenomena as strong indicators that crisis is immanent: 
failure to vote by a large percentage of the population, 
disintegration of the two party system, success of a third 
party platform and the emergence of a socio-economic class 
that experiences a great deal of discomfort. See Dews, 1986, 
p. 66. 
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legitimation. That this is possible, according to Habermas, is 
formally demonstrated through an analysis of the universal-
pragrnatic content of speech acts. The following provides an 
account of Habermas' attempt to develop the results of his 
reconstruction of communicative action into an anticipatory-
utopian theory. 
This theory rests on the view that practical questions 
(questions of norms and action) can be responded to with 
claims that have universal validity: "that the values and 
norms in accordance with which motives are formed have an 
immanent relation to truth" (LC, p. 95). As such, moral 
development can be "logically reconstructed," facilitating the 
explanation of motivational development. This is significant 
in that at the highest developmental stages of moral 
consciousness, a universal morality emerges that is rooted in 
a "fundamental norm of rational speech" (LC, p. 95). Hence, a 
connection is drawn between rationally conducted discourse and 
the establishment of universal norms. This indicates that 
there can be a link between legitimation and truth--something 
which "must be presumed to exist if one regards as possible a 
motivation crisis resulting from a systematic scarcity of the 
resource of meaning" (LC, 97). 
Legitimation claims without truth content suffice for 
psychological purposes only; when crises arise they lose their 
effectiveness. This creates something of a dilemma, as the 
claim that practical statements can have truth content is at 
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best dubious. In defense of his position Habermas appeals to 
the consensus theory of truth. In discourse, the validity of 
a norm is argumentatively tested by the constituency that it 
will effect. This . produces rational agreement that can be 
subjected to further discursive scrutiny if deemed 
appropriate. Discursively established norms are true insofar 
as general agreement is the criterion for truth (LC, pp. 104-
106). In a later formulation Habermas provides these criteria 
for normatively redeeming validity claims: l) the statement 
must be true; 2) it must be appropriate to the relevant 
normative context; and 3) the speaker's intention must be 
properly expressed and received. "Thus the speaker claims 
truth for statements or existential propositions, rightness 
for legitimately regulated actions and their normative 
context, and truthfulness or sincerity for the manifestation 
of subjective experience" (1985, pp. 163-4). Truth content is 
embedded in the propositional component of any speech-act 
uttered in discourse; and truth is the foundation for 
universality. As such, all utterances that meet these three 
requirements, discursively tested under appropriate 
conditions, can be deemed universally valid. 
The truth value of an established norm is not equal to a 
deduction. Truths of this sort (such as those in mathematics 
or formal logic) have no practical consequence in the 
political sphere. Practical truth, for Habermas, is the 
product of a process in which 11 substantial arguments 11 are 
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validated through a discursive procedure that goes beyond the 
analysis of abstract sentences (as is the case with the formal 
logical analyses of some trends in analytic philosophy); 
validity is determined by an analysis of the content 
established through a series of coherently connected sentences 
which are shaped in the course of argumentation. The result is 
acceptance or rejection of validity claims that have been 
procedurally clarified (LC, p. 107). 
With this in mind, Habermas lays out a platform for 
discourse on practical questions (this is a practical 
interpretation of the ideal speech situation). Discourse, as 
he defines it in this context, is a communicative form that 
takes place outside the realm of "experience and action" (LC, 
p. 107). The general rules are: that the topics under 
discussion be limited to validity claims; that types of 
arguments remain unrestricted with the exception that they 
stick to the validity claim in question; that the only force 
employed be argumentative; and that there be no self-
interested motives. Dialogue under these conditions results in 
the establishment of norms that reflect the general interest 
of participants (LC p. 107-108). Habermas considers this to be 
an idealized model for public debate concerning questions 
pertinent to the life of a community. Its viability rests on 
the purportedly established fact that the intersubjective 
structures of language usage allow for agreement on questions 
of practice that can be translated into universal norms. As 
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such, there is no need for a higher order of validation than 
consensus. 
In support of this Habermas argues that the hypothetical 
ideal speech situation (the above described platform) is the 
presupposition underlying any communicative practice. It is 
the prerequisite for acceptance of the fundamental norms of 
rational speech. The ideal speech situation, coupled with the 
language of discourse (natural language) provides the 
theoretical ground for politically determined universal norms. 
"This, if you will, transcendental character of ordinary 
language ... can be reconstructed in the framework of a 
universal pragmatics" (LC, p. 110"). 
In summary, Habermas' explanatory-diagnostic analysis of 
late modern capitalism reveals that the dominant mode of 
action is strategic. This operates via a distorted 
communicative medium that relies on perlocutionary force to 
accomplish purposively defined objectives (those of the 
political regime or the monopolized capitalist complex). While 
considerably more systematic than Horkheimer's and Adorne's 
analysis in Dialectic of Enlightenment, the conclusions do not 
conflict. Habermas, however, is not resigned to quietism, as 
would seem to be the case under one reading of his mentors. In 
his reconstruction of language usage he points out that the 
distorted communication patterns that operate under the 
advanced-capitalist rationality paradigm exclude the 
intersubjective aspect of the double dimensional semantic 
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structure that is characteristic of ordinary language. By 
reactivating the intersubjective element, via a systemic shift 
towards substantive political discourse, the way toward a 
society that operates on the basis of communicative rather 
than strategic action is paved. The main point of Habermas' 
anticipatory-utopian theory is that increasing democratization 
through a revitalization of the presently distorted realm of 
public communication is the only palpable solution to the 
crises of the welfare state. 16 
At this point I would like to raise several issues that 
will be developed more thoroughly in subsequent chapters. 
These comments will thematize the reservations that I have 
about the relationship between theory and practice in 
Habermas' work (this will be addressed more directly in 
chapter IV). As I noted in chapter I, Habermas is sympathetic 
to, while still critical of, the aspirations of the 
Enlightenment. At the core of enlightened thought is the 
16 See Habermas' discussion in "Conservatism and 
Capitalist Crisis" in Dews, 1986, pp. 67-68. Here he states in 
unequivocal terms that democratic forms of life are part of 
the human telos (or one might say human nature). This seems to 
cohere with the claim that intersubjective communication is 
the telos of language. Neither of these assertions can be 
verified empirically or argued for convincingly. Habermas' 
enlightenment aspirations clearly shape his interpretation of 
human nature and the ends of language. This also represents a 
reaction to the "stalemated" critical theory that emerges 
after Dialectic of Enlightenment. A I will argue later, a 
shift away from the goals of the Enlightenment does not 
necessarily lead to pessimistic quietism. While I agree that 
participatory forms of government is the route to go, I see no 
reason to think that social evolution will lead to this. As 
such, normative theory needs to consider strategies that 
promote more revolutionary modes of action. 
81 
notion that all human enterprises must proceed from 
demonstrable foundations. Habermas contends that relinquishing 
this in the political sphere leads either to quietism (which 
he claims is the case with Horkheimer and Adorno) or, worse 
yet, political nihilism (which he associates with 
poststructuralism). Habermas considers a reformulated 
Enlightenment project, with built in reflexivity, to be the 
way out of the predicaments of late capitalism. I will now 
point out--in the spirit of Habermas' own appeal to internal 
critique--several "enlightened" elements of his thought that 
could have been reflected on more carefully. 
As I just indicated, when the subterranean crises of 
advanced capitalism surface, two distinct political 
alternatives emerge: democratization and totalitarianism. It 
can be well documented historically that popular uprisings 
often lapse into totalitarianism; Nazi Germany serves as the 
paradigm for Habermas' concern with this possibility. Insofar 
as this is obviously undesirable, some form of initial 
direction is necessary if responses to late modern crises are 
not to turn into postmodern nightmares. Enter the enlightened 
social analyst. 17 Habermas develops the model for this in an 
early essay, "On Systematically Distorted Communication," 
17 See Habermas' introduction to Theory and Practice, 
"Some Difficulties in the Attempt to Link Theory and Praxis". 
The section subtitled "Objectivity of knowledge and interest" 
is particularly relevant to the argument that I am developing. 
It fails to meet my objections for reasons that will become 
clear shortly. 
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(Which I will discuss in chapter III) and seems to uphold it 
in his more recent work as well. I want to be quite clear that 
the model, as I am construing it, is an interpretation of the 
perspective from which the theory of communicative action is 
constructed; it is not a critique of the theory itself nor a 
contention that Habermas would describe his own view of social 
science as I do in my interpretation. My concern is to show 
that when the relationship between analyst and analysand is 
based on this quasi-medicinal (Habermas himself comments on 
the oddity of using medical terminology) model, the normative 
implications of that analysis will be skewed by an imbalance 
of power. The analyst tacitly purports to have a more 
enlightened perspective and as such can legitimately prescribe 
curative measures for social-political ills. This may or may 
not cause difficulties in the case of the simple relationship 
between a psychoanalyst and her/his patient. When magnified to 
the dimension of the relationship between the social-analyst 
and the social body, however, a different problematic emerges. 
While in the analyst's eyes the source of crisis is 
systematically distorted communication which prohibits 
meaningful political participation, in the eyes of the general 
public (according to Habermas) the only indication of crisis 
will be a failure on the part of the state to ensure that all 
of their wants and needs are met. This indicates that the 
standards of legitimacy are different from the perspective Qf 
enlightened science then from that of the average consumer. 
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The analyst's task is to demonstrate that substantive 
democracy, not the potential to accumulate exorbitant wealth, 
or even to merely subside is where the true wants and true 
needs of the populous reside. If this can be accomplished, the 
transition towards a society defined by communicative action 
will begin. As a result, the general interest will become 
increasingly manifest which in turn contributes to the 
establishment of universal norms of action. 
A theoretical projection of this sort, however, relies on 
two questionable assumptions that reflect Habermas' 
Enlightenment orientation. The first assumption is that the 
scientific sphere of society (upon which the analyst depends) 
can gain objective distance from the political and economic 
spheres, enabling an accurate analysis. While Habermas quite 
clearly recognizes the degree to which distorted communication 
and strategic action have infected the economic and political 
systems, he fails to consider the possibility that the 
sciences reflect these problems as well. His rebuttal to this 
would be that the sciences are by definition formally in the 
realm of disinterested discourse and as such have the 
potential for making objective pronouncements without becoming 
completely detached from specific interests. 18 In taking this 
stance Habermas is attempting to defend one of the most 
contested planks of the Enlightenment platform. 
18 See Habermas' discussion of the Heidelberg Research 
Project in Systems Analysis in Towards a Rational Society, pp. 
70-73, for an example of this. 
84 
such an assumption is problematic in two specific 
respects: first, the gap between the standards of legitimacy 
adhered to by the enlightened scientist and the average 
consumer is obvious and can only be narrowed if the predicted 
economic crisis occurs. As will be evident shortly, however, 
Habermas' most recent analysis of the late modern condition--
and the type of problems it generates--is less committed to 
the inevitability of economic collapse. While he continues to 
be interested in the economic dynamics that could lead to 
substantial political change, he likewise acknowledges that 
capitalism has a remarkable ability to survive. This places 
additional pressure on the embedded Enlightenment premise that 
the only happy, healthy society is one in which the citizenry 
actively contributes to the determination of patterns of 
collective activity. The fact that public demand for this is 
not exerted when the economy is operating smoothly indicates 
that there is a serious bifurcation between the ideals of the 
Enlightenment and the standards of consumer societies. Second, 
it fails to take into account the degree to which the economic 
and administrative systems in advanced-capitalist societies 
can infiltrate the spheres of scientific--including social 
scientific in the form of ideology--research. In the same way 
that workers can be politically neutralized by higher wages, 
etc., the scientist can be co-opted by government sponsored 
grants that steer research in the direction of strictly 
economic interests, high paying private sector jobs that place 
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the scientist in settings where scientific discovery is 
subordinated to corporate profit, and the general consumer 
ethos that prevails in advanced-capitalist societies. In other 
words, the production of truth can easily be reduced to the 
production of commodities. 
The problem in general is this: there is a gap between 
the ideals of enlightened science and the objectives of 
consumer societies. It is possible that if this gap is to be 
narrowed, enabling Enlightenment ideals to play a more 
important political role, then there will have to be some type 
of economic crisis. Unless this takes place, enlightened 
science won't have any social-political impact. The other 
direction in which this gap can narrow is toward what I 
referred to as the consumer ethos of advanced capitalism. This 
seems to be the more likely case given the survivability of 
the capitalist economy. Under such an arrangement, science is 
assimilated by economic imperatives that render it potentially 
dangerous. While I disagree with Habermas as to the exact role 
played by science in a theory of social-political change, I do 
agree that obtaining relevant social-scientific knowledge 
contributes to the process of social-political transformation. 
Nevertheless, it must be dealt with cautiously or science 
(including social science) will contribute to the domination, 
rather than liberation of humanity. This is precisely the 
concern of Horkheimer and Adorno. "Knowledge, which is power, 
knows no obstacles: neither in the enslavement of men nor in 
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compliance with the world's rulers" (DE, p. 4). 
The communicative practices that have constituted the 
modern sciences that Habermas depends upon are bound up in the 
same general discourse as their economic and political 
counterparts: the discourse of modernity. Habermas would 
contend that the sciences accommodate a moment of internal 
reflection. This, however (as he points out), was the ideal of 
the modern state as well. In both cases these ideals are 
subject to corruption: a corruption that I would argue is the 
product of the way that power and knowledge interpenetrate 
under the rationality paradigm of capitalism. The consequence 
for action is that the already empowered continue to define 
emancipation in terms of their own interests. As such, a 
democracy as vacuous as bourgeois democracy is likely to 
obtain. 19 The second enlightenment assumption that is 
apparent, and problematic, in Habermas' solution to the crisis 
19 Ben Agger, in "A Critical Theory of Discourse," an 
article that contests the practicability of Habermas' theory 
of discourse, indicates the importance of the powerless 
setting the agenda for dialogue. While Agger regresses in the 
direction of orthodox Marxism at times, and settles for the 
philosophically questionable theories of Herbert Marcuse, this 
~s a crucial point that Habermas fails to accommodate. By 
insisting on a movement towards discursive symmetry by way of 
therapeutically transforming those who are not presently 
competent, he ignores the fact that within the boundaries of 
~any populist movements symmetry already exists, and that this 
is a source of power. I would argue that the power embodied in 
these corporate units should be exercised against the 
established sectors of power. This of course pi ts power 
against power--something that rationalists like Habermas would 
loathe. My argument will be that this is necessary if the gap 
between the empowered and the subordinated in late modern 
society is to be dissolved. 
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conditions of advanced-capitalism emerges in his 
characterization of the potential for communicative action. 
For Habermas this is rooted in the development of linguistic 
capabilities. As rationality develops, and becomes sedimented 
in natural languages, communicative practices tend to reflect 
a tacit reliance on the regulative principles of ideal speech. 
In turn, human coexistence moves toward a corresponding ideal 
that is rooted in communicative rationality and action. 20 This 
view follows from the universal pragmatic theory of language 
and communication (which is heavily dependent on sciences such 
as linguistics and psychology), a formal reconstruction that 
abstracts from concrete historical and political realities. 
Guided by the assumption that humanity evolves progressively 
and that reason is ultimately the driving force of this 
movement, Habermas conflates the formal model of linguistic 
development with social-political evolution. As both his 
empirical assessment, and Horkheimer's and Adorno's critique, 
reveal, human reason does not exhibit a discernible 
developmental pattern that verifies this. In fact the power-
knowledge model suggested by Horkheimer and Adorno seems to be 
based on more concrete evidence. 21 
2° For a critical discussion of this see Anthony Giddens' 
"Reason Without Revolution? Habermas' Theorie des 
kommunikativen Handelns", in Bernstein, 1985, pp. 95-121. See 
in particular pp. 112-121. 
21 For Habermas' view of social evolution see Legitimation 
Crisis, pp. 20-23. His view is that all societies evolve along 
similar lines in a manner that is characterized by increasing 
rationality and increasing freedom. For a critique of this see 
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This does not establish that the authors of Dialectic of 
filllightenment are right and Habermas is wrong. It merely 
redefines their points of contention. Further, Habermas has 
carefully revealed the paradox that in his judgment freezes 
Horkheimer and Adorno in their tracks: you can't use reason to 
completely obliterate reason.~Nevertheless, if the 
anticipatory-utopian dimension of Habermas' theory is to 
succeed (even on a strictly theoretical level), so must the 
theory of language and communication which, as I will argue in 
chapter III, is bound up with the normative theory of 
modernity in a problematic fashion. 
I have raised these concerns at the present jµncture to 
introduce the idea that there are radical discrepancies 
between the normative content of modernity and the practices 
that define it socially, politically and economically. This 
leads to further questions pertaining to what it means to say 
we live in a modern society and can tap into its enlightenment 
resources for the sake of bringing about emancipatory 
transformations. In the section that follows I will argue that 
Habermas' more recent analysis of contemporary Western 
societies pushes him in the direction of concessions to the 
descriptive claims of postmodernists such as Lyotard and 
Jameson. This in turn, I will claim, has further implications 
Benhabib, 1986, pp. 270-277. 
22 See "The Entwinement of Myth and Enlightenment", The 
Theory of Communicative Action, and The Philosophical 
Q..iscourse of Modernity. 
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for the status of his normative theory. 
In the segment that follows I will discuss some of 
Habermas' recent work, concentrating on the second volume of 
I)le Theory of Communicative Action CTCA:2) and an essay titled 
"The New Obscurity: The Crisis of the Welfare State and the 
Exhaustion of Utopian Energies" ( TNO) . Habermas' latest 
assessment of modernity in general and advanced-capitalism in 
particular takes as its point of departure a critical 
reformulation of the system-theoretic model of society (a 
model that dominated Habermas' work in the 70' s). Systems 
theory views society in terms of functions that are 
coordinated with respect to the social system in general. This 
model, Habermas argues, fails to account for the role played 
by the lif eworld in the process of rational differentiation 
that is necessary for a functionally organized society to 
evolve in the first place. He proposes, in response, a bilevel 
theory of society: one which recognizes the relations that 
exist between system and lif eworld and the extent to which 
they have developed and been damaged during the modern epoch. 
Habermas takes careful note in this context of the 
paradox that emerges with respect to action motivation in the 
modern period. On the one hand, due to rationalization, 
secularization and differentiation within the lif eworld, 
modernity meets the conditions necessary for consensus 
formation to coordinate social action. On the other hand, due 
to the huge need for coordination in a social order that has 
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grown increasingly complex, non-linguistic "steering media" 
(money and power) play a more dramatic role. As efficiency is 
of paramount importance to the capitalist economy, it is the 
latter mode of action coordination that comes to dominate, 
relegating the lifeworld to subsystem status. 
My primary concern will be with Habermas' recognition of 
the way that subsystemic units interact with one another via 
steering media and the degree to which this subdues available 
lifeworld resources. This analysis, I will suggest, conflicts 
with the view that language has as its telos intersubjective 
communication. In response I will continue to argue that 
language merely has the potential for numerous other 
communicative and action coordinating modes. This critique 
will be developed largely in the chapter V. Habermas has 
adequately demonstrated the potential for intersubjective 
communication (explanatory-diagnostic) and has convincingly 
argued that a society based on communicative action is 
desirable (anticipatory-utopian). Between these two 
theoretical propositions, however, is a huge gap that is 
filled with the tangled bureaucracies of advanced-capitalism 
(which are particularly void of communicative action 
coordination). My argument here, and in the remainder of this 
book, will be that Habermas' theory doesn't allow for a praxis 
that can bridge the gap between communicative potential and a 
communication based social reality. Another way of putting 
this would be that Habermas fails to allow for a politics of 
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enlightenment that is adequate to the task of dealing with the 
adversity plagued aftermath of modernity. 
Habermas' aim in his conceptualization of the lifeworld 
is to avoid the pitfalls of the phenomenological model 
developed by Shutz and Luckrnann. 23 They, in line with 
traditional phenomenology, start from the standpoint of the 
abstract subject. "Like Husserl, they begin with the 
egological consciousness for which the general structures of 
the lifeworld are given as necessary subjective conditions of 
the experience of a concretely shaped, historically stamped, 
social lifeworld;" (TCA:2, p. 129). The strength of this 
position is that the lifeworld is conceived as a socio-
historically developed backdrop for action. The chief problem 
lies with the assumption that the acting subject is 
fundamental. In contrast, Habermas argues, the subject is 
always formed in contexts of intersubjectivity that are rooted 
in the communicative structures of the lifeworld (TCA:2, pp. 
126-135). 
As conceived by Habermas, the lifeworld serves as the 
"horizon and backdrop of communicative action", a pool of 
already give resources that can be readily thematized within 
contexts of discourse. 
description of three 
His characterization begins with a 
actor/world relations. Each time a 
speech-act is uttered one of three world domains is explicitly 
thematized: the objective world which is the domain of 
23 See Shutz and Luckrnann, 1973. 
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external things; the subjective world which is the domain of 
internal experience; and the social world which is the domain 
shared in common by a community of actors. In addition to the 
explicitly thematized relation, the other two relations are 
implicitly thematized, thus creating in each act a network of 
overlapping worlds. It is this network that constitutes the 
above mentioned pool of resources, situating a communication 
dynamic that proceeds by defining and redefining the 
communicative possibilities available at any give time. "These 
redefinitions are based on suppositions of commonality in 
respect to the objective, social, and each's own subjective 
world. With this reference system, participants in 
communication suppose that the situation definitions forming 
the background to an actual utterance hold intersubjectively" 
(TCA: 2, 120-22). 
In each specific communication situation, pertinent 
content is drawn from the lifeworld. This points to the 
variability of lifeworld contexts relative to the situation 
being defined. Habermas accounts for this in terms of three 
lifeworld dimensions that correspond with the above mentioned 
actor/world relations. The spatio-temporal dimension, which 
corresponds with the relation to the objective world, varies 
relative to the world that is available to the actor. This is 
delimited by such things as communication opportunities and 
transportation technology. The social dimension, which 
corresponds with the relation to the social world, varies 
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relative to the specific collectivity of which the actor is 
part. This is delimited by the role of the actor and the scope 
of the world in which he/she acts (this might be a 
neighborhood for one person, a country for another and the 
entire world for another). The personal dimension, which 
corresponds with the relation to the subjective world, varies 
relative to personal background experiences of actors. This is 
delimited in terms of the social dimension to which an actor 
is bound. Themes of action, and their attendant plans, will 
shift with respect to context variability. These shifts effect 
both the focal point and the boundaries of the lifeworld 
( TCA : 2 I p . 12 2 -2 4 ) . 
As general background the lifeworld is relatively 
trivial, gaining significance only when thematized in a 
specific situation. Habermas states this as follows: 
From a perspective turned toward the situation, the 
lifeworld appears as a reservoir of taken-for-granteds, 
of unshaken convictions that participants in 
communication draw upon in cooperative processes of 
interpretation. Single elements, specific taken-for-
granteds, are, however, mobilized in the form of 
consensual and yet problematizable knowledge only when 
they become relevant to a situation (TCA:2, p. 124). 
The lifeworld should be conceived as·a reserve of patterns 
which facilitate the interpretation of specific scenarios. 
These interpretive patterns are conveyed via cultural 
traditions and are organized linguistically. It is the view 
that the lif eworld is linguistically ordered that 
distinguishes Habermas' account from the phenomenological 
version. By positing semantically determined boundaries that 
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are grammatically regulated, the "egological" problem is 
solved. Language, rather than the abstract subject, serves as 
a transcendental primitive. It (language) is the medium of 
exchange for content that can be thematized into communicative 
situations (TCA:2, pp. 124-25). 
In summary, the lifewor!d is comprised, fundamentally, of 
a bank of knowledge that is located in the capacity to utilize 
ordinary language with the aim of reaching consensus 
(understanding). This is the unproblematic, unproblematizable 
resource that accommodates shifts in the horizon of the 
lifeworld yet makes transgression impossible. While the 
boundaries of the objective, social, and subjective worlds can 
be problematized and overcome, the lifeworld always 
constitutes the intersubjective acts that generate movement of 
this sort. 
The lifeworld is, so to speak, the transcendental site 
where speaker and hearer meet, where they can 
reciprocally raise claims that their utterances fit the 
world (objective, social or subjective), and where they 
can criticize and confirm those validity claims, settle 
their disagreements, and arrive at agreements. In a 
sentence: participants cannot assume in actu the same 
distance in relation to language and cul tu re as in 
relation to the totality of facts, norms, or experiences 
concerning which mutual understanding is possible ( TCA: 2, 
p. 126). 
With this in mind I will proceed to Habermas' discussion of 
the way that the lifeworld is effectively subdued by "the 
system" in mature capitalist societies (TCA:2. pp. 124-26). 
This aspect of Habermas' analysis is entrenched in the 
theory of social evolution that I commented on above. The 
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general sequence of social evolution proceeds from tribal 
(organized by kinship) to traditional (organized by a central 
state) to modern (organized by steering media). 
Differentiation is the active mechanism in this sequence: 
within the lifeworld (rationalization), within the system 
(functionalization) and between the system and the 
lifeworld. 24 Habermas' main concern is to identify the 
developmental trends that lead to both the positive and 
negative consequences of differentiation in the modern epoch. 
As we shall see, modern societies attain a level of 
system differentiation at which increasingly autonomous 
organizations are connected with one another via 
delinguistified media of communication: these systemic 
mechanisms--for example, money--steer a social 
intercourse that has been largely disconnected from norms 
and values, above all in those subsystems of purposive 
rational economic and administrative action that, on 
Weber's diagnosis, have become independent of their 
24 Habermas draws a parallel between social evolution and 
ontogenesis in humans. Following Lawrence Kohlberg, he 
contends that in the same way that children develop such that 
they achieve increasing ability to resolve conflicts, 
societies evolve so that they are more capable of resolution. 
This of course would be the case if consensual communication 
were visibly the main medium of dispute and resolve (See 
Communication and the Evolution of Society, pp. 69-94 and 
TCA:2 pp. 172-79). The analogy Habermas draws is quite 
obviously questionable. "Is the structural isomorphism between 
the two developmental schemas strong enough to justify the way 
of proceeding? The homology is strongest, Habermas observers, 
in the case of cognitive development, weaker in the case of 
moral development. In both cases one can observe roughly 
parallel paths of decentration. Nevertheless, there are places 
where the analogy breaks down. The pattern of individual 
development cannot mirror that of social evolution, since even 
the most primitive societies have institutionalized (at the 
~dult level) relatively advanced interactive competencies 
involving reciprocity and generalized expectations. Again, the 
sorts of crises confronting the individual personality differ 
f7om those encountered by the social system and hence call for 
different developmental solutions" (Ingram, 1987, p. 133). 
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moral-political foundations (TCA:2, p. 154). 
In spite of the "delinguistification" process within the 
system, and the degree to which this effects the lifeworld, 
Habermas contends that the lif eworld remains fundamental to 
the fabric of society. As such, it is within the structures of 
the lifeworld that emancipatory energy is located. While 
generally sympathetic to this position (with certain 
reservations concerning Habermas' account of the lifeworld), 
I will argue in the concluding chapter of this book that a 
lifeworld based politics of enlightenment has to break with 
certain key standards to which Habermas adheres. 
The first state of social evolution (tribal) is 
relatively undifferentiated. There is no distinction drawn 
between objective, subjective, and social worlds; the system 
itself is premised on kinship and gender relations rather than 
functional operations; and there is no distinguishable 
difference between system and lifeworld (TCA:2, pp.156-164). 
It is not until the phase of traditional (state organized) 
society develops that differentiation begins to appear. "It is 
in societies organized around a state that functional 
specification first encroaches upon the very way of life of 
social groups" ( TCA: 2, p. 16 9) . Membership in traditional 
societies is determined on the basis of a criterion other than 
kinship. One is acknowledged by virtue of legal status, 
acceptance (in principle) of the state's validity, willingness 
to participate in group activity by proxy and submission to 
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centrally administrated executive procedures. The significant 
difference between tribal and traditional societies lies in 
the amount of functional differentiation and the degree to 
which social action is centrally orchestrated (TCA:2, pp. 169-
171). 
The transition into the modern phase is marked by 
decentralization of action orchestration through the 
development of both governmental and non-governmental 
subsystems. This is due primarily to the emergence of a 
capitalist economy and the standardization of a monetary 
currency which serves as a medium of exchange between 
subsystems. The economy, as such, functions both as a 
subsystem and as an interconnective substrata which 
coordinates relations within the subsystemic network. The 
state comes to rely on this coordinating mechanism, leading it 
to restructure its own method of directing activity. "The 
state apparatus becomes dependent upon the media-steered 
subsystem of the economy; this forces it to reorganize and 
leads, among other things, to an assimilation of power to the 
structure of steering medium: power becomes assimilated to 
money" (TCA:2, p. 171). Hence, political power (administrative 
capacity) and economic power (money) converge. On the positive 
side, the shift into the modern epoch does away with 
traditional (that is to say unquestionable) norms, creating an 
environment in which legitimation can be rooted in rational 
discourse. On the negative side, the type of economic system 
98 
that emerges, and the efficiency that is demanded therein, 
ieads to the above mentioned delinguistif ied mode of action 
coordination. Rather than discourse (as Habermas is defining 
it), late modernity has steering media: money and power 
( TCA : 2 I PP • 1 71-1 7 2 ) • 25 
The prominence of steering media as coordinative devices 
weakens the capacity of the lifeworld to provide social 
integration. In Habermas' terms, the system is uncoupled from 
the lifeworld in modern societies: "The social system 
definitively bursts out of the horizon of the lifeworld, 
escapes from the intuitive knowledge of everyday communicative 
practice, and is henceforth accessible only to the 
counterintuitive knowledge of the social sciences developing 
since the eighteenth century" (TCA: 2 I p. 173). While 
structural differentiation within the lifeworld (due to 
increased rationalization) delineates the domains appropriate 
to the three validity claims raised in consensual 
communication (objective/truth, subjective/truthfulness or 
honest and social/rightness or justice), it likewise gives 
25 In "Human Agency Between System and Lifeworld: 
Habermas' latest version of critical theory", Klaus hartmann 
states that Habermas fails to recognize that the steering 
media of the capitalist economy are in fact linguistic (p. 
152). Habermas does not commit this error, as a careful 
reading clearly reveals. When Habermas uses the term 
"delinguistification" he does not mean to imply that 
activities such as negotiation and "dealing", which are 
c7ntral to the capitalist mode of exchange, are engaged in 
simply by flashing great roles of money. Rather, his point is 
that the linguistic aspect is secondary and does not utilize 
the "understanding reaching" capacity that is inherent in 
language. 
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rise to increasingly complex systemic structures which tend to 
rope off or "colonize" the lifeworld: "the lifeworld seems to 
shrink to a subsystem", restricting its role as the social 
foundation. From the former aspect of rationalization follows 
an abstract system of law and an increase in demand for 
political legitimation that has a communicative basis. From 
the latter aspect follows a propensity to allow the steering 
media, which are reflections of the capitalist economy, to 
infringe upon the institutional domains (political, legal, 
etc. ) that depend on highly developed communication structures 
( TCA : 2 I p . 1 7 3-7 8 ) . 26 
The dilemma alluded to here can be thought of in terms of 
a process of clarification. During earlier stages of social 
evolution the spheres of communicative and strategic action 
were not clearly delineated. In contrast, the modern epoch is 
defined by its ability to draw distinctions between the two. 
Habermas characterizes this in terms of two modes of 
motivation: rational, which is premised on consensus 
formation, and empirical, which operates on the basis of 
coercion through the use of steering media (money and power). 
The former of course is grounded in the differentiated 
lifeworld structures; the latter, however, is detached from 
26 Here Habermas follows Marx in pointing out that 
bourgeois law and bourgeois democracy do not reflect the 
enlightened ideals that they are supposed to objectively 
preserve. As long as there is class differentiation based on 
access to steering media (money and power) there will be 
discrimination in these spheres. 
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the lifeworld altogether. 
The way these media function differs according to whether 
they focus consensus formation in language through 
specialization in certain aspects of validity and 
hierarchizing processes of agreement, or whether they 
uncouple action coordination from consensus formation in 
language altogether, and neutralize it with respect to 
the alternatives of agreement or failed agreement ( TCA: 2, 
p. 183). 
As a consequence of the tendency during the modern epoch to 
rely on steering media rather than linguistic modes of action 
coordination the lifeworld has been effectively subordinated. 
This results in the replacement of language games with 
symbolically determined behavior. Habermas refers to this 
trend "as a technizing of the lifeworld", the outgrowth not of 
modernity in general but of the specific economic mode 
(capitalism) that has determined systemic formation and, 
consequently, social integration (TCA:2, pp. 179-183). 
More recent developments in the capitalist economy 
(specifically the emergence of the welfare state) have only 
contributed to the problem. The "utopian energies" of 
modernity have grown increasingly suspect27 while the media of 
money and power have become more and more dominant. Habermas 
labels this "the new obscurity" (which I will argue is 
tantamount to saying "the aftermath of modernity") which "is 
part of a situation in which the program of the social welfare 
27 Specifically the faith in rationality, science, and 
technology. Late modern phenomena such as the holocaust, 
nuclear war, the arms race, environmental crises suggest that 
these Enlightenment ideals produce the exact opposite of what 
was intended. 
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state, which still feeds on the utopian energy of a laboring 
society, is losing its capacity to project possibilities for 
a collectively better and less endangered way of life" (TNO, 
3 -5).28 PP· 
The welfare state, Habermas contends, is compensation 
oriented; its main task is to off set class conflict by 
utilizing administrative mechanisms (which function under the 
guise of democratic consensus while actually operating on the 
basis of power) to dampen the "quasi-natural" evolution of the 
economy. In theory this enables capitalism and democracy to 
felicitously coexist, even if in a compromised fashion. Two 
important questions, however, must be addressed in light of 
this: Can the welfare state sustain itself? and, Does 
administrative intervention provide a path towards 
emancipation? (TNO, p. 5-7). 
In response to the first question Habermas identifies a 
number of barriers that the welfare state must face. These can 
28 Bill Martin expresses this concern in terms of the loss 
of the possibility for community. "Humanity is on the verge of 
forever losing the sense of community, even as this sense 
seems to have been recreated in thousands of diffuse ways. 
Though the word, 'community', is a commonplace of public 
discourse it is a mere trace of its former self" (1992, p. 1). 
Martin goes on to argue that the loss of the meaning of the 
word community is virtually equivalent to the loss of the 
meaning of what it is to be human, a possibility that he 
associates with "the impasse of postmodernity." I see strong 
resonances between Martin's concern with the loss of meaning 
and Habermas' concern with the colonization of the lifeworld 
which issues in the new obscurity. Both focus on the question 
of the regeneration of human-being through semantic analyses 
which lay out the possibilities for renewal. See the third 
chapter of Martin's Matrix and Line for an important critique 
of Habermas' semantic theory. 
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be viewed in terms of the complexity of international 
capitalism and the antagonisms that arise as a consequence of 
its administration. The outgrowth is a system of political 
blocks, each reflecting special interests (e.g. big 
businesses), that vie for positions of power. This is 
destabilizing and potentially debilitating. In response to the 
second question, the welfare state is always on the defensive, 
gearing itself more toward preservation than emancipatory 
transformation. As such, a dense bureaucratic network develops 
which impinges upon the remaining autonomous spheres of the 
lifeworld with purposive-rational patchwork strategies. 29 
In short, inherent in the project of the social state is 
a contradiction between goal and method. Its goal is the 
establishment of forms of life which are structured 
according to egalitarian standards and which at the same 
time open up arenas for individual self-fulfillment and 
spontaneity. But apparently this goal cannot be achieved 
directly through a legal and administrative 
transformation of political programs. Producing new forms 
of life is beyond the capacities of political power (TNO: 
p. 9--my emphasis). 
The answer to both questions is negative. Welfare state 
29 This is a key point in the argument that I am 
jeveloping in that here Habermas explicitly recognizes that 
importance of Foucault's analysis of rationalized processes of 
"normalization." "It is this reifying and subjectivating power 
that Foucault has traced into even the thinnest capillary 
)ranchings of everyday communication. The distortions within 
~uch a regulated, analyzed, controlled, and watched-over 
Lif eworld are certainly more subtle than the obvious forms of 
naterial exploitation, and impoverishment; but these 
~onflicts, shifted into the domains of the psychological and 
:he bodily, internalized, are no less destructive for all 
:hat" (TNO, p. 9). This points precisely to the gap that I am 
:rying to thematize--that between modernity and postmoderni ty-
·within which a different notion of the politics of 
~nlightenment needs to take shape. 
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capitalism, like liberal capitalism, needs to be protected 
from itself (TNO, pp. 7-12). 
Habermas proposes as a solution to this problem that 
existing channels be viewed with suspicion as their 
communicative structures are distorted by power relations and 
economic interests. The subsystemic media steered spheres must 
be bypassed by autonomous collectivities that emerge out of 
what remains of the lifeworld. Of the existing means for 
social regulation--money, power, and solidarity--solidarity 
needs to be positioned above the other two. This entails 
drawing upon the communicative capacity that is latent in the 
structures of the lifeworld. Habermas maintains that doing so 
will "influence the boundaries between communicatively 
structured areas of life, on the one hand, and the state and 
economy, on the other" (TNO: 14-17) . 30 
A number of important developments take place in 
Habermas' analysis of modern society between the ?O's and the 
80's. First, he reconceptualizes the paradoxical situation of 
modernity, concentrating on the lifeworld as the pivotal 
element. Second, he defends a theory of the operations of 
modern societies which focuses on the dynamic of subsystemic 
relations. Third, he acknowledges that rationalization in the 
lifeworld is a necessary condition not only for communicative 
action but also for the type of strategic action, guided by 
30 Also see Habermas' discussion of new social movements 
in TCA:2, pp. 391-396. 
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steering media, that dominates social intercourse during this 
epoch. Finally, he notes that given the fragmented 
distribution of power in the later phases of modernity, 
remedial discourses must spring up locally in the form of 
grass roots solidarity movements. Given this, I will sketch 
out the reasons why these developments are incompatible with 
Habermas' communicative-evolutionary theory of social change. 
This in turn necessitates a reassessment of the diagnostic 
dimension of critical theory which unavoidably leads to an 
encounter that I will construct between Habermas and certain 
key postmodernists. 
The implication of Habermas' position is that 
differentiations in the lifeworld are the product of a 
dialectical process of social evolution. As a result o·f 
increased differentiation, two distinct and incompatible modes 
of social discourse emerge. This leads to intolerable 
incompatibility, resulting in one or the other gaining the 
upper hand. In the case of advanced capitalist society, the 
strategic mode is clearly dominant. Insofar as this is 
problematic, its opposite (pure intersubjectivity) is posited 
as the only acceptable solution. For Habermas, there is 
apparently no middle ground--even for transitional purposes. 
This is due partly to his overly narrow view of the potential 
that resides in ordinary language. The position that I will 
come to argue for is that ordinary language is susceptible to 
a number of different normatively structured formations and 
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that the contextual circumstances of a "discourse" (and I 
intend to expand the meaning of this term) will vary quite 
dramatically. The demands of the early modern period gave rise 
to consensus oriented and purposive oriented discursive 
practices. The latter has subsequently become dominant, giving 
rise to the crises or pathologies (as Habermas has more 
recently labeled them) of late capitalism. I will argue that 
this calls for a reconceptualized notion of the politics of 
enlightenment: a type that is willing to breakdown, rather 
than repair, the discursive arrangements of late-modernity. 
This is suggested by Habermas' account of the degree to 
which purposive discourses have fragmented the social system 
and infiltrated every dimension of social life. Nevertheless, 
he continues to insist, albeit in more localized forms, that 
the appropriate practices in light of this predicament are the 
formation of collectivities of solidified consciousness that 
can establish patterns of communicative action within their 
subsystemic regions. This stance denies the revelations of his 
own analysis. Whether or not reform represents a viable way of 
altering existing patterns of social-political interaction is 
questionable The alternatives seem to be either to capitulate 
to the standards of the system or to expand the vision of 
emancipation--the utopian energy of the theory--such that more 
substantive notions of transformations will factor into the 
normative content of critical social theory. Part of 
developing such a theory entails thinking through--
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practically--ways that existing channels of social 
coordination can be broken down. Only then does the utopian 
energy of communicative action begin to have political 
viability. 
Habermas' response to my suggestions would be that 
theoretical knowledge provides the kernel of potential that 
will facilitate efforts to deploy consensus oriented 
discourses. Picking up on the point I made earlier, I will 
argue that the normative terrain of modernity is inextricably 
intertwined with the political and economic systems, thus 
leaving no virgin soil for the growth of enlightened dialogue. 
If my assessment is correct, these views follow directly from 
Habermas' own analysis. Yet he fails to acknowledge the huge 
gap between his communicative ideal (which I subscribe to 
whole heartedly) and the communicative reality that his 
analysis discloses. In order to substantiate this position I 
will now turn to the work of Jean-Francois Lyotard and Fredric 
Jameson. 
Modernity vs. Postmodernity: 
Normative and Empirical Questions 
As I indicated in the introduction, postmodernism has 
replaced positivism as the arch enemy of critical theory in 
recent years. Habermas' concern with postmodernism has been 
centered around the political implications of a mode of 
thought that insists upon undermining "established" normative 
structures simply for the sake of showing that they can be 
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undermined. Further, he is concerned that this leads to an 
ambivalence with respect to regenerating normative standards 
that can provide the grounds for emancipatory action. Finally, 
he is distressed by the celebratory posture of reckless 
postmodernist who revel in a bacchanalian disdain for the 
progress that has been made in the quest for universally valid 
social, political, and ethical standards. The fact that the 
"post" in postmodernism situates his "debate" with central 
thinkers of that movement in either /or terms provides Habermas 
with an important opportunity to defend his attachment to the 
Enlightenment. In this section I will attempt to complicate 
this dichotomy--one to which Habermas strongly adheres. 
Before proceeding to this it is useful to gain a sense of 
the genealogy of thought, as Habermas reconstructs it, that 
leads to the current modernity vs. postmodernity debate. In 
The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (PDM), Habermas 
provides a sophisticated historical analysis of the two main 
strains of anti-modernist thought that have followed from 
Nietzsche's critique of modernity. The strain which develops 
from Heidegger to Derrida takes up Nietzsche's critique of the 
Western metaphysical tradition; the strain which develops from 
Bataille to Foucault assimilates his erotic lebensphilosophie 
and his genealogical approach to the study of history. 
Habermas focuses his criticisms of the anti-modernists upon 
the "paradox" of attacking modernity while still relying on 
modern philosophical suppositions. This is developed into an 
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analysis of the problems that he associates with the "boundary 
obliterating" postmodern thinkers: specifically, that once the 
distinctions that have traditionally delineated various modes 
of discourse are blurred, the substantive fields (such as 
scientific or political discourses) will have no basis for 
claiming their hierarchical superiority over expressive 
(literary or artistic) modes. Habermas concurs with the 
postmodern thinkers on one point: that the modern philosophy 
of the subject has run its course (see the above discussion of 
lifeworld theories). His proposal for transforming 
subjectively based philosophy, however, is different in two 
crucial respects 1) Habermas contends that in order to break 
from the philosophy of the subject the modern project of 
enlightenment must be completed; and 2) that a critical 
component of this project is to theoretically rope off domains 
of discourse in terms of the validity claims that they raise. 
This, as I have been arguing (and will continue to argue) 
restricts a theory of social-political action, thereby 
perpetuating the gap that exists between real and ideal 
communication. 
The fundamental question raised in PDM is: what is the 
significance of modernity? In addressing this question 
Habermas identifies two strains of anti-modernist thought that 
have emerged in the 20th century: neoconservatism and 
anarchism. Both developed a conception of modernity based on 
Weber's observation that the constitutive elements of modern 
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society are secularization and rationalization--f eatures that 
are systematically manifest in "the organization cores of 
capitalist enterprise and the bureaucratic state apparatus" 
(PDM, 1) • The anti-modernists de-historicize Weber's 
observations, which are still marxist enough to be framed in 
the context of universal history. Breaking from the tradition 
of meta-narrative historical theory enables two key moves 
pertinent to the epoch question: 1) the necessity of closure 
or completion of modernity is done away with; and 2) as a 
result, the shift into postmodernity can be posited without an 
identifiable historical referent. Hence, one merely has to 
declare the death of God, the death of metaphysics, the death 
of philosophy, the death of art and in general the death of 
Enlightenment as sufficient grounds for claiming that a new 
age has arrived. 31 Habermas is suspicious of this. His 
suspicions focus on whether attempts to make this break are 
not always determined by a conceptual and historical linkage 
with modernity. "We cannot exclude from the outset the 
possibility that neoconservatism and aesthetically inspired 
anarchism, in the name of a farewell to modernity, are merely 
trying to revolt against it once again. It could be that they 
are merely cloaking their complicity with the venerable 
tradition of counter-enlightenment in the garb of post-
enlightenment" ( PDM, 5) . 
31 For an interesting discussion of this see the 
introduction to Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind. 
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Modernity runs into none of these problems. It is 
qualitatively distinguishable from its predecessor epochs. 
"Modernity can and will no longer borrow the criteria by which 
it takes its orientation from the models supplied by another 
epoch; it has to create its normativity out of itself" (PDM, 
7)· Modernity developed along with historically determinate 
events such as the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and the 
great bourgeois revolutions. Hence, the primary 
characteristics of modernity have a traceable evolution. The 
attempted break from modernity does not, leaving it 
paradoxically dependent on categories that it no longer 
recognizes. It is this "paradox" that leads to the discussion 
that I will now pursue. 
While, as I mentioned in the introduction, the term 
postmodernism has been around for quite some time, it was the 
publication of Jean-Francois Lyotard's La Condition 
postmoderne: rapport sur le savoir that transformed it into a 
term with wide circulation in academic circles. Originally 
designed as a report for the governmen~ of Quebec on the 
current status of knowledge in advanced societies, it has 
become the postmodern bible for a generation of literary 
critics, philosophers and specialists in cultural studies. 
Lyotard defines postmodernism as "incredulity toward 
metanarratives" (PC, p.xxiv). This, of course, situates 
postmodernism in a precarious position vis-a-vis the tradition 
of the Enlightenment from the outset. For instance, Kant's 
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theory of enlightenment is deeply embedded in a historical 
metanarrative, as are the theories of Hegel and Marx as they 
attempted to reformulate the idea of enlightenment such that 
it met the demands of a rapidly changing world. Furthermore, 
even radical critics of the enlightenment--most notably 
Horkheimer and Adorno--rely on a meta-narrative theory to 
"ground" their analysis. Finally, Habermas retrieves the 
tradition of metanarrative in his theory of social evolution, 
which as I showed above is central to his theory of 
emancipation. In short: without a meta-narrative, it would 
appear that the very idea of enlightenment, regardless of ones 
perspective, starts to lose shape. 
This immediately pits Habermas and lyotard against one 
another on a very important issue: the possibility for 
emancipatory politics. The following claim further clarifie~ 
their points of contention: 
Thus, the society of the future falls less within the 
province of a Newtonian anthropology (such as 
structuralism or systems theory) than a pragmatics of 
language particles. There are many different language 
games--a heterogeneity of elements. They only give rise 
to institutions in patches--local determinism (PM, p. 
xxiv). 
In other words, a systematic theory of society, such as 
Habermas' reconstructs social and political arrangements in a 
manner that enables the determination of where power resides 
and what forces operate at the heart of the system. In 
Habermas' case this tendency manifests itself as an analytic 
schema which places "language games" into two distinct 
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categories: those that are coercive and those that are 
enabling or emancipatory. In Lyotard's judgment, this denies 
the fundamental disorder that society finds itself in. 
The decision makers, however, attempt to manage these 
clouds of sociality according to input/output matrices, 
following a logic which implies that their elements are 
commensurable and that the whole implies that the whole 
is determinable. They allocate our lives for the growth 
of power. In matters of social justice and of scientific 
truth alike, the legitimation of that power is based on 
optimizing the systems performance efficiency. The 
application of this criterion to all of our games 
necessarily entails a certain level of terror, whether 
soft or hard: be operational (that is commensurable) or 
disappear (PC, p. xxiv). 
In denying this disorder, a disservice is done to those social 
agents--embroiled in their own heterogeneous matrices of 
language games--that is tantamount to annulling their (we 
might say) autonomy. 32 
While these passages represent a not so veiled polemic 
against Habermas, the next remark states their differences in 
straight forward terms. 
Is legitimacy to be found in consensus obtained through 
discussion, as Juer·gen Habermas thinks? Such consensus 
does violence to the heterogeneity of language games. And 
invention is always born of dissension. Postmodern 
knowledge is not simply a tool of the authorities; it 
refines our sensitivity to differences and reinforces our 
ability to tolerate the incommensurable. Its principle is 
not the experts homology, but the inventor's paralogy 
(PC I p. xxv) . 
Under this description Habermas' discursive approach to a 
32 I am intentionally couching this discussion in a 
vocabulary that highlights the internal incoherence that 
Habermas finds with postmodernism. While one wearies of 
hearing him harp on about performative contradictions there 
are points at which he is just right about this. 
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politics of enlightenment is both impossible and violent: 
impossible in the sense that it tries to bring order to that 
which is fundamentally chaotic; and violent in that in trying 
to achieve the impossible, differences between incommensurable 
groups of social actors are destroyed. 33 Furthermore, Lyotard 
suggests that there are emancipatory possibilities within the 
postmodern condition. This is where, as I will argue in the 
final section of the present chapter, his postmodernism 
becomes normative. From this perspective it is possible to 
discuss whether a politics of enlightenment that has as its 
fundamental aim the toleration of incommensurability is 
really worth anything. 
In the main body of The Postmodern Condi ti on Lyotard 
develops his positions in considerably greater detail. He 
extends his discussion even further in Just Gaming (JG) and 
The Differend (TD). My aim here is to situate Lyotard vis-a-
vis Habermas' discursive view of the politics of 
enlightenment. This politics, as I have shown above, and will 
portray more formerly and abstractly in the next chapter, is 
rooted in the normative force of ordinary language within 
specified forums of discourse. Under conditions of discourse, 
33 I feel as though this is a charitable reading of 
Lyotard's remark. Less charitably I would say that its a bit 
silly to think that the impossible can be violent. The very 
fact that it is possible brings about the threat of violence. 
Habermas is also guilty of this sort double talk from the 
other side of the coin. His concern with violence is a more 
legitimate one but nonetheless problematic. Any viable theory 
o~ emancipation must be able recognize that violence is always 
within the realm of possibility. 
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claims Habermas, it only makes sense to communicate if we hold 
common presuppositions about the purpose of communication. For 
him this includes the general agreement that we will proceed 
in the direction of truth, that we will express our interests 
with sincerity, and that we will engage our interlocutors as 
equals. 34 Normatively this implies that linguistic discourses 
are governed by movement toward consensus. Lyotard, on the 
other hand, holds that consensus is not a viable candidate as 
the standard for validating claims concerning truth or 
justice. Holding such a position involves an anthropological 
mistake in that it holds false assumptions about subjectivity-
-such as that subjects are self possessed agents of knowledge 
and that they are governed by their own wills--and also 
propagates the notion that history is moving in the direction 
of emancipation. 35 These ideas, according to Lyotard, are 
34 It is a point of interest that a theory which is so 
deeply committed to reciprocity has painfully little to say 
about listening. We get an elaborate characterization on the 
way that speech acts operate but there is an assumption that 
the reception of speech acts is unproblematic. The question of 
listening, which is a hot topic in popular psychology, of all 
places, is flagrantly ignored in what I consider to be the 
most sophisticated theory of communication available. This 
strikes me as an important area for critical theorists to 
address. 
35 Both these points are addressed by Habermas to a 
certain extent in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity 
where he refigures the subject so as to accommodate 
poststructuralist critiques of the modern version of 
subjectivity, and also recharacterizes the narrative of 
emancipation. These responses might not satisfy Lyotard, and 
don't entirely satisfy me, but they do show how to get beyond 
the dichotomy between the totally fragmented subject which 
Lyotard propounds and the idea of subject as absolute totality 
that follows from one reading of Kant. Axel Honneth's 
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rendered invalid (and here the need to use normative language 
is once again significant) by the postmodern condition. "For 
this reason, it seems neither possible, nor even prudent, to 
follow Habermas in orienting our treatment of the problem of 
legitimation in the direction of a search for universal 
consensus through what he calls Diskurs, in other words, a 
dialogue of argumentation" (PC, p. 65--my emphasis) . Habermas' 
view, Lyotard claims, assumes the possibility for universal 
agreement whereas in fact, language games are heteromorphous. 
It likewise assumes that the telos of discussion is agreement 
whereas in fact, Lyotard suggests, it is paralogy (PC, pp.60-
65). 
In The Diff erend, Lyotard claims that Habermas' 
insistence on consensus building dialogues is Platonic. "You 
are preferring dialogue to differend. You are presupposing, 
first of all, that univocality is possible; and second, that 
it constitutes the healthiness of phrases" (TD, p. 84). He 
continues by raising questions about two key issues pertaining 
to Habermas: First, whether the idea of heal thy vs. sick 
discourses is addressing the nature of language; and second, 
whether there is a pre-differentiated dynamic to the 
circulation of phrases that is lost in discourse analysis. 
This, for Lyotard, is the differend: "the unstable and instant 
of language wherein something that must be able to be put into 
discussion of this at the 1992 meeting of the Society for 
Phenomenological and Existential Philosophy is instructive on 
this point. 
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phrases cannot yet be" (TD, p. 13). The question that Habermas 
would raise at this point would concern the ontological status 
of the differend. Is this a transhistorical category that 
takes its final shape within the postmodern condition? Or is 
it merely a symptom of a colonized lifeworld that has been 
stripped of its ability to serve as a historically developed 
linguistic resource? This is at the core of the 
normative/empirical question, as well as the modern/postmodern 
question. These in turn, are at the heart of the possibility 
for a politics of enlightenment in the aftermath of modernity. 
Turning now to the broader context in which Lyotard 
situates his claims concerning language games, paralogy, and 
the differend, the distinction between modern and postmodern 
is designated as follows: "I will use the term modern to 
designate any science that legitimates itself with reference 
to a metadiscourse of this kind making an explicit appeal to 
some grand narrative, such as the dialectics of Spirit, the 
hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or 
working subject, or the creation of wealth" (xxiv). All of 
these categories are rendered obsolete by the postmodern 
condition which represents a "maturity" that enables us to see 
beyond the great ideological constructs of modernity. 36 In 
36 It is significant that Lyotard attempts to identify his 
normative postmodernism with maturity. This is of course the 
way that Kant defines enlightenment. In his view enlightenment 
meant waking up to our own capacity for freedom. For Lyotard, 
maturity is precisely the opposite of this. Lyotard explicitly 
writes off this side of Kant's work in Just Gaming as being 
totalizing. "But nonetheless it goes without saying for Kant--
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order to demonstrate this he turns to the work of the later 
Wittgenstein. For Wittgenstein, language usage is constituted 
within distinct forms of life. These forms of life are in turn 
framed by rule governed language games. Such games are 
composed of syntax, grammar, vocabulary and a performative 
context. Hence, they are heterogenous--being contingent upon 
the form of life out of which they emerge and in turn which 
they help to form and re-form. Language games, for 
Wittgenstein, are not universal, but rather are related to one 
another through the exhibition of certain family 
resemblances. 37 
Lyotard characterizes his appropriation of Wittgenstein 
as follows: 
What he means by this term is that each of the various 
categories of utterance can be defined in terms of rules 
specifying their properties and the uses to which they 
can be put--in exactly the same way as the game of chess 
is defined by a set of rules determining the properties 
of each of the pieces, in other words, the proper way to 
move them (PC, p. 10). 
Lyotard's aim is to show that discourses are not self 
legitimating; they are based on ad hoc contracts of sorts. 
This leads to the establishment of tacit rules, without which 
there is no game. In turn, to alter the rules is to alter the 
game. Within this game context any particular linguistic act 
and it is very clear in the article on "Enlightenment", and in 
"The Cosmopolitan Idea", or in the "Project of Perpetual 
Peace"--that humanity must form a whole" (JG, p. 86). For this 
reason it is Kant's third critique that plays the most 
important role in Lyotard' s "postmodern" Kantianism (Ingram). 
37 See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations. 
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is analogous to a particular move in a given game. The main 
idea that Lyotard wants to convey in his appropriation of 
Wittgenstein is that language usage is fundamentally 
agonistic. It is not about establishing reciprocal relations 
with other speakers; rather, it is a question of gaining 
position vis-a-vis an interlocutor that will define relations 
of power. To speak is to fight. Such interaction leads to the 
composition of networks of social relations in the postmodern 
world. 38 
Up to this point Lyotard's discussion sounds perfectly 
modern. Metaphysically grounded norms are no longer valid so 
legitimation must assume a different form. In this case that 
form is provided by the tacit rules that govern language 
games. Another version of this is Adam Smith's invisible hand 
theory which claims that economic activity is motivated and 
orchestrated by interests which at the intentional level are 
purely self oriented but collectively assume a logical 
coherence. In other words it is a war of all against all by 
different means--one of the trade marks of post-Hobbesian 
political thought. What is distinctly postmodern about the 
language games that Lyotard describes pertains to their 
38 Lyotard' s model is really more economic than linguistic 
and the game is much more like monopoly than chess. His views 
reflect that side of modern life which Habermas associates 
with system imperatives. Rather than show the normative 
depravity of this, however, Lyotard attempts to describe it in 
a manner that celebrates the constant strife and contestation 
which prevents the realization of a social or political 
totality. 
indebtedness to new technological developments 
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that 
fundamentally alter the modes of circulation. The Postmodern 
society is increasingly ordered by mechanistic means, 
primarily due to the advent of highly sophisticated computer 
technologies and the languages that are developed such that 
they can operate in the absence of centralized modes of 
administration. This results in the disabling of key modern 
categories such as the nation-state, democracy, truth, and 
most importantly for Lyotard, the "self." "The self does not 
amount to much, but no self is an island; each exists in a 
fabric of relations that is more complex and mobile than ever 
before" (PC, p. 15). 
Lyotard's view of the self is an extreme version of the 
"de-centered" subject that has been characterized by various 
poststructuralist thinkers. In his judgment the subject is a 
nodal point within a matrix of linguistic operations. 
Together, these points create a linguistic circuitry that give 
rise to ever changing social formations. The model for this is 
a computer language and the programs that can be generated 
through its implementation. In any given program the status of 
individual lines in that program is contingent. When one line 
is changed, the matrix itself is altered. As the matrix is 
altered, so too are all of its constitutive parts. Hence, 
nodal points, represented by subjects within the matrix are 
flexibly (not reflexively) related to one another and are only 
as stable as the matrix itself. The question of the stability 
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of the matrix is crucial here as in order to characterize this 
"description" as fundamentally different from the modernist 
system-theoretic approach it must be demonstrated that the 
matrix or matrices in question are relatively unstable. While 
the demonstration for this is scant, it seems to be Lyotard's 
assumption (and to a certain extent a correct one). Given 
this, the status of the subject is reduced to that of a post 
through which messages pass. This leads Lyotard to the 
understanding that while the circulation of power in 
postmodern societies is increased--that is to say, the 
category of power plays an expanded role--the prospect for 
subjects being empowered is virtually annulled. Instead of 
drawing normative distinctions between freedom and slavery, 
emancipation and domination, or coercion and communication, 
the normative delineations are based on degrees of 
performativity. 
Lyotard sums this up as follows: 
It may even be said that the system can and must 
encourage such movement to the extent that it combats its 
own entropy; 39 the novelty of an unexpected move with 
its correlative displacement of a partner or group of 
partners, can supply the system with that increased 
performativity it forever demands and consumes. (PC, 15). 
Hence, the distinction between manipulation and reciprocity 
dissolves into the postmodern melange. It no longer makes 
sense to talk about truth, freedom or justice as all of these 
• 
39 This sounds like a typically superficial growth economy 
claim. For a careful critique of the normative failure of 
growth economics theory see David Schweickart, Against 
£.apitalism, chapter four. 
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immature modern categories have been invalidated by the 
flexible positionality of contemporary social, political, 
economic and legal institutions. At the same time however--and 
this is where the incoherent normative structure of Lyotard's 
thought coalesces somewhat with Horkheimer's and Adorno's, as 
well as my own--the potential for total administration is also 
eliminated. The postmodern society has too many points of 
slippage for any particular point to be the locus of power. To 
the extent that Lyotard is taking a position--and in fact I 
think he is taking a rather strong position which factors 
importantly into the descriptive aspect of his theory--it is 
that modernity totalizes. Postmodernity, on the other hand, 
recognizes the "truth" of the fundamental indeterminacy of all 
things. In this realization, which must me accompanied by the 
proper acceptance or resignation, we are liberated from the 
dangerous tendency to pursue totalities, whether they be 
social, political, or ethical. 
As I have been hinting at all along in my discussion of 
Lyotard, there seems to be a philosophy of being lurking in 
the backdrop of his cryptic analysis of the postmodern 
condition. I find this most clearly expressed in his notion of 
paralogy and the differend. Paralogy, loosely defined, is 
false reasoning. In his appropriation of this term Lyotard 
attempts to utilize it as a critical foil against the grand 
rational schematizations of the meta-narrative tradition. His 
notion of paralogy is rooted in the micro dynamics of "mini-
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narratives" which constitute what I will risk calling 
postmodern lifeworlds. Mini-narratives (or possibly regional 
lifeworlds) are paralogical due to internal limitations 
determined by their radical temporal and spatial contingency. 
This leads to confusion, paradox, and perpetual 
reconfiguration as the rules that govern these systems are 
grounded only in terms of their referential relationship to 
one another. Since these relations are not governed by a 
principle of coherence, the discourses that they produce are 
essentially arbitrary. As such, knowledge production, social 
organization and political legitimation are inherently 
unstable: they are practices in paralogism, the point of which 
is not to progress or generate consensus but rather to 
undermine previous establishments. 
If we situate this in terms of Habermas' characterization 
of the difference between the lifeworld and discourse (see 
chapter V for more details on this), paralogy would be located 
at the level of discourse. More fundamental than this, 
however, is the level of the differend, which I see as being 
similar to the lifeworld in the broadest sense. Not in the 
sense of regional lif eworlds, as I called them above, but 
rather in the sense of a postmodern lif eworld that corresponds 
to Habermas' modern lifeworld. Lyotard characterizes the 
differend as follows: 
The dif f erend is the unstable and instant of language 
wherein something that must be able to be put into 
phrases cannot yet be. This state includes silence, which 
is a negative phrase but it also calls upon phrases which 
123 
are in principle possible. This state is signaled by what 
one ordinarily calls a felling: 'One cannot find the 
words,' ~tc. A lot of searching must be done to find new 
rules for f orrning and linking phrases that are able to 
express the differend disclosed by the feeling, unless 
one wants this dif f erend to be smothered right away in a 
litigation and for the alarm sounded by the felling to 
have been useless. What is at stake in literature and for 
philosophy, in a politics perhaps, is to bear witness to 
differends by finding axioms for thern"(TD, 13). 
The dif f erend is the inexpressible which is basic to 
expressibility. It always exceeds that which can be put into 
phrases. As such, it provides for the generation of new, even 
if inadequate modes of expression. In other words, the 
differend is an anti-rnetatheory of the impossibility of a 
self-contained discourse outside of parochially limited 
spheres. It likewise serves as the ontological precondition 
for the postmodern condition. 
In brief summary: For Haberrnas, the lifeworld represents 
the possibility for discourses that tend toward the 
transformation of society through emancipatory practices. For 
Lyotard, the differend represents the impossibility of unified 
language games that tend toward totalities. Paralogy is the 
ontic state that demonstrates this ontologically rudimentary 
condition. For Haberrnas, the advanced capitalist system 
confounds these possibilities by literally imprisoning the 
semantic resources which supplant the potential for 
liberation. For Lyotard, postmodern capitalism is the corning 
to fruition of the repressed under current of modernity, hence 
"freeing" us to recognize the radical contingency of the human 
condition. For Haberrnas, the modern lifeworld offers us the 
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iast hope of a politics of enlightenment. For Lyotard, the 
differend annuls the desire for a politics of enlightenment. 
I will return to Lyotard in the concluding section of this 
chapter. At this time, however, I will move on to the work of 
Fredric Jameson. 
For readers of Horkheimer's and Adorno's Dialectic of 
!flliqhtenment, reactions are similar to those of readers of 
Aldous Huxley's Brave New World: it either seems self 
evidently right or outrageously wrong. The interpretations 
differ, I believe, along political lines--depending on the 
readers position vis-a-vis the neo-conservative "revolutions" 
of the 1980' s. In this light, Fredric Jameson makes the 
following remark: 
Here at length, in this decade which has just ended but 
is still ours, Adorno's prophecies of the 'total system' 
finally came true in wholly unexpected form. Adorno was 
surely not the philosopher of the thirties (who has to be 
identified in retrospect, I'm afraid, as Heidegger); nor 
the philosopher of the forties and fifties; nor even the 
thinker of the sixties--those are called Sartre and 
Marcuse, respectively; and I have said that, 
philosophically and theoretically, his old-fashioned 
dialectical discourse was incompatible with the 
seventies. But there is some chance that he may turn out 
to have been the analyst of our own period which he did 
not live to see, and in which late capitalism has all but 
succeeded in eliminating the final loopholes of nature 
and the Unconscious, of subversion and the aesthetic, of 
individual and collective praxis alike, and, with a final 
fillip, in eliminating any memory trace of what thereby 
no longer existed in the henceforth postmodern 
landscape. 40 
In other words, Adorno is the first modernist to theorize the 
4° Fredric Jameson, Late Marxism: Adorno, or, The 
R..ersistence of the Dialectic, p. 5. 
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postmodern condition. What Habermas recognizes, but tries to 
steer around with normative theory, and what Lyotard 
recognizes and tries to make normative theory, Adorno saw in 
advance. This is far from saying that Adorno just had it all 
right and that we need not look farther in our attempts to 
grapple with the present and forge a new future (Adorno is 
particularly weak on the latter). Rather, it is to say that 
Adorno anticipated what I am calling capital without 
calvinism: a consumer society that has lost track of its 
material base and which possibly doesn't have enough 
consciousness left to maintain hope of regenerating visions of 
enlightenment. This is crucial for my argument as the issue 
hinges on whether or not the lifeworld has been irretrievably 
colonized by the system. Habermas thinks not (and in fact I 
agree). His own analysis, however, suggests otherwise. The 
difficulty, then, as I have alluded to above, lies with how to 
square the idea of a colonized lifeworld with a lifeworld 
based politics of enlightenment. For Habermas, the modern 
lifeworld contains all the necessary possibilities. In my 
judgment (and as I will argue in chapter V), to the extent 
that the lifeworld is modern, it has exhausted its 
possibilities. Hence, the return to Adorno, and hence my 
appeal to Jameson. 
If Lyotard' s The Postmodern Condition has become the 
postmodern bible, than Jameson's essay "The Cultural Logic of 
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Late Capitalism" ~ should at least be assigned the status of 
one of the lost gospels. In the book length version of CLC, 
Jameson provides a series of analyses of the contemporary 
social, theoretical, political and economic scene; or, more 
generally, postmodern culture. As one commentator puts it: 
" ... Postmodernism can be read as a long meditation on the 
place of Marxism in contemporary culture. "42 The title essay 
sets the stage. It demonstrates the way that various cultural 
products of late capitalism grovel nostalgically for the past 
without even entertaining the possibility of a future. In 
doing so a sort of depthlessness is admitted which doesn't 
merely preclude emancipatory political practices but goes a 
step further by precluding even the thought of 
"enlightenment." Jameson situates· this in terms of a meta-
narrative (in spite of Lyotard) of capitalist development. 
Informed by Ernest Mandel's Late Capitalism, Jameson 
identifies three distinct phases of capitalism's evolution. 
The first he deems market capitalism, the second, monopoly 
capitalism, and the third, multinational or postmodern 
capitalism. To each of these corresponds a particular 
technological innovation. For the first it was the steam 
engine and the revolutionary changes that it made possible in 
• 
41 Originally published in 1984, this essay is reprinted 
in its entirety in Postmodernism, or,The Cultural Logic of 
kate Capitalism (CLC). 
42 Reed Way Dasenbrock, "Fredric Jameson and the Dilemmas 
Of Late Marxism" (1992). 
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the industrial world; for the second it was electricity that 
enabled a qualitative departure from the classical period of 
capitalist production--one which led to imperialism; for the 
third it was the computer, which enabled capital to achieve 
the sort of liquidity that made the whole world its back yard. 
Jameson claims that this final, postmodern, phase of 
capitalism is the purest. In a sense it represents the destiny 
of capitalism. 43 
This is one of the points that I was attempting to make 
in my discussion of Lyotard: that the postmodern condition is 
a highly developed--if not quite inevitable--stage of 
capitalism. This, once again, seems to square with Habermas' 
analysis. Reading Lyotard' s description of the postmodern 
condition leads one almost immediately to the conclusion that 
what postmodernity is about is economies. That is to say, the 
postmodern world is a grand circulatory system in which sign 
value is exchanged at the same pace, and on the same level, as 
commodities. Or, to put this in Habermasian terms: We live in 
a world that is steered by forces-- money and power--that have 
systemic lives which range well beyond the control of 
individuals or collectives of individuals. As such, the ideas 
of autonomy and emancipation really are reduced to the nodal 
politics of Lyotard's Matrix. For Jameson, who remains 
attached to the base/superstructure model of marxian fame, 
43 For a useful summary of Jameson's Marxist approach to 
postmodernism see Alex Callinicos, Against Postmodernism, pp. 
128-132. 
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this is best explained in terms of ideologies of the market. 
AS such, I will turn to the chapter in CLC titled 
upostmodernism and the Market." 
Jameson begins his discussion by identifying the market 
as one of the great "ideologemes" of the modern period. It 
represents a transcendental force that rescues us from our 
futile attempts to order our own lives, rationally determine 
our material wants and needs, and corrects our tendencies 
toward excessiveness by defining limits in terms of consumer 
power. Jameson's objective is to show how the market, as 
ideologeme, cannot be separated from the political-economy of 
capitalism: 
So also with the attempt to separate ideology and 
reality; the ideology of the market is unfortunately not 
some supplementary ideational or representational luxury 
or embellishment that can be removed from the economic 
problem and then sent over to some cultural or 
superstructural morgue, to be dissected by specialists 
over there. it is somehow generated by the thing itself, 
as its objectively necessary afterimage; somehow both 
dimensions must be registered together, in their identity 
as well as their difference (CLC, p. 260). 
His view is that the idea of the market lies at the very heart 
of the possibilities for the radical transformation of society 
(or in my terms a politics of enlightenment). Once we have 
thoroughly internalized the idea that the market is an 
economic constant which reflects human nature we will have 
effectively eliminated a whole range of other possibilities. 
As one reads through Jameson's analysis--which is based 
on section one of Marx's Grundrisse (to which I will return in 
chapter III)--one begins to wonder what this has to do with 
129 
postmodernity. He returns to this theme, however, precisely 
where his argument concerning the idea of the market reaches 
a point of transition. "The representational consequences of 
a view like this will now lead us belatedly to pronounce the 
word postmodernism for the first time" (CLC, p. 268-69). What 
distinguishes the modern market from the postmodern market is 
effectively a shift in pace and volume. In other words, it is 
a classic case of a quantitative change becoming qualitative. 
whereas the modern market was underpinned by a frugality--
rooted in the protestant work ethic (which was both an ethic 
of production and an ethic of contained consumption )--the 
postmodern market is consumption gone berserk. "We must 
therefore posit another type of consumption: consumption of 
the very process of consumption itself, above and beyond its 
content and the immediate commercial products" (CLC, p. 276). 
For Jameson this shift is rooted in the new technologies that 
he identifies with multinational or postmodern capitalism: 
electronic technologies such as computerized information 
systems and mass media. This meta-consumption can be explained 
in terms of the evolution of modern market economies. In order 
for capitalism to work there has to be ever increasing 
consumption. Yet consumer needs are finite--you can only need 
so much. As such, in order for the economy to continue to 
operate, mechanisms need to be introduced so as to trump up 
consumption. Hence, the economy becomes dematerialized: 
exchange for exchange sake. Without stating this in so many 
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words, what Jameson implies is that the postmodern market has 
created a sort of consumptive ethos that has permeated to the 
core of consciousness in advanced capitalist society. This is 
not to say that meta-consumptive urges can be fulfilled under 
these conditions. In fact, needs are never fulfilled: whether 
one lives in abject poverty or in extravagant luxury. The 
market, Jameson seems to claim, has moved qualitatively from 
the base of modern economics to the metaphysical 
superstructure of po~tmodern economies. This development must 
be confronted if a pol1tics of enlightenment is to take shape. 
"What is wanted is a great collective project in which an 
active majority of the population participates, as something 
belonging to it and constructed by its own energies. The 
setting of social priorities--also know in the socialist 
literature as planning--would have to be part of such a 
collective project. It should be clear, however, that 
virtually by definition the market cannot project at all" 
( CLC I p • 2 7 8 ) • 
Normative vs. Descriptive Postmodernism: 
Toward a Critical Theory of the Aftermath of Modernity 
The focus of this chapter has been Habermas' account of 
advanced capitalist societies. I identified a shift in his 
thinking from Legitimation Crisis to The Theory of 
.Q.ommunicative Action. This shift, in my estimation, makes 
important concessions to a certain type of postmodernism. A 
good indication of this is the way in which he appropriates 
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the language of "steering media." That his description is of 
Q_ostmodern capitalism is testified to by the way that he shows 
how money and power have become those media. The modern dream 
of self-determination has been surpassed by the systemic 
imperatives that are at the heart of the capitalist mode of 
production. The fact that Habermas has significantly toned 
down the language of legitimacy in this more recent analysis 
indicates that the notion of political legitimacy has come to 
play a much smaller roll. This suggests that he is making 
major concessions to the critique which started with Dialectic 
of Enlightenment; It is conceptually incoherent to forecast a 
legitimation crisis when illegitimacy has been internally 
accepted. This analysis is augmented by Lyotard's and 
Jameson's. Lyotard, it could be claimed, has a micro-analysis 
of steering media. While he wouldn't want to accept Habermas' 
systematic totalization of the situation, his own account 
resonates strikingly with the notion that all of social life 
is determined by systems of exchange. Jameson makes this point 
more explicitly. His claims are more economic than political, 
but in the final analysis so are Habermas'. He (Habermas) 
shows quite conclusively--without any sophisticated economic 
analysis--that a material base rooted in market economies 
which are premised on the high speed exchange (money) of 
commodities leads to the exchange of political power in a 
similar fashion. What drops out of the analysis for all three 
theorists is the notion of collective agency under such 
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conditions. In each case some mechanism, or set of mechanisms, 
have kicked in which diminish significantly the social, 
political, and economic role of the modern subject. This, in 
my judgment, adds up to a qualitative change, if not a 
determinate rupture. 
Does this mean, then, that we now live in a postmodern 
world? Further, does it mean that we are beyond the point of 
establishing movements aimed at collective emancipation? Both 
of these questions depend to a certain extent on how we define 
our terms. This is particularly the case with the former. As 
such, I would like to conclude this chapter by distinguishing 
more clearly between normative and descriptive postmodernism 
and to show why I prefer to revise the terminological debate. 
Let me begin with descriptive postmodernism. This side of 
the distinction is relatively self-explanatory. A descriptive 
postmodernist is one who characterizes various contemporary 
scenarios as being postmodern without making value judgments 
about that condition. Jameson falls easily into this category 
as he explicitly claims that postmodernity is an advanced 
phase of capitalism. I have also suggested that to a certain 
extent Habermas falls into this category. His is a more 
difficult case as he would deny this at all cost. His reasons 
for this denial are sound as for him, the politics of 
enlightenment are bound up in normative structures that are 
distinctly modern. As I indicated above, however, there are 
key shifts in his analysis that place him closer to Lyotard 
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than he himself would be comfortable with. This leads to an 
empirical/normative dualism which plays itself out as 
incompatibility. In other words (and as Jameson points out) 
you can't wish for a modern politics of enlightenment if we 
now live in a postmodern world. 
Habermas' response to this would be that if we concede 
the postmodern condition we can't talk about a politics of 
enlightenment at all. Jameson equivocates on this question 
while Lyotard seems to agree with Habermas and celebrates this 
point of no return. As Christopher Norris puts it, Lyotard 
propounds a "rock-bottom cynical outlook" (and in sighting 
this I am agreeing with it). Citing a passage in which Lyotard 
lampoons virtually all the ideals of modernity, Norris states 
the following: 
This passage is the center-piece of Lyotard's argument 
that we have now lived on into a postmodern epoch when it 
is no longer possible to attach any credence to those old 
'meta-narrative' schemas (truth, enlightenment, progress 
and so forth) which once lent support to such grandiose 
ideas. Henceforth it can only be a matter of 'phrases in 
dispute', piecemeal items of evidential witness which 
claim no privileged epistemic status (much less any 
access to the master-code of history), and which thus 
submit themselves to the nominalist tribunal of isolated 
facts, dates, or events. Any theory that attempts to do 
more--to situate those facts within some larger, more 
ambitious explanatory paradigrn--is ignoring the weight of 
de facto evidence that composes the sad chronicle of 
history to date. 44 
Lyotard fails, however, in his attempt to be a cool 
positivist, simply laying out the facts. As I pointed out in 
44 Christopher Norris, What's Wrong With Postmodernism, 
p. 7. 
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my analysis of The Postmodern Condition Lyotard's vocabulary 
is laced with terminology which celebrates the postmodern 
condition that we find ourselves in. We have been liberated 
from the myth of autonomy; we are emancipated from the 
responsibility to pursue our own destinies; we have matured 
beyond the point that universally valid values are even 
thinkable; and we are no longer responsible for making 
history. Lyotard doesn't simply describe postmodernity; he 
prescribes it as well. In what might seem a paradoxical 
formulation, Lyotard is a straight forwardly normative 
postmodernist. His description is an admonition to be resigned 
to a world in which we are no longer expected to think and act 
for ourselves and with others. 
The cynicism of this, as Norris put it, is more blatantly 
expressed in Lyotard' s Just Gaming. This text, a dialogue 
between Lyotard and Jean-Loup Thebaud, is supposed to be a 
postmodern version of Plato's Republic. It is a playful 
attempt to think through the question of justice in an age 
that has no basis for distinguishing between legitimate and 
illegitimate action. The thesis is that in a standardless 
world we are limited to the expression of preferences. In 
their defense of this position they turn to Kant's Critique of 
Judqment. 45 I won't rehearse the views that they articulate as 
they are generally weakly defended and of no great interest to 
~ As I indicated 
analysis distorts the 
political philosophy. 
in Chapter I, I believe this sort of 
potential that lies in a Kantian 
135 
critical social theory (unlike The Postmodern Condition and 
1]1e Differend which I think are very important). Rather, I 
will turn to a passage that illustrates both the normative 
status and moral and political vacuity of Lyotard's stance. He 
states the following: 
Yes, it is quite broadly a politics of capital, actually. 
That is true. And I think that what interested me, was to 
see it at work within capital, to make it appear in its 
affirmative force. Except that, insofar as one is a 
political thinker, one cannot do without justice. But the 
question is: What is this horizon? Which horizon are we 
determining? (JG, 90-91). 
This remark is prefaced with a parenthetical laugh 
"(laughter)". It seems to be an attempt at irony. 'We used to 
believe in the abolition of capitalism, the goals of 1968, but 
now we are simply defending the status quo. Isn't it ironic?' 
Lyotard realizes, in a moment of self reflection, that his 
postmodernism has brought him full circle. Since all of the 
ideals that factor into a theory of justice have been 
obliterated, we are right back to square one: only better or 
worse, depending on ones perspective. Better if the return to 
capitalism, in its postmodern form, is the sign of maturity; 
worse if it represents the lost hope that Kant identified with 
maturation. Lyotard, while loathe to judge positively on this 
issue, seems to come down squarely on the side of 
postmodernity, which as he seems to recognize is to advocate 
what Jameson calls postmodern capitalism. 
Having roughly sketched the normative/descriptive 
distinction, I would now like to problematize it. Habermas 
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seems concerned that to concede the descriptive point is to 
border on accepting the normative point. Lyotard' s 
irrepressible use of normative language seems to illustrate 
this problem. Jameson makes the strongest effort to keep the 
two separate but ultimately runs into similar problems.~ A 
possible solution to this difficulty would be to dispense with 
postmodernity as a descriptive term and refigure it as a 
normative term. It is interesting to note that the first time 
Habermas uses the term postmodern, in legitimation Crisis, he 
does so with the intent of affirmatively expressing a possible 
future. I don't think too much should be made of this in terms 




as I claim, 
in the framework that I am 
the project of enlightenment 
cannot be fulfilled in modern terms than it only stands to 
reason that we should look toward something post-modern. What 
is currently described as postmodernity holds some of the 
answers; but as I have been trying to show, it culminates in 
a cynical resignation to what is worst about modernity. As 
such, I prefer to call what is being characterized as the 
postmodern condition, the aftermath of modernity: a phase in 
the evolution of modernity that is qualitatively 
distinguishable from early phases, but does not represent a 
radical departure. 
In defense of this terminological shift it is important 
46 See the introduction to CLC. 
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to note once again the reasons for labeling the present 
postmodern. The most sophisticated advocates of this view 
point to important cultural, social and economic changes which 
indicate the end of modernity. It is not precisely an end, 
however, but rather a slipping back and forth--into and out 
of--modern forms and conditions. As such, the distinctive 
feature of postmodernity is ultimately its fuzziness. This is 
most obvious in modes of cultural expression; rather than the 
clean detached radicalism of "high-modern" art, architecture, 
prose and poetry, postmodern expressions integrate elements 
from diffuse traditions while at the same time disintegrating 
the notion that they comprise a totality. Socially, 
postmodernity is defined by crises in identity; gender roles, 
racial identities and sexual orientation have all become 
question marks rather than handed down truths. Economically, 
postmodernity is marked by radical liquidity; capital, in the 
atmosphere of leverage buyouts, multi-national/multi-
dimensional conglomerates and maze like corporate structures, 
has in a sense lost its determinateness and as such is 
vulnerable to radical redistribution. These I take to be some 
of the more positive aspects of the postmodern condition--
those that afford important possibilities. 
The common factor in each of these spheres of 
postmodernity is the emergence of radical difference and 
conglomeration. I question, however, the authenticity of these 
features. In the cultural sphere they seem subjectively 
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contrived; in the economic sphere they cloak and preserve the 
very worst of modern capitalism (alienation and exploitation) 
while expunging that which is desirable (efficiency and 
productivity); in the social sphere they provide the framework 
for a political myth which deflates contestation and reif ies 
existing hegemonies. In fact then the conditions of advanced 
capitalist societies are not postmodern at all. Rather they 
represent the aftermath of modernity, or modernity in struggle 
with itself: still modern but at a point where modernity runs 
up against its own contradictions. At its best, postmodernity 
is a projection--one which must be thought through in terms of 
political strategies that are appropriate to bringing it 
about. Hence the need for a politics of enlightenment in the 
aftermath of modernity. 
As I indicated above, Habermas could possibly agree with 
this up to a point. He certainly wants to deny that advanced 
societies are postmodern. It is his view that all necessary 
emancipatory structures have developed during modernity and 
that this is where a poiitics of enlightenment must take its 
heed. This, however, ignores the radical deformation of these 
structures in their present state--a condition that Habermas 
describes with piercing insight. In the following chapter I 
will focus on the value structures of modernity and argue for 
my claim that they are inextricably intertwined with the 
capitalist mode of production. 
CHAPTER 3 
MODERN NORMATIVITY AND THE 
UTOPIAN IDEALS OF DISCOURSE 
In chapter one I examined the problem of enlightenment 
from a conceptual point of view. In Chapter two I discussed 
the same problem in sociological terms. In the present chapter 
I will be approaching the question from a normative 
perspective. The primary concern can be stated as follows: Do 
the normative structures of modernity have a relationship to 
enlightenment that is unambiguous enough to ground a politics 
of enlightenment? I have suggested thus far that this is not 
the case. Here I will undertake the task of providing a more 
substantial defense of my position. In doing so I will begin 
by examining Habermas' theory of language and communication. 
This may, on the surface, seem odd; but for Habermas this is 
the most important place to examine the pure normative content 
of modernity. It is within the structures of modern languages 
that we find the embedded moral content which provides us with 
a foundation for criticizing the aberrations that mark 
advanced capitalist societies. My critique of this will take 
as its point of departure Marx's analysis of bourgeois 
categories such as freedom and truth in the Grundrisse and 
will proceed to an analysis of Habermas' central categories: 
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communication that enabled the rise of fascism? And, what are 
the necessary conditions for a social structure premised on 
discursive clarity? These questions lead Habermas deeply into 
theories of language and communication. According to Thomas 
McCarthy, this provides the foundation for his entire project: 
"the theory of communicative competence is decidedly not a 
theoretical luxury in the context of critical social theory; 
it is a concerted effort to rethink the foundations of the 
theory-practice problematic. The success or failure of this 
effort cannot be a matter of indifference to a social theory 
designed with a practical intent. As we shall see, Habermas' 
argument is, simply, that the goal of critical theory--a form 
of life free from unnecessary domination--is inherent in the 
notion of truth; it is anticipated in every act of 
communication. 112 This states the importance of language and 
communication analyses for Habermas' formulation of critical 
theory. In the following section I will discuss the 
development of his views on this topic, keeping in mind the 
role that they play in his notion of a politics of 
enlightenment. 
Fred Dallmayr points out that while Habermas' work did 
not take an abrupt "linguistic turn", at a relatively well 
defined point it became necessary for him to undertake a 
careful study of language and communication theories. In 1970 
two articles, "On Systematically Distorted Communication" and 
2 Thomas McCarthy, 1978, p. 273. 
142 
"Towards a Theory of Communicative Competency", appeared in 
back to back issues of Inguiry which for the purposes of this 
essay will serve as an introduction to Habermas' theories of 
language and communication. 3 The first utilizes Freudian 
psychoanalytic methods to evaluate communication breakdown 
caused by systemic linguistic discrepancies; the second draws 
upon Chomsky's theory of generative linguistics, as well as 
Austin's and Searle's speech-act theories, to substantiate the 
view that in discourse, validity claims can be raised to the 
levels of truth, truthfulness and rightness. These essays 
state the fundamental problem, and provide the framework for 
a solution, that has guided Habermas' critical theory in the 
70 's and 80 's. I will here explicate their main features, 
highlighting the themes that are developed more completely in 
subsequent writings. 
In "On Systematically Distorted Communication" ( SDC), 
Habermas identifies two types of communication irregularities: 
the first he associates with psychosis--communicative behavior 
that is completely out of synch with social reality; the 
second, which he labels "pseudo-communication", is a form of 
communicative neurosis, causing distortion that is not 
noticeable in the context of communicative practice. It is the 
latter form of deviance that concerns Habermas as it has a 
significant effect on everyday discourse. Pseudo-communication 
is detectable only by a neutral observer who can then trace 
3 See Fred Dallmayr, Language and Politics, pp. 123-125. 
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distortion to an elemental point of crisis. Habermas uses the 
Freudian analyst as a model for the neutral observer. By 
evaluating communication patterns in terms of established 
criteria, the analyst can identify the problem and provide 
counsel that will contribute to the reconstruction of 
communicative behavior such that systematically embedded 
deviances are eliminated. 4 Habermas argues that there are 
norms of communication that ensure communicative clarity. 
These are instantiated in a language system shared by a 
community of speakers. When the rules of the system aren't 
adhered to, communicative practice will be distorted. Habermas 
sµmmarizes as follows: 
No matter on which level of communication the symptoms 
appear, whether in linguistic expression, in behavioral 
compulsion, or in the realm of gestures, one always finds 
an isolated content therein which has been ex-
communicated from the public-language performance. This 
content expresses an intention which is incomprehensible 
according to the rules of public communication, and 
which, as such, has become private, although in such a 
way that it remains inaccessible even to the author to 
whom it must nevertheless be ascribed. There is 
communication obstruction in the self between the ego 
which is capable of speech and participants in 
intersubjectively established language-games, and that 
"inner foreign territory" (Freud), which is represented 
by a private or primary linguistic symbolism (SDC, 205-
7) • 
Habermas' intention is to use psychoanalysis as a model 
4 Habermas cites three basic criteria for discerning 
incomprehensibility in communicative practices: 1) rule 
d~viation--either syntactic or semantic; 2) context 
~isorientation--use of linguistic gestures that are 
i~appropriate to a given situation; 3) lack of congruency--a 
disintegration in the coherence between linguistic symbols, 
action and non-verbal gestures (SDC, 206-7). 
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for examining communicative distortion. He asserts that 
incomprehensible communicative practice is infected with a 
sort of neurosis of the language system. This results in 
semantic incongruity, causing defective meaning 
representation. The process of tracing this back to a point of 
critical breakage in the sequence of linguistic development is 
analogous to the psychoanalyst's probing of the patients past 
experiences in search of a crisis that will account for some 
behavioral disorder. Like the psychoanalyst, the communication 
analyst attempts to reconstruct the developmental process in 
line with normative standards, enabling the communication 
participant to regain access to public discourse (SDC, 207-9). 
The analyst must adopt a hermeneutical posture in order 
to understand distorted communication. Semantic analyses are 
sufficient for identifying the problem; in order to grasp its 
nature, however, a careful explanation, informed by a 
scrupulous interrogation of contextual circumstances pertinent 
to the instance of distortion, must be provided. "The What, 
the semantic content of a systematically distorted 
manifestation, cannot be 'understood' if it is not possible at 
the same time to 'explain' the Why, the origin of the 
symptomatic scene with reference to the initial circumstances 
which led to the systematic distortion itself" (SDC, p. 209). 
This hermeneutic move has two phases: the context of a deviant 
communication pattern must be understood in order to 
completely explain the point of distortion; once an 
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explanation has been provided it serves as the basis for 
understanding the operation of this communication pattern in 
undistorted fashion. 5 
Achieving a sufficient level of understanding requires 
that the analyst go beyond standard hermeneutic approaches, 
developing an interpretive strategy that is shaped by a set of 
scientifically conceived theoretical propositions. Habermas 
terms this "scenic understanding": an understanding premised 
on the relationship between the original--where distortion 
ernerges--and the transference of semantic distortion to 
analogous scenes. The analyst uses the "everyday scene"--which 
is based on normal communication--as a standard of measure. 
Habermas embraces scenic understanding for the following 
reasons: first, a special mode of communication is opened 
which enables the analyst to penetrate the contexts of 
distortion (the analyst/patient relationship); second, the 
analyst has a pre-understanding that is informed by the 
already isolated distorted pattern. The former provides a 
situation that enables the explication of distorted meaning 
which would never arise in the course of everyday 
communication; the latter narrows the range of semantic 
possibilities to a manageable number. These two features of 
scenic understanding distinguish it from semantic analysis and 
5 This view resembles G.H. von Wright's theory of the 
relationship between understanding and explanation. For von 
Wright, understanding must inform explanation; in turn, 
explanation provides the framework for further understanding. 
See Explanation and Understanding, Chapt III. 
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standard hermeneutic understanding, neither of which has the 
theoretical sophistication needed to sufficiently grasp the 
situation in question (SDC, p. 208-9). 
The theoretical basis of scenic understanding rests on 
three propositions: 1) that we have a preconceived notion of 
undistorted communication; 2) that distortion can be traced to 
a specific breakdown in the developmental sequences of 
symbolic organization; and 3) that in order to explain 
communication distortion a theory of interactional patterns 
and personality structures must be utilized (SDC, 209-10). 
The first proposition is concerned with the structures of 
normal communication. Non-distorted communication is coherent 
at all of the three fundamental levels: language, action and 
gesture. This model of coherence provides a meta-communication 
standard against which deviant patterns can be evaluated. The 
standard for the meta-system is established by the structure 
that undergirds communication communities: a set of linguistic 
rules that are commonly adhered to. For Habermas, the 
important feature of the meta-system is its rootedness in a 
shared sense of meaning. As such, normal communication 
provides for a plenitude of mutual understanding. This enables 
participants to make fundamental distinctions (subject/object, 
public/private, etc.) as there are commonly applied rules that 
allow speakers to differentiate opposites. Further, shared 
semantic rules allow clear references to be made, enabling 
accurate and efficient object identification. Finally, speaker 
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identity (ego, alter-ego and collective ego) is clarified in 
terms of rules of intersubj ecti vi ty, facilitating intelligible 
reciprocal discourse. With such a system properly intact, 
abstract concepts such as substance, causality and space and 
time can be developed in a mutually comprehensible fashion 
(this hints at Habermas' consensus theory of truth--SDC, pp. 
210-12). 
The second proposition is basically the antithesis of the 
first. Insofar as the analyst presupposes an "ideal speech 
situation", 6 she/he must also assume a pre-linguistic, pre-
rational mode of communication to which distorted 
communicative behavior regresses. The theoretical model that 
Habermas adopts is "archaic symbol-organization"--a 
communication system based on "paleosymbols." "Paleosymbols do 
not fit into a system of grammatical rules. They are not 
classified elements and do not appear in sentences which could 
be transformed grammatically" (SDC, p. 212). Habermas places 
emphasis on the fact that at this level there is no way to 
systematically account for communicative structures. Rather 
than being grounded in a set of internally coherent rules, 
paleosymbolic communication is based on emotive gestures that 
are specific to immediate contexts. As such, making 
differentiations necessary for communicative transference (to 
. 
6 Habermas doesn't use the phrase ideal speech situation 
7n this essay. I will be discussing his conception of the 
ideal conditions that he presumes undergird communicative 
relations shortly, clarifying my usage of the phrase in the 
present context. 
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a broad range of contexts) is impossible. Semantic content 
remains private; a paleosymbolic system cannot generate 
substantive public communication. "The distinction between 
reality and appearance, between the public and private sphere 
cannot be clearly differentiated with the help of paleosymbols 
(adualism)" (SDC, p. 213). 
Guided by this theoretical precept, the analyst can trace 
communication disturbances to a point at which primitive 
symbolism infects the speakers linguistic system. Once this is 
identified, the distorted system can be resymbolized such that 
it falls in line with the reality represented in the meta-
system. 
On the basis of the analysts experience with neurotic 
patients, we can, as has been shown, recognize the 
function of psychoanalysis as language analysis, insofar 
as it allows separated symbolic content, which lead to a 
private narrowing of public communication, to be 
reintegrated into common linguistic usage (SDC, p. 214). 
The objective is to "excommunicate" prelinguistic elements 
that impinge upon the rational structures of shared linguistic 
systems. These first two theoretical propositions articulate 
the ideal presuppositions that ground the analytic-
reconstructive practice of scenic-understanding (SDC, p. 214-
15). 7 
• 
7 It should be quite clear that the paleosymbolic 
intrusions that Habermas would have the analyst purge, and the 
methodologies and meta-linguistic presuppositions that the 
analyst would use, are symptoms of the enlightened 
rationalization of language that the authors of DOE indicted. 
For Horkheimer and Adorno these fragments of non-rationalized 
expression would represent emancipatory hope. This, for the 
most part, is not the case for Habermas. His response to 
149 
The final proposition establishes the relationship 
between psychoanalytic and communication theory. The Freudian 
triad of personality dimensions corresponds to the three 
linguistic levels which concern Habermas: The Id corresponds 
to disordered speech; the Ego corresponds to normal speech; 
and the Super-ego corresponds to the meta-system. In summary, 
"the structural model which Freud introduced as the 
categorical frame of meta-psychology can be reduced to a 
theory of deviant communicative competence" (SOC, p. 216). 
Habermas' objective can be understood more clearly by 
taking into consideration the point I made earlier concerning 
his interest in the role of propaganda in the rise of fascist 
regimes. Propaganda is the archetypical form of distorted 
communication: it is monological, semantically inconsistent 
and appeals to emotions rather than reason. Insofar as 
language plays an important role in action coordination, a 
Horkheimer and Adorno would be that they yearn for a primitive 
reality that never existed. Habermas does, however, make this 
curious comment: "There is however a third case: the processes 
of the creative extension of language. In this case a genuine 
integration is accomplished. The paleosyrnbolically fixed 
meaning potential is then brought into the open and is there 
made available for public communication. This tr an sf er of 
semantic contents from the prelinguistic into the common stock 
of language widens the scope of communicative action as it 
diminishes that of unconsciously motivated action. The moment 
of success in the case of creative language is a moment of 
~mancipation" (my emphasis). Habermas' recognition that 
systemic deviance has emancipatory potential is an interesting 
aspect of this essay that fails to re-emerge in subsequent 
writings. While he would insist on inscribing this deviant 
moment in the established system, he is willing to acknowledge 
that a distortion of normativity can be productive. I will 
return to this issue in chapter five. 
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linguistic system premised on propaganda will lead to 
corporate action that is unreflective, unpredictable and 
irrational. Given the obviously undesirable nature of such 
activity, remedial action should be aimed at distortion in the 
communication system(s). How this can best be accomplished is 
an entirely different matter. The approach suggested by 
Habermas is problematic in several crucial respects. 
First, the analogy between psychoanalysis and 
socialanalysis is weak. There are radical differences between 
a patient on the analysts couch and an aggregate of subjects 
that share a communication system. How can a communication 
community be interrogated in such a way that the corporate 
soul is laid bare? Who is qualified to conduct the analysis? 
To what degree is the analyst a product of the distorted 
communication patterns of the community? Habermas would argue 
that the answer to all of these questions is located in the 
social scientific hermeneutic that is applied by the 
psychoanalyst. This simply needs to be adapted to the 
circumstances faced by a social analyst. 
Another important objection is issued in by this 
response. The assumption fundamental to Freudian analysis is 
that behavioral disorders can be linked to a traumatic moment 
in the past. Once this moment is identified and brought to the 
level of patient consciousness, the "cure" can begin to take 
shape. Disregarding the questions that can be raised 
concerning this approach to psychoanalysis, the notion of an 
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origin to which communicative distortion can be traced is 
highly problematic. Language, and the formations it assumes in 
communication, is the product of a complex of historical 
phenomena. To isolate a particular phenomenon, label it the 
primary cause of distortion, and begin to therapeutically 
reshape communication from this point of original 
transgression is a dubious task. The example that seems to be 
in the back of Habermas' mind--communicative distortion in 
Nazi Germany--is a case in point. A number of interwoven .and 
overlapping phenomena facilitated the proliferation of fascist 
propaganda. To isolate a point of origin in this causal mish-
mash would be difficult if not impossible. 
Finally, the claim that a set of communicative rules can 
be used as a standard of normalcy is problematic. If 
discursive practice is distorted, why would discourse rules be 
any less distorted? This ties into the question raised in my 
first objection concerning the relationship between the social 
analyst and the "patient". If the analyst operates within the 
same network of communication as the "patient" (which is 
necessary if there is to be any intelligibility), then 
analysis will reflect the distortions that permeate the 
communicative system. Habermas' assumption seems to be that 
the analyst is enlightened above and beyond the average 
participant; and that this illumination provides access to 
ideal rules of communication. If the analyst is bound by 
distorted discursive rules, the proposed remedy will only 
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contribute to the existing predicament. Habermas would claim 
that there are meta-systemic rules that can be grasped and 
used as standards against which discursive practices are 
measured. I will indicate some problems with this view 
shortly. 
While this is not Habermas' most sophisticated version of 
his theory of clear and distorted communication, it does 
contain several elements that figure prominently in later 
formulations. Specifically, the notion of an originary 
communicative form, the claim that intersubjectivity has a 
natural primacy over other discursive patterns and the use of 
hermeneutic social science to grasp and repair problems. As 
they stand, the objections I have raised are merely questions. 
I will develop these more completely in terms of Habermas' 
latest work in the final chapter of this book. For now it 
suffices to say that "On Systematically Distorted 
Communication" is a problematic, yet crucially important, 
phase in the evolution of Habermas' theory of communicative 
action. 
The main tenets of this essay are drawn together with a 
view to its sequel. Semantic analysis in general depends upon 
a well formed notion of communicative competence between 
native speakers (participants in a communication community). 
In order to detect and remedy distortion, a theoretical 
understanding of communicative competence is essential. As 
such, this essay leads directly into the theory of 
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communicative competence. 
rn "Towards a Theory of Communicative Competence" ( TTCC) , 
Habermas moves out of Freudian psychoanalytic theory and into 
chomskyan linguistics. His focus is on Chomsky's view that 
linguistic experience is disproportionate to linguistic 
knowledge; we know more than can be accounted for by our 
experiences. Chomsky explains this in terms of the following 
assumptions: 1) speakers rely on an abstract linguistic system 
that is composed of generative rules; 2) this system of rules 
is innate; 3) the innate structure shapes all natural 
languages (universally); and 4) specific instances of language 
usage are a manifestation of deep linguistic structures that 
surface through the application of transformation rules. The 
competent speaker is one who has sufficiently mastered these 
rules--derivatives of the innate linguistic mechanism (TTCC, 
p. 360-1). 
While impressed with Chomsky's focus on speaker 
creativity, the grammatical structures of language and the 
asymmetry between experience and knowledge, Habermas finds 
fault in his "monological" characterization of linguistic 
competence. The only model of intersubjectivity that can be 
derived from this is mechanistic; shared meaning is merely a 
function of similarities between the linguistic program of 
speakers. "Speech, the actual language behavior, would then 
have to be explained as the result of interaction between 
linguistic competence and certain psychological, as well as 
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sociological, peripheral conditions which restrict the 
application of competence" (TTCC, p. 362). This monological 
model of communication is accompanied by an a prioristic 
semantic theory which neglects the "pragmatic dimension of 
language performance", denying the potential for meaning 
development in the context of reciprocal communication (TTCC, 
361-2) . 
Habermas attempts to counter these flaws by developing a 
semantic theory that recognizes both a priori and a posteriori 
universals. A priori universals provide the foundation for 
communicative and interpretive schemas. A posteriori 
universals are contingent but apply trans-culturally. The 
difference between the two can be understood in terms of the 
difference between intersubjectively and rnonologically 
determined semantic structures. "Therefore, we differentiate 
between semantic universals which precede all socialization 
and semantic universals which are linked to the condition of 
potential socialization (rnonological/intersubjective)" (TTCC, 
p. 363). This theory generates four classes of semantic 
universals: dialogue-constituent universals which include 
personal pronouns, imperatives, interrogatives, assertives, 
etc; cultural universals which include organizational 
signif iers such as words that designate kinship relations; 
universal cognitive schemes of interpretation such as 
substance, causality and space and time; and universals of 
perceptive and motivational constitution which are a function 
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of basic drives--such as the sex drive, hunger and thirst--and 
patterns of emotional expression. The first two are 
respectively intersubjective a priori and intersubjective a 
posteriori; the second two are respectively monological a 
priori and monological a posteriori (TTCC, p. 363-4). 
Habermas seeks to develop his theory of communicative 
competence on the basis of intersubjective universals. While 
Chomsky's monological universals have a valid function, their 
theoretical usefulness is limited by an inability to go beyond 
an "elementaristic meaning-analysis" (TTCC, p. 365). This 
excludes all complex semantic relations and meaning 
development. Speaker competency must be defined in terms of 
situations of linguistic application that depend on an 
intersubjective linguistic structure. 
This structure is generated neither by the monologically 
mastered system of linguistic rules, nor by the extra-
linguistic conditions of its performance. On the 
contrary, in order to participate in normal discourse the 
speaker must have at his disposal, in addition to his 
linguistic competence, basic qualifications of speech and 
symbolic interaction (role-behavior), which we may call 
communicative competence. Thus communicative competence 
means the mastery of an ideal speech situation (TTCC, p. 
367). 
In order to clarify this position, Habermas turns to the 
speech-act theory of Austin. 
Austin, in his analysis of the usage of performative 
verbs, draws a distinction between locutionary and 
illocutionary meaning. Locutionary meaning is solely a 
function of the propositional content of an expression; 
illocutionary meaning is a combination of propositional 
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content and the general notion of a speech situation. 8 
Habermas, following Austin, labels this "illocutionary force". 
Any expression of illocutionary force depends upon an a priori 
knowledge of the structures of intersubjective communication. 
This, for Habermas, establishes the existence of "the 
universal pragmatic power of utterances" (TTCC, 367). The 
theory of communicative competence must therefore be premised 
on this notion of universal pragmatics (TTCC, pp. 366-7) 
Habermas' claim is that at the foundation of any 
linguistic utterance lies an intersubjective a priori semantic 
I 
structure which is itself, in a sense, linguistically 
determined; the speech situation is composed of reflexive 
relations. This is not, however, to be understood as an 
empirical generalization. Rather, in order to generate data 
for empirical observation, "the structure of potential speech" 
must be in place. "It is the dialogue-constitutive universals, 
as we now prefer to say, that establish in the first place the 
form of intersubjectivity between any competent speakers 
capable of mutual understanding" (TTCC, p. 369). The basis, 
then, of communicative competence is the ideal speech 
situation. In order to engage in communicative acts the 
speaker must have a mastery of intersubjective a priori 
universals. 
8 Two meaning constitutives supplement 
structure of the propositional content of 






utterances9 (TTCC, pp. 369-71). 
As a result of this analysis, Habermas identifies a 
number of symmetrical relations which exist in the ideal 
speech situation. 
Pure intersubjectivity is determined by a symmetrical 
relation between I and You (We and You), I and He (We and 
They). An unlimited interchangeability of dialogue roles 
demands that no side be privileged in the performance of 
these roles; pure intersubjectivity exists only when 
there is complete symmetry in the distribution of 
assertion and dispute, revelation and concealment, 
prescription and conformity, among the partners of 
communication (TTCC, p. 371). 
Maintaining these symmetries enables subjects to reach 
consensus through open ended discussion, provides for genuine 
interpersonal rapport through honest self-representation and 
facilitates the establishment of universalizable norms through 
the explication of common expectations. These three 
symmetries, Habermas contends, are the linguistic 
correspondents of the ideas of truth, freedom and justice 
(truth, truthfulness and rightness): truth in the sense that 
propositional content is universally intelligible; freedom in 
the sense that there is genuine, undisguised self 
representation between speaking subjects; and justice in the 
sense that correct courses of action can be determined (TTCC, 
PP. 371-2). 
Habermas acknowledges that pure intersubjectivity is 
9 The significance of truth, truthfulness and rightness 
~ill be spelled out in greater detail shortly. It is a very 
important scheme as it lies at the root of Habermas' normative 
theory. 
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unrealizable--that the ideal speech situation cannot be 
established. Nevertheless, the achievement of communicative 
competence does indicate the presence of these ideal 
structures in the communicative practices of speakers. As 
such, a competent speaker is able to conceptualize truth, 
freedom and justice independent of any existing socio-
poli tical system. The model of ideal speech also provides a 
standard against which asymmetries that distort communication 
can be measured. With this addition to the theory of 
systematically distorted communication, Habermas provides a 
model for rehabilitating communicative abnormalities. The 
claim that intersubjectivity is a standard form (or normal), 
however, is not defensible on these grounds. Language can be 
applied in asymmetrical discourse just as readily as in 
symmetrical contexts without deviating from meta-linguistic 
rules. For example: the fact that the system of personal 
pronouns in a modern language allows for clear identification 
of dialogue roles among participants does not standardize 
participatory equality. It is just as likely that participants 
will be distinguished in terms of subordinate and 
superordinate roles. 
My point is that given the analysis of linguistic 
competence that Habermas provides, there is no reason to 
accept the implicit (later to be made explicit) claim that 
intersubjective communication is the natural end or telos of 
linguistic practice. That language can be applied in a number 
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of discursive contexts for numerous purposes is a more 
plausible conclusion to draw. If this were Habermas' 
conclusion the method of identifying distortion and 
rehabilitating deviances would need to be revised. 
communicative, or discursive, patterns would have to be 
analyzed in terms of the way that meta-systemic rules 
translate into discursive rules. This would allow the social 
theorist to dispense with the notion of an original point of 
distortion and concentrate on existing discursive practices 
that promote deception, domination and injustice. In the case 
of fascist propaganda, the specific relations between this 
form of communication and the intolerable practices that 
follow would be analyzed in terms of the discursive rules that 
operate in specific communicative contexts. The ideal 
situation could still serve as a standard of sorts. But not as 
one that represents the core or original mode of language 
usage. Habermas recognizes that these two essays represent a 
rudimentary "first attempt to grasp communicative competence 
in terms of linguistic theory" ( TTCC, p. 3 7 2) . In the 
remainder of this section I will discuss his efforts to build 
upon the basic analysis and his attempt to insert it into the 
main body of a critical social theory. 
In "Towards a Theory of Communicative Competence", 
Habermas suggests that both linguistic and communicative 
competence are susceptible to rational reconstruction in 
universal terms. In order to reconstruct communicative 
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competence, careful attention must be paid to the universal 
pragmatic foundations of the ideal speech situation which are 
presupposed by all speakers in communication communities. 
Habermas' most detailed attempt at reconstructing 
communicative competence is found in "What is Universal 
pragmatic?" (UP), a lengthy and extremely complex essay that 
is a benchmark in the development of his theory of 
communication. In the following section I will discuss this 
essay in terms of the way that it develops the ideas forwarded 
in "On Systematically Distorted Communication" and "Towards a 
Theory of Communicative Competence." 
In "What is Universal Pragmatics?", Habermas focuses on 
the validity basis of speech. "I shall develop the thesis that 
anyone acting communicatively must, in performing any speech 
action, raise universal validity claims and suppose that they 
can be vindicated (or redeemed) " (UP, p. 2) • In communication 
that seeks understanding, the following validity claims are 
unavoidably raised: 1) that the utterance is understandable; 
2) that the utterance has propositional content; 3) that the 
speaker is representing his/her self authentically; and 4) 
that intersubjective agreement can be established. 
Corresponding to these are four requirements: 1) that speech 
is intelligible; 2) that the propositional content is true; 3) 
that the speaker presents him/her self truthfully; and 4) that 
rightness can be agreed upon by subjects. This is of course 
essentially that same as the criteria for communicative 
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competence (intelligibility is an embedded criterion in the 
earlier account). The purpose of the present analysis is to 
determine the way in which ambiguity infiltrates communication 
and to provide a discursive model of rectification. Without 
this, communication becomes strategic: that is, manipulative 
and domineering. 10 In order to isolate the point at which 
communication becomes opaque, Habermas contends, distinctions 
must be established between the situation which allows for 
validity claims to be raised, the actual content of the 
validity claims and the means by which validity claims are 
redeemed (UP, pp. 2-4). 
Habermas writes at some length on the similarities and 
differences between the universal pragmatic approach and 
competing analyses of language and communication. It is not 
necessary here to go into these questions in detail. The 
conclusion drawn is that speech-act theory is most compatible 
with his project. As such, I will direct my discussion towards 
his appropriation of Austin's work. 11 
As was noted in the previous section, Habermas is 
10 As I mentioned above, Habermas' acute awareness of the 
potential for communicative practice to lapse into dominating 
modes seems to be shaped by fascism. As such, grasping the 
social-structural contexts that allow language to be abused in 
the way that it was in fascist propaganda is crucial. This is 
why Habermas insists on taking the pragmatic dimension of 
communication so seriously. 
11 For a useful summary of this see McCarthy's discussion 
in The Critical Theory of Juergen Habermas, pp. 273-76, or 
John Thompson's essay, "Universal Pragmatics", in Habermas: 
Critical Debates edited by Thompson and David Held. 
163 
influenced by Chomsky's generative linguistics. It was also 
noted that he detected flaws in generative linguistics which 
limited their usefulness for his theory. In order to define 
the object domain of universal pragmatics, linguistics (which 
analyzes sentences in terms of grammatical rules) must be 
supplemented with speech-act theory (which analyzes utterances 
in terms of communicative rules). The domain of linguistics is 
sentence production; the domain of speech-act theory is 
sentence utterance. Combined, they cover the four mandates of 
communicative competence: comprehensibility (linguistics) and 
truth, truthfulness and rightness (speech-act theory). Insofar 
as it is speech-act theory that moves analysis closest to the 
domain of intersubjective communication (by focusing on 
utterances rather than sentences) it will .provide a 
theoretical point of departure (UP, 26-34). 12 
Habermas identifies the following as the objective of 
speech-act theory: "the principle task of speech-act theory is 
to clarify the performative status of utterances" (UP, 34). As 
was noted in section A-1., Austin's analysis of illocutionary 
utterances proved useful for Habermas' theory of communicative 
competence. His primary interest is not in the way that this 
analysis characterizes utterances as always interrelational 
(as opposed to sentences which can be analyzed in the 
12 Habermas goes into considerable detail about the 
relationship between the mode and objective domain of 
analysis. He provides a summary of this discussion in a chart 
on page 33 of UP. 
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abstract). Rather, Habermas is concerned with the generative 
power of utterances, which "consists in the fact that the 
speaker, in performing a speech act, can influence a hearer in 
such a way that the latter can take up an interpersonal 
relation with him" (UP, 35). At this level, speech act theory 
can enter into an analysis of the conditions of 
intersubjectivity or communicative action (UP, 34-40) 13 
In "Towards a Theory of Communicative Competence" 
Habermas suggested that the a priori structures of 
communication are already linguistic in that they represent a 
set of reflexive relations. This, he now claims, is due to the 
double structure of speech. All speech acts have semantic 
content on two levels: locutionary and illocutionary. At the 
former level is propositional content that can be utilized in 
any number of speech acts. At the latter level is 
intersubjective content which contributes to understanding in 
a specific context of employment. Recognition of this double 
semantic structure identifies a fundamental feature of natural 
language: reflexivity. "Thus the peculiar reflexivity of 
natural language rests in the first instance on the 
13 Habermas identifies three basic types of action, all 
of which fall under the general rubric of social action. 
Symbolic action utilizes expressive modes that are incapable 
of conveying propositional content (instrumental music or 
dance). Strategic action is action that is oriented 
exclusively to the success of the speaker (generally 
manipulative or domineering, but not necessarily so). 
Communicative action is action which strives for mutual 
understanding (as modeled by the ideal speech situation). At 
this point Habermas directs his analysis toward communicative 
action. 
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combination of a communication of content--eff ected in an 
objectivating attitude--with a communication concerning the 
relational aspect in which the content is to be understood--
effected in a performative attitude" (UP, 43). As such, 
linguistic theories that attempt to abstractly analyze the way 
that propositional content is transmitted are undercut; they 
are incapable of accounting for the process of understanding 
content. In this light, Habermas def in es the direction of 
universal pragmatic analysis. 
As opposed to this, I consider the task of universal 
pragmatics to be the rational reconstruction of the 
double structure of speech. Taking Austin's theory of 
speech acts as my point of departure, I would like now to 
make this task more precise in relation to the problems 
of meaning and validity (UP, 41-44). 
Habermas begins by identifying the semantic categories of 
universal pragmatics. Following Austin's distinction between 
meaning ( locutionary) and force ( illocutionary), he delineates 
pragmatic and linguistic meaning. Pragmatic meaning, that of 
an utterance, is contingent and flexible; linguistic meaning, 
that of a sentence, is stable. The fundamental difference 
between pragmatic and linguistic meaning can be characterized 
as the difference between an intersubjective and a 
subject/object relation. In the former, meaning is shaped by 
an illocutionary context while in the latter meaning is 
determined by the relationship between component words and 
sentence structure. Habermas considers his formulation to be 
superior to Austin's in that it attributes semantic content to 
contexts of employment. Any consistent theory of meaning must 
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take this into account (UP, 44-50). 
The significance of the transformation of Austin's 
semantic distinction is demonstrated by the light it sheds on 
the relationship between communicative modes and the 
thematization of validity claims. Insofar as the distinction 
between locutionary and illocutionary modes of communication 
cannot be drawn on the basis of the difference between meaning 
and force, neither can it be drawn on the basis of the 
difference between constative and performative acts. Under 
this schema only locutionary acts can be evaluated as either 
true or false; illocutionary acts are merely either happy or 
unhappy. Austin came to realize this error and replaced the 
class of locutionary acts with "(a) the propositional 
component contained in every explicit performative utterance, 
(b) a special class of illocutionary acts that imply the 
validity claim of truth--constative speech acts" (UP, 50). 
Austin understood the class of constative speech acts to be 
unique in their ability to render universal validity claims. 
Habermas, on the other hand, contends that this applies to the 
whole range of speech acts: 
It is easy to see the reason for this; the validity claim 
of constative speech acts is presupposed in a certain way 
by speech acts of every type. The meaning of the 
propositional content mentioned in nonconstative speech 
acts can be made explicit through transforming a sentence 
of propositional content, "that p", into a propositional 
sentence "p"; and the truth claim belongs essentially to 
the meaning of the proposition thereby expressed. Truth 
claims are thus a type of validity claim built into the 
structure of possible speech in general. Truth is a 
universal validity claim; its universality is reflected 
in the double structure of speech (UP, p. 52). 
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Truth content is a function of propositional content; 
propositional content is built into the semantic structure of 
every speech act. Therefore, the truth claim embedded in the 
meaning of all utterances enables the specific claim of an 
utterance to be universalized (UP, 50-52). 
Austin ultimately abandoned the constative/performative 
distinction. Habermas, however, chooses to reconstruct it in 
more suitable terms. In communication, he asserts, 
participants engage one another on two distinct levels which 
can be characterized in terms of intersubjective and 
propositional meaning. The former represents a predominately 
interactional use of language while for the latter, language 
usage is fundamentally cognitive. Depending on the context, 
one or the other of these modes will be dominant. it appears 
on the surface that the nature of the validity claim 
established in a given context will be shaped by the dominant 
mode. This is in fact the case, but the difference, Habermas 
claims, is Qne of degree, not of kind. If the context calls 
for an interactive use of language then interpersonal 
relations are thematized and validity is construed in terms of 
rightness. The thematic difference determines which universal 
aspect of speech is emphasized, not whether the claim is 
universalizable. By retaining the constative/performative 
distinction, albeit in highly revised form, Habermas feels 
that he has successfully broadened the range of 
universalizable validity claims, enriched the concept of truth 
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and certified the notion of rightness. Comprehensibility is 
presupposed in any mode of communication. If a breakdown 
occurs at this level a hermeneutic discourse is utilized in 
order to establish intelligibility. The fourth speaker 
mandate--truthfulness--is a function of expressive mode of 
communication and is thematized in terms of speaker 
intentions. It also has universal implications insofar as it 
plays a roll in all illocutionary acts (UP, 53-59). 
The problems that I have alluded to thus far are to a 
certain extent dealt with through the clarification of the 
double structure of speech and the introduction of an 
intersubjective semantic theory. These developments ground 
communication in contexts of usage. They don't, however, 
overcome my two main objections: the implicit claim that there 
is an originary form of communication and that one particular 
type of linguistic practice is in line with the purpose or 
natural end of language usage. To suggest that because every 
validity claim has propositional content it aspires to 
universality ignores the contextual embeddedness of patterns 
of communication established by the intersubjective semantic 
theory. And to claim that because meaning is formulated in 
discursive contexts it is grounded in intersubjectivity 
ignores other modes of communication that operate in 
discursive situations. Habermas' analysis is more advanced in 
this version and seems to move in the direction of discourse 
analysis. He nevertheless clings to the "universal" at the 
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expense of the "pragmatic." 
In the remainder of UP, Habermas attempts to ground his 
analysis in a theory of rationality. This is dealt with more 
effectively in subsequent work and will be addressed in the 
following section. The significant contribution of this essay 
is the detailed explication that it provides of the basic 
notions outlined in TTCC. It constructs a necessary bridge 
between the early writings and The Theory of Communicative 
Action. 
At this point it is worth pausing for a moment to note 
the amazing breadth of Habermas' social theory. Working under 
the immediate influence of the revisionist marxism of the 
Frankfurt school of critical theory, his studies span a range 
that is bound by Vienna Circle positivism on one end and 
French Poststructuralism on the other. His own philosophical 
project settles in somewhere between German philosophical 
hermeneutics and Anglo-American speech act theory. Habermas' 
work in the 80 's draws all of these diverse influences 
together into one magnum opus, The Theory of Communicative 
Action. In the following section I will discuss the 
development of his theory of language and communication in 
this text. I will concentrate on the way that developments in 
the present context lead into a theory of social action which 
will be the main topic in the Chapter IV. 
In the third major segment of The Theory of Communicative 
Action (TCA), "Intermediate Reflection: Social Action, 
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purposive Activity and Communication", Habermas attempts to 
articulate his analysis of linguistic communicative structures 
to a normative theory of social action. Taking as his point of 
departure Weber's theory of action (TCA, pp. 279-284), 
Habermas develops a typology of action that is based on a 
distinction between nonsocial and social action. Nonsocial 
action is purely instrumental; its only objective is to 
achieve a desired consequence. 14 (For example, if I wanted a 
window shut I would simply get up and shut it.) Social action 
can be subdivided into two main categories: action oriented to 
success and action oriented to reaching understanding. Success 
oriented "strategic action" is based on what Horkheimer and 
Adorno called "instrumental rationality" (see chapter I). It 
aims at influencing rational agents in order to secure some 
advantage for the actor. (For example, the way that a 
capitalist uses workers in order to secure profit for 
her/himself.) Understanding oriented "communicative action" is 
Habermas' primary concern: 
By contrast, I shall speak of communicative action 
whenever the actions of the agents involved are 
coordinated not through egocentric calculations of 
success but through acts of reaching understanding. In 
communicative action participants are not primarily 
oriented to their own individual successes; they pursue 
their individual goals under the condition that they can 
harmonize their plans of action on the basis of common 
situation definitions. In this respect the negotiation of 
14 Habermas makes the point that nonsocial or 
"instrumental action" can play a role in social action. 
"Instrumental actions can be connected with and subordinated 
to social interactions of a different type--for example, as 
the 'task elements' of social roles" (TCA, p. 285). 
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definitions of the situation is an essential element of 
the interpretive accomplishments required for 
communicative action (TCA, p. 286). 
This can be pursued in terms of a theory of the rationality of 
action informed by speech act theory. 
Habermas begins by developing a schema that can be used 
to determine whether an action is strategic or communicative. 
Rather than depending on an analysis of psychological states, 
this schema relies on knowledge of the structural foundations 
of "reaching understanding. 1115 Understanding can be simply 
defined as agreement between speakers. The process of reaching 
understanding involves a rationally driven movement towards 
consent with respect to the propositional content of an 
utterance. Habermas stresses the point that understanding 
cannot be imposed in any way; it must be mutually achieved. 
This, for him, is "the inherent telos of human speech." In 
order to def end this claim Habermas turns once again to speech 
act theory (TCA, p. 286-88). 
In addition to the original categories of locution and 
illocution, a third category adopted from Austin, perlocution, 
now enters into the analysis. A perlocutionary utterance is 
one that brings about an effect or change in the world. These 
effects can either be trivial or significant. Trivial effects 
are merely unforeseen side effects of interaction; significant 
effects are the function of strategically designed 
15 This is an extremely important move for Habermas. He 
does not want to work from the philosophical foundation of 
subjectivity or abstract consciousness. 
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interactional contexts. "The effects ensue whenever a speaker 
acts with an orientation to success and thereby 
instrumentalizes speech acts for purposes that are only 
contingently related to the meaning of what is said" (TCA, p. 
289). The relation between illocutionary and perlocutionary 
acts, and communicative and strategic action should be clear. 
As such, distinguishing between illocution and perlocution 
will contribute to the task of categorizing action (TCA, p. 
288-90). 
Habermas proposes the following set of criteria for 
drawing this distinction: 
1. Illocutionary acts clearly aim to convey meaning 
through reciprocal understanding while the aim of 
perlocutionary acts is unclear and context dependent. 
2. Illocutionary success can be achieved without 
achieving locutionary success while perlocutionary acts 
must achieve locutionary success. 
3. Illocutionary results are regulated by internal 
meaning while perlocutionary results are regulated by 
external meaning. 
4. Successful illocutionary acts make intentions explicit 
while successful perlocutionary acts leave intentions 
unknown. 
In contrast to the distinction between locutionary and 
illocutionary acts, the distinction between locutionary and 
perlocutionary acts is not analytic. Perlocutionary acts are 
structurally dependent upon illocutionary acts. If the speaker 
cannot transmit meaning to the hearer, the effect will not 
obtain. This, for Habermas, confirms the claim that 
communication is originally and essentially illocutionary. 
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perlocutionary communication is an exploitative parasite (TCA, 
P· 290-93). 
The basic conditions of communicatively coordinated 
interaction include the utterance of a speech act by a speaker 
and the reception and affirmation by a hearer. This grounds 
the speech act in an interpersonal relationship which is 
structured by propositional content, a speaker guarantee and 
obligation on the part of the hearer (truth, truthfulness, and 
rightness) . The speech act can be responded to on three 
levels: yes or no, accept or decline, and action in accordance 
with the obligation (truth, truthfulness and rightness). 
Insofar as semantic content is a function of the process of 
understanding, the speech act has the authority to coordinate 
interaction. "The pragmatic level of agreement that is 
effective for coordination connects the semantic level of 
understanding meaning with the empirical level of developing--
in a manner dependent on the context--the accord relevant to 
the sequel of action" 16 (TCA, pp. 294-300). 
In order to raise this analysis to the level of validity 
claims, Habermas draws a distinction between simple 
imperatives and complex normative imperatives. The simple 
imperative relies on the above stated conditions; the complex 
normative imperative, which takes the form of a command or 
16 Habermas defends this in terms of the universal 
Pragmatic (or formal pragmatic as he calls it here) semantic 
analysis. Insofar as there is little new development in this 
context I will not discuss it any further. 
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order, involves the additional conditions of an established 
norm and institutionally based authority. Also, some threat of 
sanction is generally included. Determining whether a validity 
claim is raised with a simple imperative is relatively easy; 
it depends on whether the conditions of interactional 
understanding are intact in the specific context of 
communication. In the case of a complex normative imperative, 
whether or not a validity claim is raised depends on the 
nature of its foundation. If it is based on rationality, can 
be subjected to argumentation, and is accepted or rejected on 
these grounds (as opposed to power motivated acquiescence), 
then in fact the complex normative imperative raises a 
validity claim (TCA, p. 300-305). 
As I have noted, there are three criteria for determining 
whether a validity claim should be redeemed or rejected: 
truth, truthfulness, and rightness. Habermas formulates this 
in a number of ways and summarizes as follows: "the fact that 
the intersubjective commonality of a communicatively achieved 
agreement exists at the levels of normative accord, shared 
propositional knowledge, and mutual trust in subjective 
sincerity can be explained in turn through the functions of 
achieving understanding in language" ( TCA, p. 308) . 
Illocutionary meaning is the focal point for testing any 
Validity claim as all speech acts have a cognitive, expressive 
and regulative dimension. The cognitive content indicates 
something about the objective world; the expressive content 
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indicates something about the speaker's internal or subjective 
world; and the regulative content indicates what type of 
action is legitimate in the social world. Habermas 's main 
claim is that by studying the structures of language and 
communication we can develop a method for categorizing the 
different types of social actions and determining which of 
these are legitimate (TCA, p. 306-310). 
The remaining question pertains to how this highly 
idealized structure can be translated into the "real world". 
Habermas suggests that a model for this can be developed by 
connecting formal and empirical pragmatics. Doing so involves 
adapting the formal conception in a number of ways. The 
analysis of basic modes of communication needs to be 
supplemented with illocutionary models that account for 
culture-specific interpersonal communication. In addition to 
a set of standard forms of speech acts a method for realizing 
speech acts is required. The fact that the vast majority of 
communicative practice does not plug neatly into a universal 
pragmatic category is problematic. The scope of analysis has 
to be broadened tremendously in order to accommodate the 
complex networks of communication and overlap of ideally 
distinguished performative attitudes and their corresponding 
"worlds." An operable model of planning, based on the concept 
of communicative action, must be developed. And finally, 
further consideration needs to be given to the existing 
networks of norms and background institutions. As such, the 
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ideal speech situation is still an unrealizable abstraction; 
and universal pragmatic distinctions break down when the ideal 
meets the real (TCA, p. 328-330). 
This is not to say that the formal pragmatic analysis is 
without merit: 
An empirical pragmatics without a formal-pragmatic point 
of departure would not have the conceptual instruments 
needed to recognize the rational basis of linguistic 
communication in the confusing complexity of the everyday 
scenes observed. It is only in formal-pragmatic 
investigations that we can secure for ourselves an idea 
of reaching understanding that can guide empirical 
analysis into particular problems--such as the linguistic 
representation of different levels of reality, the 
manifestation of communication pathologies, or the 
development of decentered understanding of the world 
( TCA, p . 3 31 ) • 
The ideal model provides a solid backdrop for identifying 
communication related social problems (which for Habermas 
includes virtually all social problems). It likewise 
establishes a rational foundation for what I consider to be 
Habermas' primary objective: to develop a discursive theory of 
social-political action that is premised on participatory 
consensus. In short, then, what Habermas establishes--albeit 
not unproblematically--is that there is a direct connection 
between normative structures and patterns of language 
usage. 17 
In chapters IV and V I will concentrate on Habermas' 
effort to develop this theory into a politics of 
17 For a detailed account of the development of Habermas' 
latest version of the theory of communicative action see David 
Ingram (1987), chapter 3. 
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enlightenment. In his efforts to do so, the gap between ideal 
speech and communicative problems in the real world is 
narrowed. Habermas situates his theory of language and 
communication within the context of the modern lifeworld (as 
noted in chapter II). This establishes an historical context 
for, and practical application of, the formal normative 
structures discussed in this section. The problems that I have 
identified are likewise carried into this 
theory. While in the final formulation of 
aspect of his 
the theory of 
communicative action (which I have just discussed) Habermas is 
more conscious of the importance of actual communicative 
contexts, the difficulties that I have alluded to throughout 
are heightened. Habermas states specifically that his theory 
establishes the claim that all language usage can be 
referenced to an "original mode" and that its natural end or 
"telos" is intersubjectivity. These problems will factor 
importantly into the remainder of my analysis in this chapter 
and will carry on into the chapters IV and v. The most 
significant development at this stage is the relationship that 
Habermas has established between modern linguistic systems and 
modern normativity. This is of crucial importance in that it 
gives a historicist twist to universal ethical standards. I 
would like to twist the historicist point a bit more at this 
time--moving it in the direction of classical marxism. The 
assumption that ethical standards and linguistic development 
can emerge independent of concrete economic conditions strikes 
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me as being mistaken. As such, in order to provide the basis 
for my argument against this I will take a short detour 
through Jameson's analysis of Marx's Grundrisse. 
A Marxist Interlude: 
Modern Ideals and the Capitalist Mode of Production 
In order for Habermas' normative positions to be viable 
it is necessary that the standards of truth, truthfulness, and 
rightness, or, alternately, truth, freedom and justice, can be 
cleanly separated from the capitalist mode of production. As 
we saw in chapter II, that mode of production has lead to the 
distortion of values and the reduction of communicative 
interaction to the steering media of money and power. His 
attempt to make this separation is ingenious. If, Habermas 
surmises, we can show how modern modes of communication, are 
inherently dependent on these norms, then it can be 
established that, qua values, they are independent of the 
capitalist mode of production. His attempt to make this 
determination is enticing, if not ultimately compelling. Where 
it fails, as I have indicated, is in its inability to contend 
with the specific ways in which value structures are in fact 
distorted in the late modern world. As I put it above, 
Habermas focuses too much on the formal and not enough on the 
pragmatic. Another way to put this would be that Habermas' 
theory of language and communication is excessively abstract. 
In the following sections of this chapter I will argue this 
point conceptually. In Chapter IV I will argue the same point 
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This is precisely the case that I wish to make against 
Habermas: that modern norms such as truth, freedom, and 
justice, are figured in such a way that they cannot be cleanly 
separated from the modern mode of production. This is not to 
say that they are valueless; in fact I will argue they are 
invaluable. It is to claim, however, that if they are to have 
emancipatory content they need to be ref igured in terms of a 
politics of enlightenment that is as independent of the modern 
mode of production as possible. This is to say that a 
normative appropriation of these values must be characterized 
in terms of the aftermath of modernity--not as a defense of 
modernity. 
Returning briefly to Jameson and Marx, I will cite a 
passage from the Grundrisse to which Jameson appeals and then 
show vis-a-vis Jameson's interpretation how this pertains to 
my problem. 
Exchange value, or, more precisely, the money system, is 
indeed the system of freedom and equality, and what 
disturbs (the Proudhonists) in the more recent 
development of the system are disturbances immanent to 
the system, i.e., the very realization of equality and 
freedom, which turns out to be inequality and unfreedom. 
It is an aspiration as pious as it is stupid to wish that 
exchange value would not develop into capital, or that 
labor which produces exchange value would not develop 
into wage labor. What distinguishes these gentlemen from 
the bourgeois apologists is, on the one hand, their 
awareness of the contradictions inherent in the system, 
and, on the other, their utopianism, manifest in their 
failure to grasp the inevitable difference between the 
real and the ideal shape of bourgeois society, and the 
consequent desire to undertake the superfluous task of 
changing the ideal expression itself back into reality, 
whereas it is in fact merely the photographic image of 
this reality (CLC, pp. 261-62--my emphasis). 
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Jameson's analysis goes as follows: what Marx is criticizing 
is a sort of naive realism in the Proudhonist socialists. They 
believe that the status of values such as freedom and equality 
is to be found, free of ambiguity, within the established 
framework of bourgeois society. While the reality of the 
situation doesn't bear this out, all that needs to be done in 
terms of concrete social change is to "improve the model and 
make freedom and equality appear for real" (CLC, p. 262). This 
sounds amazingly like Habermas' own account of the retrieval 
of modern normativity. The question that I will approach in 
the concluding section of this chapter concerns whether 
Jameson and Marx are right that the only way to realize these 
ideals is to abolish them along with the reality that brings 
them about. 18 
The issue of modern normativity is addressed most 
directly by Habermas in lecture XII of The Philosophical 
Discourse of Modernity (PDM). This discussion is situated by 
his analyses of thinkers ranging from Nietzsche, to Horkheimer 
and Adorno, to Foucault and Derrida. He distinguishes between 
the "cryptonormativity" of, for instance, Foucault, and the 
18 Jameson makes several direct references to Habermas in 
this discussion. "They think (along with the Habermassians 
today, perhaps) that the revolutionary ideals of the bourgeois 
society--freedom and equality-- are properties of real 
societies ... " His point, as is mine, seems to be that even 
those on the more radical side of liberalism will always balk 
at the idea of fundamentally transforming society. Habermas 
has deemed it unrealistic to think that such change is 
~ossible. This, Jameson would accord, is a simple case of 
ideological deception. 
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clear and distinct "normative content of modernity" to which 
he appeals. In my discussion of this text I will flesh out the 
position that I have been developing throughout this book: 
that the normative content of modernity is at best ambivalent 
and at worst in complicity with the very system that Habermas 
denounces. And in line with my claim in Chapter II, I will 
argue that Habermas' own assessment of late-modern society 
provides some of the most convincing evidence in support of 
this position. 
Three thinkers and three methods of analysis that have 
developed during the twilight of modernity are indicted by 
Habermas as the greatest threats to modern normativity: Adorno 
and negative dialectics, Derrida and deconstruction, and 
Foucault and genealogy. Insofar as each defies the boundaries 
that separate the constitutive discourses of modern knowledge 
production, without acknowledging any debt to pre-modern 
tradition (such as the neo-conservatives have done), they are 
left without an analytic base. "They cannot be unequivocally 
classified with either philosophy or science, with moral and 
legal theory, or with literature and art. At the same time, 
they resist any return to forms of religious thought, whether 
dogmatic or heretical" (PDM, p. 336). In other words, they 
subscribe to no standards--making up the rules as they go 
along and monitoring their development only in terms of 
analytic efficacy. This, Habermas would maintain, along with 
their characteristically flamboyant rhetoric, has earned them 
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a following analogous to the patronage of outrageous late-
roodern art: obscurity provides a shelter from the demands for 
normative justification. 
In their haste to condemn modernity the late-modern 
"anarchists" have suspended the primary modern virtue--
rationality--which while dangerous when misused, is 
nevertheless inexpendable. 
aptly analyzed by the 




instrumentalism and totalism; the critique of instrumental 
reason was most adamantly pursued by Adorno while the critique 
of totalistic reason was and is the pet project of Derrida. 
Foucault, it could be said, combines the two in his 
genealogical studies of discourse formations and power 
relations. Habermas wouldn't deny the value of these critiques 
as he too is a critic of modern forms of reason. His is 
distinguished from the others, however, as it points to an 
alternative form of reason--communicative rationality--that 
while rooted in the normative content of modernity is not 
vulnerable to modern abuses. The others, he claims, revert to 
irrationalism. The assumption· that undergirds this 
pronouncement is that the above mentioned critics view 
rationality as something that is inherently warped: that there 
are no good forms of reason. Hence, as the opposite of 
rationality is irrationality, and these critics oppose reason 
in totalistic fashion, they must be irrationalists. 
It would be difficult to find conclusive evidence in the 
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writings of these thinkers supporting the claim that they 
advocate irrationalism. Habermas confuses their renunciation 
of certain forms of rationality . with an all encompassing 
"obliteration" of reason. He himself recognizes that the forms 
under analysis are not the only possible manifestations of 
reason. What he fails to see is that there is quite 
conceivably more than one alternative and that forms of 
rationality have to be tailored to the historical (social, 
economic, cultural, political) circumstances within which they 
are developed. Habermas argues that communicative rationality 
has universal applicability and that the differentiated 
structures of the modern lifeworld facilitate its development. 
· I will argue that while communicative rationality needs to be 
one element in the complex normative structures that take 
shape in the aftermath of modernity, it is not in and of 
itself sufficient for supplanting a politics of enlightenment: 
it is not sufficiently forceful to solicit changes in late-
rnodern societies which will lead to the establishment of the 
communicative society that Habermas tacitly advocates. In 
order to grasp the rational for Habermas' claim it is 
necessary to observe the relationship that he identifies 
between communicative reason and the cultural reserve that 
gives rise to its production. 
For Habermas, modern lifeworld differentiations 
correspond to the components of speech-acts (as discussed 
above) . The cultural sphere corresponds to propositional 
185 
content; the societal sphere corresponds to illocutionary 
content; and the personal sphere corresponds to intentional 
content. The structures of language and the structures of the 
lifeworld are functionally interdependent. 
Cultural reproduction ensures that (in the semantic 
dimension) newly arising situations can be connected up 
with existing conditions in the world; it secures the 
continuity of tradition and a coherency of knowledge 
sufficient for the consensus needs of everyday practice. 
Social integration ensures that newly arising situations 
(in the dimension of social space) can be connected up 
with existing conditions in the world; it takes care of 
the coordination of action by means of legitimately 
regulated interpersonal relationships and lends constancy 
to the identity of groups. Finally, the socialization of 
members ensures that newly arising situations (in the 
dimension of historical time) can be connected up with 
existing world conditions; it secures the acquisition of 
generalized capacities for action for future generations 
and takes care of harmonizing individual life histories 
and collective life forms. Thus, interpretive schemata 
susceptible of consensus (or "valid knowledge"), 
legitimately ordered interpersonal relationships (or 
"solidarities"), and capacities for interacting (or 
"personal identities") are renewed in these three 
processes of reproduction (PDM, p. 343-344). 
This can be summarized as follows: the lifeworld serves as a 
text which is the source pool for the three linguistic 
components that are thematized in speech acts (I will develop 
this extensively in chapter V). The first ensures that there 
is semantic consistency with respect to objects in the world: 
so that when .I say dog you envision a creature with four legs 
and a tail instead of one with wings and a beak. The second 
provides for continuity between spheres of action through 
mutual understanding: we can make the transition from one mode 
of collective activity to another. The third ensures that the 
concept of .I that is produced in the contexts of we will 
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endure and develop from generation to generation. 
Habermas openly acknowledges that this is an 
idealization, one that must contend with masses of evidence 
indicating that modern societies don't reproduce th ems elves in 
this manner. The following, however, is the important 
question: Does this characterization of the modern lifeworld 
have an actual correspondent in any form, and if so, how can 
it be drawn upon to move in the direction of a society that 
coordinates action through consensus? 
Habermas argues that formally, everything is in place to 
begin conducting social life on the basis of these lifeworld 
differentiations. Modernity is no longer strapped by 
mythologically legitimated knowledge; rather, what is 
constituted as knowledge hinges on consensus among the 
appropriately empowered figures (such as a 
scientists). There is also greater leeway 
community of 
available for 
personality development, enabling increased individuality. 
Finally, the idea of universal legal and moral structures has 
developed, providing formal protection against arbitrary 
changes based on power shifts. Habermas attributes this to the 
realization in lifeworld structures of the inherent qualities 
of language which correspond to the essential values of truth, 
freedom and justice. 
Central to Habermas' argument is the notion that at no 
time in the history of the West (or any other civilization) 
has there been so much potential for intersubjective 
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communication. Truth, freedom and justice are defined in terms 
of democratic equality, hence providing for a consensus 
oriented public sphere that could produce in practice 
something similar to the "public will." "The procedures of 
discursive will formation established in the structurally 
differentiated lif eworld are set up to secure the social bond 
of all with all precisely through equal consideration of the 
interests of each individual" (PDM, p. 346). Stating this in 
more linguistic terms: the system of personal pronouns that 
provides the referential basis of modern languages finds its 
home in the modern lifeworld; insofar as there is potential 
for direct interchange between "I" and "I" (ego and alter) the 
establishment of a well conceived "we", one that reflects the 
social, economic and political concerns of its referent, is 
possible. This also contributes to the process of 
secularization as the power of discourse overrides that of 
tradition. 
The question that I would raise in light of this is 
whether the power of modernity is located in either tradition 
or discursive will formation. Certainly there has been a trend 
away from traditional modes of justification (divine rights of 
royalty or Papal primacy). But, has this in fact been replaced 
with a rationally determined, consensus oriented type of 
legitimation? Modern theory clearly moves in this direction; 
and there is evidence that these theoretical developments have 
been translated into constitutional discourses. My concern is 
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whether these discourses in fact contribute to the 
establishment of consensus oriented polity or whether they 
merely cloak the dominant modern practices that are justified 
in between the lines. Do the modern concepts of justice, 
freedom and truth have a conceptual foundation in democratic 
equality or in the steering media of the modern mode of 
production--money and power (force)? If, as I will argue, the 
latter is the case, then the normative content of modernity is 
an ambiguous "pseudo-normativity." The dominant normative 
content, that which guides practices and serves implicitly as 
the justification for those practices, resides within the 
motivational structures of the capitalist mode of production. 
To state this explicitly, and in fairly conventional Marxist 
terms: the normative foundation of modernity is not freedom, 
truth and justice, in any universalistic sense; rather it is 
these ideals, conceived relative to production, profit and 
technical proficiency. The modern Enlightenment concepts of 
freedom, justice and truth are simply traditional ideals (and 
worthy ones at that) that are tailored to support the systemic 
norms that certify modern activities. Further, as Horkheimer 
and Adorno, Habermas, and Foucault have carefully detailed, 
these activities take on a distinctly negative tone in the 
late phases of modernity. 19 
19 Since the question that I am addressing focuses on 20th 
century capitalism I will concentrate on the problems of that 
period. Both Foucault and Habermas (and more importantly Marx) 
recognize that the forms of domination which have developed in 
the 20th century have- historical antecedents. Recent 
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Habermas accounts for this by suggesting that rather than 
operating within the boundaries of modern normativity, modern 
practices have deviated from the normative standards to which 
they are accountable. Consequently, three types of pathologies 
develop in late modern societies: loss of meaning (a semantic 
pathology), social anomie (an interpersonal pathology) and 
personality disorders (a pathology of the individual). These 
correspond to the structural differentiations of the modern 
lifeworld (objective, social, and subjective). In effect what 
Habermas is stating is that socio-political developments 
(grounded in the modern lifeworld) that distinguish modernity 
from previous periods are susceptible to both enlightened or 
pathological practices--that the problems of the late modern 
period are in fact native to modernity. This, I would argue, 
is do to the bi-level normativity of modernity. Rather than 
accounting for the above mentioned "pathologies" as deviances, 
I would suggest that the are actually in conformity with a 
more pronounced, although less visibly expressed, normative 
base. I will stress here that my argument rests on the notion 
of two levels of normativity and the interplay that exists 
between them; it is not my position that there is simply one 
exclusively dominant level (this would merely reverse 
Habermas' position). 
As I noted in chapter II, Habermas' most recent 
Phenomena, however, take on a distinctly different character 
that can be linked to the way that capitalism has developed. 
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assessment of late-modern society takes note of a bi-level 
societal structure: system and lifeworld. He further notes 
that increasingly the system infringes upon the lifeworld, 
isolating it as a subsystem and squeezing from it the type of 
communicative patterns that meet late-modern economic and 
political needs. In doing so, the normative content is 
marginalized; it is replaced with system imperatives that are 
directed via steering media--money and power. By insisting on 
a rigid system/lifeworld distinction (that recognizes 
normative content only in the lifeworld), Habermas can keep 
intact his psycho-medicinal model for social change. If the 
essence of normalcy is located in some all-but-lost social-
political foundation (one constructed under the auspices of an 
emerging bourgeois society--see chapter IV), then in fact the 
appropriate course of action is to bring this concept of 
normalcy to the fore and measure socio-political practices 
against it. By doing so, rampant late-modern pathologies can 
be diagnosed and "cured."~ If, however, the system/lifeworld 
distinction is questioned while the bi-level theory of society 
is retained--focusing on the interplay between, rather than 
the distinctiveness of the two levels--a new picture emerges 
which calls for a different remedial strategy. AS I mentioned 
20 I borrow the term "cure" from Bill Martin. See his "The 
Enlightenment Talking Cure: Habermas, Legitimation Crisis and 
the Recent Political Landscape". This is in fact a crucial 
point as Habermas has consistently used medical terminology 
(distortion, crisis, pathology) to describe flaws in the 
modern system. This protects the much talked about, but rarely 
exemplified, modern sense of normativity. 
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above, the two levels that I am referring to both factor into 
the normativity of modern society: the explicit, but weak, 
ideal dimension corresponds to Habermas' lifeworld while the 
implicit, but more powerful dimension corresponds to Habermas' 
system. 21 Characterized as such, rooting efforts to bring 
about social-political change in modern normativity will be 
dubious. Doing so stands to solicit the recurrence of existing 
problems. I will now provide a defense of this position and 
point to some further repercussions. 
To begin, it is important to clarify what I mean by 
normative. I use this term, as does Habermas, to refer to the 
standards against which social, economic, and political 
practices are measured. If the bi-level or pseudo-normative 
foundations of late-modernity are to be determined, then it is 
necessary to consider the practices that are prevalent in late 
modern society. Insofar as Habermas provides an excellent 
account of those practices I turn once again to his analysis. 
Habermas develops his critique in terms of the 
communication theory that serves as the basis for his entire 
system. Summarizing my earlier discussion: the central problem 
~ I am using Habermas' language here for the sake of 
expediency. I do not accept either the category of system or 
lifeworld per se. I am particularly suspicious of Habermas' 
notion of the lifeworld. His characterization of the lifeworld 
lends itself to the interpretation that it is a pure, but lost 
origin of modernity and as such his theory is suggestive of 
return to an untainted past. If my position is valid the 
entire idea of the isolated lifeworld is put into question. If 
all the practices that are supposedly grounded in the modern 
lifeworld are hypothetical, then what is left of the 
foundation? 
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of late modern society is the lack of substantive 
communication. Human interchange is driven by economic 
imperatives that are coordinated through the steering media 
money and power. As a result, the system has overtaken almost 
every sphere of human life. It has infiltrated the objective, 
subjective and intersubjective worlds of modern individuals. 
"The deformation of a lifeworld that is regulated, fragmented, 
monitored, and looked after are surely more subtle than the 
palpable forms of material exploitation and impoverishment; 
but internalized social conflicts that have shifted from the 
corporeal to the psychic are not therefore less destructive" 
(PDM, p. 362--here Habermas exhibits still too much faith in 
the welfare state). Habermas goes on to recognize Foucault as 
the master analyst of this phenomenon. "The legal-
administrative means of translating social-welfare programs 
into action are not some passive, as it were, 
medium. They are connected, rather, with a 
property less 
praxis that 
involves isolation of facts, normalization, and surveillance, 
the reifying and subjectivating violence that Foucault has 
traced right down into the most delicate capillary tributaries 
of everyday communication" (PDM, p. 362). Clearly such 
practices are not in line with the principles of freedom, 
truth, and justice unless these concepts are defined relative 
to some other form of normativity: production, profit, and 
technical power. 
But are these flaws the mark of failure or a rather 
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warped form of success? Do they deviate from or refine the 
normativity of modernity? Habermas raises this question as 
follows: "In the utopias painted in the old romances about the 
state, rational forms of life entered into a deceptive 
s~iosis with the technological mastery of nature and the 
~ 
ruthless mobilization of social labor power. This equation of 
happiness and emancipation with power and production has been 
a source of irritation for the self-understanding of modernity 
from the start--and it has called forth two centuries of 
criticism of modernity" (PDM, p. 366--my emphasis). My point 
is this: given Habermas' own analysis of late modern society, 
his recognition of the dominant modes of communication and 
sociability, the normative content of modernity (as he clearly 
points out) becomes questionable. Late modern problems such as 
"isolation of facts, normalization, and surveillance, the 
reifying and subjectivating violence" may in fact correspond 
to, rather than deviate from, the complex bi-level normativity 
of the modern period. With these doubts about the modern 
program on the table I will turn to my conceptual argument. 
Freedom is not a concept that is unique to modernity. It 
gains attention in almost every political theory from Plato to 
Rawls. The important questions that surround this concept 
include: 1) What does it mean to be free? 2) To what extent 
should freedom be limited? And 3), who should be free? In the 
modern epoch the focus has been placed on the third question. 
The official response has been: everyone. Habermas latches on 
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to this aspect of modern freedom--the claim to universality. 
This, for him, is representative of an implicit consensus 
among modern individuals. While I would certainly not want to 
deny that universal freedom has been a focal point of 
modernity, it is quite clear that universal freedom has not 
been the norm. 22 Further, the most pervasive forms of non-
freedom--the subjection of women, the incarceration of ethnic 
minorities in ghettos and housing projects, the exploitation 
of wage laborers, etc.--have been justified on the basis of 
the formal concept of freedom, with all its universalistic 
abstraction, that is native to modernity. When forms of 
"enslavement", such as I have mentioned, are pointed out, a 
common response is (and I say common here as common sense 
seems to reflect the sort of normative ideals to which 
Habermas' theory aspires) : What prevents people in these 
situations from liberating themselves? They are not determined 
by law to live under such conditions (this is the more 
sophisticated version of the 'Get a Job' argument). 
These of course are the obvious cases; ones which I think 
can be accounted for within the framework of modern 
normativity via Habermas' "illness" model. The more difficult 
22 An obvious example of this would be the explicit slave 
labor of the 17th through 19th centuries in the United States, 
What for all practical purposes was slave labor in both Europe 
a~d the United States as industry developed, the "apartheid" 
like setups that exist in most large urban areas in the United 
States, and the type of "enslavement" referred to earlier in 
this section that is less explicit--the type that Habermas 
acknowledges Foucault as revealing. 
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cases are those identified by Habermas only in his later work 
(as mentioned above) and which have been the focal point of 
Foucault's research since the late 50 's: the use of power 
strategies to permeate all spheres of human life for the sake 
of achieving and maintaining a distinctly modern form of 
w:-oductivity. This activity relies upon institutions of 
pedagogy, mental health, manufacturing, administrating and 
rehabilitation. And, as Foucault has carefully pointed out, 
all of these institutional practices have been justified on 
the basis of humanistic values which repeatedly appeal to the 
concept of universal freedom that Habermas considers to be 
fundamental to modernity. In light of this the following 
points can be made: 1) that Habermas is in agreement with 
Foucault concerning these modern practices and quite openly 
acknowledges that what they amount to is domination; 2) that 
the rhetoric of freedom, as defined in the modern period (an 
idealistic abstraction), is deployed in the service of the 
aforementioned practices of domination; and 3) that the real 
justification for these practices (which is the way that 
Habermas defines normativity) is a distinctly modern form of 
productivity: one that produces not only material products but 
also the various types of subjects that are needed to maintain 
this productive mode. My suggestion is that given Habermas' 
recognition of these practices in late modern societies it 
becomes increasingly difficult to claim that the solution to 
the unique forms of domination that prevail will be found in 
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the ambiguous modern notion of freedom. The ideal of freedom 
has been shaped to serve the norm of productivity. 23 This is 
not to say that freedom isn't a modern norm in any sense; 
rather, to the extent that freedom is normative, it is defined 
and institutionalized relative to the norm of production. 
The norm of productivity has endured during modernity, 
and flourished during the late modernity, because the ideal of 
freedom which was formulated in the early stages failed to 
address explicitly the other two questions that are central to 
conceptualizing a notion of freedom: What is the nature of 
freedom and what sorts of limitations should be placed on free 
activity? These questions were implicitly addressed within the 
economic sphere, allowing the quest for productivity to shape 
the modern concept of freedom and to use the explicit appeal 
to universality in justification of practices that can (and 
are by both Habermas and Foucault) be viewed as domination 
rather than liberation. This being the case, it seems unlikely 
that these problems can be solved on the basis of a clear and 
distinct modern normativity, as modern normativity has neither 
of these qualities. Movement toward a solution cannot be 
retrogressive. Rather, in order to begin refiguring the ideal 
of freedom, its rootedness in the modern norm of production 
23 I want to be clear that I am not renouncing 
Productivity per se (as does Bataille in some instances and as 
Foucault has been accused of doing). I am opposing in this 
context the types of production that are needed to maintain 
consumerism: production that is grounded in the normative 
concept of profit rather than justice. 
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must be carefully analyzed. 
The second important component of modern normativity, in 
aabermas' account, is justice. This takes form in the modern 
legal system. The modern system of law purportedly ascends to 
universal standards of action that are rationally determined 
(as opposed to being determined by some religious principle). 
As was the case with freedom, the feature of the modern system 
of law that appeals to Habermas is its universality: it is 
supposed to be applicable across the range of individuals--
recognizing no special cases or exceptions. By objectifying 
these principles within a durable legal structure, the 
contingencies of shifting regimes and arbitrary manipulation 
of law and order are eliminated. The central feature of this 
system is a stable center of political power--some form of 
republic--that can administer justice independent of the 
interests of particular administrators. Hence, equality before 
the law is the slogan of modernity. 
As was the case with freedom, modern theorists were not 
the first to be interested in the concept of justice. Nor were 
they the first to conceive of a universal law; the Romans also 
had a notion of universal natural law that was rooted in the 
common human capacity to reason. The assumption was that on 
the basis of this common capacity, rationally determined law 
receives tacit consent from all of humanity. It would not be 
generally agreed, however, that Roman society was a paradigm 
of justice. A simple example would be that while in the 
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abstract it was considered intolerable to maintain any form of 
slavery, in actuality slavery was central to the Roman economy 
and was justified by Roman law. As such, it would be safe to 
say that this ideal was tenuously applied as a norm. 
If during the modern epoch the ideal principle of 
universal justice has been clearly raised to normative status, 
then an analysis of practice should conf irrn this by showing 
that deviations are in conflict with, not supported by, the 
conception of justice that is distinctly modern. Practices 
such as slavery (in the United States), exploitation of child 
labor, sexual discrimination and cases of unfair treatment due 
to race, gender, or lifestyle preference in courts of law,.can 
be accounted for in this manner: as practices in exception to, 
rather than legitimated by, the modern concept of justice. 
These are not conceptual problems but rather stern from 
residual biases that can be increasingly filtered out as "we" 
become more enlightened. 
The harder cases are those that prevail in the late 
modern period (not that the others have gone away). These fall 
into two general categories. The first concerns sectors of 
society that regardless of legal ref orrn--both systemic and 
individual--are not dealt with justly. I would include in this 
' 
category people that are homeless, a high percentage of single 
parents, numerous ethnic minorities and the bulk of working 
women (where average salaries are consistently lower than 
men's with comparable training). These are problems that 
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Habermas associates with the welfare state in "crisis": 
incongruities that persist after legal adjustments have been 
made to provide for greater amounts of social and economic 
justice. There are no legal reasons why the aforementioned 
groups cannot achieve social, economic and political status 
equal to those from notably different circumstances. It is the 
very fact that formal legal justice is achieved that movement 
toward substantive justice is halted. The argument would once 
again be: 'What is prohibiting them from changing their 
status? They simply need to show some initiative.' (This is of 
course not Habermas' argument. ) My point is that these 
problems cannot be accounted for as deviations from modern 
standards of justice; rather, they are supported by the 
pseudo-norm of justice which is conceptualized relative to the 
principle underpinning these practices. I will return to what 
I consider this principle to be after discussing the second 
category. 
The second category concerns those aspects of the law 
which provide advantage to sectors of the population that 
possess a great deal of power. I would include in this tax 
laws that favor the affluent (both corporately and 
individually), criminal laws that almost encourage (by virtue 
of leniency) white collar crime, laws that allow for unsafe 
levels of contaminants to be put into the environment 
(legitimated on the grounds that it is necessary in order to 
remain competitive), as well as putting unsafe additives into 
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food products (naming only a few). The fact that laws have 
been enacted to deal with these problems (under the guise of 
reform) serves to cloak the abusive practices which ensue. My 
point once again is that the rhetoric of equality before the 
law (justice) complies with the principle that undergirds 
these practices. 
The normative principle that perpetuates the 
aforementioned practices is profit. From the very beginning of 
the modern period an ethic of profit has been central: 
virtually any activity is justified if profit is the 
consequence. When stated so bluntly this is of course 
offensive. Hence it is necessary to equate the pursuit of 
profit with some principle of justice. This, I would argue, is 
the principle of justice that have developed during the course 
of modernity. When pressure for legitimation becomes intensive 
(for instance during the civil rights movement in the United 
States or during the student movements in both the United 
States and Europe), adjustments are made that are formally 
satisfying and have enough substance to quiet unrest. They 
don't, however, lead to the kind of social change that is 
needed to eliminate the problem (witness the regressions of 
the 80's and 90's). It could be argued that when justice comes 
into conflict with the principle of profit, the powerful 
sectors of society that thrive on profit exercise their force 
to preserve favored position. Habermas would in fact accept 
this argument on the basis of his own analysis of modernity. 
201 
He would contend that this deviates from a more genuine sense 
of justice that is distinctly present in the modern lifeworld. 
My position is that this "genuine" level of justice is not as 
distinct as Habermas claims: that an analysis of late modern 
practices reveals a conceptual interrelationship between the 
Enlightenment ideal of justice and the profit oriented 
imperatives of capitalism. As such, movement toward a more 
substantive form of justice shouldn't be in the direction of 
a clear and distinct normativity that is already in place. 
Rather, the task of theory is to reconfigure the notion of 
justice such that it is independent of the sub-terranean 
normative standard of profit. 
The third component of modern normativity, in Habermas' 
account, is truth. Truth is primarily the product of science 
during the modern period and there is little doubt that 
science has flourished. The question, however, is whether it 
has been the quest for truth, or some other force, that has 
driven modern science. Once again it is important to take note 
of the fact that the modern sciences emerged at essentially 
the same time as the modern economy. As a result, the pursuit 
of truth has often been guided by production and profit in the 
form of technical prowess. In the realm of the hard sciences, 
theoretical research is funded on the basis of potential for 
technical application. The proliferation of truth in this 
sphere has brought us to the point where we are dealing with 
the greenhouse effect and mutually assured destruction (see 
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Habermas' remarks on this in PDM, p. 366-67). In the realms of 
the human sciences technologies have been developed to shape 
subjects into individuals that are useful in the quest for 
production and profit. The truth of social scientific 
discourses is measured in terms of their efficacy; if they do 
the job, they are true. As a result we now have layer upon 
layer of these discourses reforming the practices of modern 
individual. Given this it can be argued that the dominant norm 
in question is technique--truth conceptualized relative to 
technical efficacy. I am not claiming that science has been 
driven exclusively by technical motives. Nor am I claiming 
that scientists are not motivated by the pursuit of truth. 
Rather, my point is that given the type of truth that feeds 
the modern "system", the norm that guides scientific research 
(when viewed broadly) is indelibly linked to technique (at the 
expense of research that might produce truths which are 
actually more in line with enlightened ideals). If this is 
correct, then returning to some untainted modern notion of 
truth simply runs the risk of reinscribing the distortions 
that are prevalent in modern sciences as currently practiced. 
My claim is that the norm of truth ( lifeworld) cannot be 
separated from technical imperatives (system). 
The arguments that I have presented are not incompatible 
with Habermas' assessment of modernity nor his general theory 
that modern society has a bi-level structure. They are, 
however, in opposition to Habermas' claim that the two levels 
203 
of modern society (system and lifeworld) are distinct from one 
another and that the lifeworld contains the last remaining 
kernels of unperverted modern normativity. My position is that 
the two levels of modern society both factor into modern 
normativity and that the interplay between the two cloaks the 
operational motivation of late modern practices. If Habermas' 
view is accepted, a theoretical model of a politics of 
enlightenment must hark back to the pure normativity 
conceptualized early in the modern period. The desire for an 
unperverted primitive origin that can be tapped into and 
applied in present conditions is exactly the sort of thing 
that he accuses the critics of modernity of yearning for. His 
claim is that they long for a pre-rational impulse, Dionysian 
in tenor, that will liberate humanity from the oppression of 
rationality. My point is that Habermas seems to be making a 
similar move, with the exception that the origin he appeals to 
is modern rationality prior to its capitalistic corruption: a 
form of reason that was originally a product of the modern 
lifeworld but which has been twisted into the service of 
system imperatives. I have tried to show that the two are 
inextricably intertwined and that a contemporary theory of a 
politics of enlightenment should not yearn for the originary 
pristini ty of enlightened (as opposed to corrupted) modernity. 
While my argument here is not definitive, I hope that it 
raises serious questions about the normative structure that is 
at the base of Habermas' model for a politics of 
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enlightenment, or what we can infer concerning a politics of 
enlightenment. The strength in his position is his ability to 
link normativity with modern standards of communicative 
competence. This contextualizes his position historically 
without succumbing to relativism. The theory of language and 
communication, however, also serves as a weak link in that if, 
as I have attempted to show, the norms of modernity--rooted in 
the lif eworld--cannot be separated sharply from steering 
imperatives--rooted in the system--than neither can 
communicative action. In chapter IV I will continue to deal 
with the first of these issues. In chapter V I will address 
the latter. 
CHAPTER 4 
THE POLITICS OF ENLIGHTENMENT AND 
THE AFTERMATH OF MODERNITY 
At this ,point I feel it will be helpful to recapitulate 
the main positions that I have developed thus far. I 
introduced the problem that I am concerned with in terms of 
the modern/postmodern debate that Juergen Habermas has 
participated in over the past 10 years. The purpose in using 
this as my point of departure was to establish that this 
debate is at the crux of my concern with a politics of 
enlightenment. Typically the enlightenment/anti-enlightenment 
split has located thinkers in one of the camps of the 
modern/postmodern dichotomy. My suggestion is that this need 
not be the case. 
In chapter 1 I examined the historical development of the 
concept of enlightenment from Kant through Horkheimer and 
Adorno, to Foucault, Habermas and Derrida. In doing so I aimed 
not so much at drawing particular conclusions, but rather to 
suggest some of the possible ways that the concept of 
enlightenment could be elaborated. 
In chapter II I turned to Habermas' theory of advanced 
capitalist societies. Contained within his critique is a 
strong defense of modernity: a modernity that he argues has 
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been deformed by the steering media of advanced capitalism. 
From there I turned to a discussion of postmodernism that 
focused on a distinction between normative and descriptive 
postmodernism. My objective here was to show that one could 
waiver a bit on the modern/postmodern question without 
hesitating with respect to the question of enlightenment. My 
suggestion was that we consider referring to the contemporary 
condition as the aftermath of modernity: a condition that is 
inherently unstable, yet one that is fraught with 
possibilities. 
In chapter III I turned to Habermas' theory of language 
and communication. My aim here was to show how Habermas has 
extracted a normative theory from his analysis of language and 
discourse. Further, I showed how deeply tied this analysis is 
to his understanding of the normative content of modernity. 
Finally, I argued that the normative content which he 
associates with modernity is not as cut and dry as he 
sometimes holds it to be. This advances the theme that I have 
been developing concerning the relationship between modernity 
and enlightenment. 
In developing the three central points that constitute my 
analysis of Habermas--the concept of enlightenment, the status 
of advanced capitalist societies, and the normative content 
that is basic to the modern condition--within the framework of 
the modern/postmodern debate, an interesting convergence 
begins to take shape that moves toward a theoretical 
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conception of a politics of enlightenment appropriate to the 
aftermath of modernity. It is, I believe, necessary to 
understand these three strains in Habermas' thought as 
providing the framework for a theoretical conception of a 
politics of enlightenment. In order to reflect upon the 
possibilities concerning emancipation, participatory 
government, self determination and community formation, these 
three points must converge with one another. What Habermas has 
achieved, I would argue, is a social theory that has as its 
basic concern the question 'What lies within the realm of 
possibilities for a politics of enlightenment?' In the 
following chapter I will attempt to address this concern 
directly and somewhat more concretely. In order to do so I 
will return to the theory/practice problem that has always 
been central to critical social theory, as well as to 
Habermas' earliest work which I believe suggests clearly what 
he could mean by a politics of enlightenment. Further, I will 
follow some of the recent literature that has concerned itself 
with the political aspects of Habermas' work--focusing on 
politically significant debates in which Habermas has 
participated. Finally, I will argue that while the terms of 
these debates are quite modern in nature, other issues 
concerning questions of emancipation, participation and 
societal transformation are less amenable to Habermas' 
modernist politics of enlightenment. This will provide the 
groundwork for my reconceptualization of Habermas' theory of 
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the lifeworld and discourse ethics in the concluding chapter. 
Critical Theory and the Public Sphere 
The recent translation into English of Habermas' The 
§_tructural Transformation of the Public Sphere has revived 
interest amongst American critical theorist in the political 
use and abuse of the idea of a public sphere of political 
discourse (or, in my terms, a modernist politics of 
enlightenment) that developed in the early modern period. As 
Craig Calhoun points out: "Habermas task ... is to develop a 
critique of the category of bourgeois society showing both (1) 
its internal tensions and the factors that led to its 
transformation and partial degeneration and (2) the element of 
truth and emancipatory potential that it contained despite its 
ideological misrepresentation and contradictions. "1 My concern 
here will be to discuss Habermas' analysis in terms of 
critical theory's focus on concrete political possibilities 
and to ultimately argue that this is unsuitable for a 
theory/practice model that is legitimately concerned with the 
conditions of the aftermath of modernity. 
The development of critical social theory has as one of 
its constitutive features a close relationship to contexts of 
political action. During the early, formative, days of the 
Frankfurt School, the concerns of socialist and communist 
party movements in Germany were a central issue of theoretical 
1 Craig Calhoun, Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 2. 
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debate. 2 These concerns came to bear importantly on what might 
be called the manifesto of critical theory: Max Horkheimer's 
"Traditional and Critical Theory." In this essay Horkheimer 
distinguishes between a type of theory that has dominated the 
modern scene and an alternative type that breaks from this 
mold. 3 "The traditional idea of theory is based on scientific 
activity as carried on within the division of labor at a 
particular stage in the latter's development. It corresponds 
to the activity of the scholar which takes place alongside all 
the other activities of a society but in no immediately clear 
connection with them" (TCT, p. 197). In contrast, critical 
theory focuses on "a definite individual in his real relation 
to other individuals and groups, in his conflict with a 
particular class, and finally, in the resultant web of 
relationships with the social totality and with nature" (TCT, 
p. 211). In other words, Horkheimer's distinction marks the 
difference between theories that tacitly prop up the status 
quo and those that call it radically into question. 
In is not altogether clear, however, whether this 
formative feature of critical theory has had a lasting legacy. 
Due to perceived weaknesses in the German leftist parties, a 
2 For a useful discussion of this see part I of Helmut 
Dubiel, Theory and Politics. 
3 I would suggest that this essay looks to a theory of 
the aftermath of modernity--a theory that can only develop 
through a radical appropriation of modern thinkers such as 
Kant, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche and Freud. The simple fact that 
critical theory is so eclectic is in and of itself a sign that 
it attempts to move beyond modernism. 
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coming to awareness of the logic of Soviet communism, and a 
profound experience of the totalizing effects of European 
fascism, the work of Horkheimer and Adorno, and to a certain 
extent Marcuse, began to move away from the theory-practice 
nexus that they inherited from Marxism. 4 While critical theory 
did not return to more traditional approaches. the shift in 
emphasis indicates a recognition that what it means to be 
critical is more ambiguously related to concrete political 
struggles than was previously suspected. Adorno, for example, 
denied the possibility of an identity relationship between 
4 For a general discussion of this see David Held, 
Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas, pp. 
29-39. Susan Buck-Morss also makes this point, although hers 
is directed more at Adorno. She goes so far as to claim that 
Adorno never was invested in the proletariat. "Whereas Jay 
(Martin) has written of the Frankfurt Institute in general and 
Horkheimer in particular that they reluctantly gave up belief 
in the revolutionary power of the proletariat only after 
Hitler's consolidation of power and still not fully until the 
outbreak of World War II, it is impossible to document such a 
gradual disillusionment in the case of Adorno. This does not 
necessarily prove that Adorno never place his hope in the 
proletariat. What it does indicate is that he refused to 
incorporate this class within the foundation of his theory, to 
allow theory's validity to be in any way dependent upon the 
existence of a collective revolutionary subject or the 
possibility of its direct application to political praxis" 
(The Origin of Negative Dialectics, pp. 24-5). Kathlene 
League, in "Adorno: No Sell Out," takes strong exception with 
those who claim that Adorno is a cynical quietist. Her 
response to this position, which is rooted in a careful 
analysis of Aesthetic Theory, is that the emancipation of 
oppressed peoples has always been at the heart of Adorno's 
work and comes to fruition in his theory of art. My own 
position is somewhere between these poles. The question for me 
is whether there is emancipatory potential in the later works 
of first generation critical theorists. While I want to answer 
that question affirmatively I think it is necessary to 
establish linkages between there work and that of the more 
explicitly emancipation oriented Habermas. 
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theory and practice. 5 This is not to say that critical theory 
began to ignore altogether concrete political movements; 
Marcuse, for example was a major source of inspiration for the 
student movement in the 60's. Rather, the point is that this 
connection came to be problematized in such a way that theory 
seemed to take priority over practice. 
Habermas' work developed under the influence of these 
important considerations. There is a sense in which he 
attempts to rethink the relationship between theory and 
practice: not by returning to the original Frankfurt program, 
but rather by reconsidering the ideological constraints placed 
on science as well as the potential for change in advanced 
capitalist societies. 6 Habermas frames the relationship 
between theory and practice as follows: "On the one hand, it 
(theory) investigates the constitutive historical complex of 
the constellation of self interests, to which the theory still 
belongs across and beyond its acts of insight. On the other 
hand, it studies the historical interconnections of action, in 
5 For an interesting discussion of this see Fredric 
Jameson, Late Marxism: Adorno, or the Persistence of the 
Dialectic, pp. 1-12, and pp. 15-24. Adorno dealt with this 
problem most directly in Negative Dialectics. 
6 If The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere 
is an example of such an effort--which I think it is--it is 
not one that met with the approval of the first generation 
Frankfurt School higher ups. Habermas submitted this work to 
Horkheimer and Adorno as his Habilitationschrift. They 
rejected it on the grounds that it was not critical enough of 
the enlightenment tradition of democracy and to radically 
attached to the idea of egalitarianism. For a discussion of 
this see Calhoun, p. 4. 
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which theory, as action-oriented, can intervene" (Theory and 
gJ"actice, p. 2). His attempts to comply with this imperative 
involve "extended reflections on the nature of cognition, the 
structure of social inquiry, the normative basis of social 
interaction, and the political, economic, and sociocultural 
tendencies of the age" ( TP, p. ) . Theory must be directly 
linked to the aspirations of social actors concerned with 
bringing about a world that will enable them to flourish as 
autonomous individuals within the spheres of a community that 
provides economic stability, cultural cohesiveness and social 
solidarity. In other words, the theory/practice problematic is 
about the theorizing of a politics of enlightenment. 
While critics of Habermas have argued that his work has 
back slid in the direction of what Horkheimer referred to as 
"traditional theory", 7 there is a strong sense in which he has 
brought critical theory back down to earth. This is 
exemplified in his analyses of the student movement in the 
sixties, as well as more recent work on neo-conservatism, the 
Historikerstreit, and the collapse of Eastern block communism. 
My concern here will focus on whether Habermas' work offer 
analytic, as well as practical, insights that illuminate the 
problems of contemporary political struggles. The focus of 
this analysis will be The Structural Transformation of the 
7 See Nancy Fraser, "What's Critical About Critical 
Theory", in Unruly Practices, pp. 113-143; and Michael Ryan, 
Politics and Culture, pp. 27-45. Also see Bill Martin, Matrix 
and Line, chapter III. 
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£.!lblic Sphere. I will concentrate on the way that public 
spheres are constituted and whether a politics of 
enlightenment should work within established public spheres or 
attempt to negate these spheres and constitute alternative 
forums. This is a particularly important concern when there is 
a pervasive 'end of history' sentiment occluding much of what 
masquerades as public discourse. This, I will contend, is a 
symptom of the aftermath of modernity, and one that must be 
mitigated against in an enlightened social theory. 
Critical theorists concerned with the theory/practice 
issue outlined above have been most interested in Habermas' 
work on the public sphere. 8 This interest makes perfect sense, 
as a concern with the possibilities for radical democratic 
social-political formation entails addressing the problem of 
how public discourse comes to be constituted. It is not 
entirely clear whether Habermas' discussion of the public 
sphere should be the source of inspiration or the object of 
criticism in this context. His analysis has been characterized 
as valorizing the liberal conception of democracy without 
8 An entire volume of Social Text was devoted to this 
topic. Also, a conference was held at the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill that resulted in a volume entitled 
Habermas and the Public Sphere. Both offer a broad range of 
perspectives on Habermas' early work on the public sphere. The 
latter includes an article by Habermas titled "Further 
Reflections on the Public Sphere," as well as a transcribed 
discussion between the conference participants and Habermas. 
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being attentive enough to its exclusive character. 9 While this 
is true, and will be discussed below, it is also the case that 
Habermas attempts to get at what is radical about liberalism 
and, in a sense, develop a normative perspective from which 
liberal ideals can be used against liberal realities. Clearly 
this was the issue at stake in chapter III. I will, in this 
more concrete setting, take seriously Habermas' aim to pit 
liberalism against liberalism while at the same time pointing 
out some of the shortcomings of this approach. 
While Habermas is, to a certain extent, ideologically 
allied with liberalism in The Structural Transformation of the 
Public Sphere, his approach is clearly informed by Marxist 
social science. His concern is to provide a careful account of 
the economic factors that gave rise to the bourgeois public 
sphere. In doing so, Habermas focuses on the way in which the 
relative opening up of economic markets necessitated the 
·opening up of forums of rational discourse that were in 
principle accessible to all members of society. Initially this 
impulse was prompted by the need for news that pertained to 
expanded market relations. It was also necessary to establish 
a vantage point from which attempts by the state to impinge 
upon economic activity could be criticized and effectively 
9 See in particular Geof Eley, "Nations, Publics and 
Political Culture: Placing Habermas in the Nineteenth 
Century", Mary Ryan, "Gender and Public Access: Women's 
Politics in Nineteenth-Century America, and Nancy Fraser, 
"Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique 
of Actually Existing Democracy." 
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fended off. The objective was to develop forums within which 
critical discussion could unfold with the intent of exerting 
indirect influence over governmental policy. These forums 
became informally instituted in the French salons, the German 
table societies, and the English coffee houses. Without 
explicitly affirming this development, Habermas clearly feels 
that the emergence of these democratic ideals more than 
compensates for their flawed character in reality. 10 
I want to highlight the point that Habermas extracts from 
the socio-economic fundaments of liberal society a radical 
dimension that has had considerable impact on the arousal of 
a democratic consciousness in bourgeois society. While keeping 
in mind (to a certain extent) that gender, social status, and 
economic class could effectively exclude one from what was in 
principle a participatory arena, he illuminates empirically a 
dimension of early modern society that seems to have 
10 In Habermas' recent reflections on the public sphere 
he is more sensitive to the exclusionary character of the 
ideal type of the bourgeois public sphere. He notes that the 
"exclusion of the culturally and politically mobilized lower 
strata entails a pluralization of the public sphere in the 
very process of the emergence. Next to, and interlocked with, 
the hegemonic public sphere, a plebeian one assumes shape" 
("Further Reflections on the Public Sphere", p. 426). This, he 
contends, has altered his understanding of the normative 
theory that he extracts from the bourgeois public sphere, 
moving him toward communication theory as the foundation for 
modern normativity (FRPS, p. 442). This sort of foundation has 
the benefit of being deeper, but it loses some of its critical 
potential in that it becomes, to a certain extent, 
dehistoricized. Then the question of how modern it is in fact 
becomes more important. My own view is that the theory of 
communicative action is a-historical and that modernity become 
simply a conceptual, rather than historical, construct in 
Habermas' theory. 
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considerable normative importance. In other words, regardless 
of the actual exclusiveness of the bourgeois public sphere, 
"with the emergence of the diffuse public formed in the course 
of the commercialization of the cultural production, a new 
social category arose" (my emphasis). As such, Habermas' 
appeal to the egalitarian 'spirit' that played a key role in 
the development of modern society has radical significance, in 
spite of its exclusive constraints. 
Habermas' aim is to show how this democratic spirit, 
which flourished in the 18th century, could have issued in a 
new era of substantive democracy. It was a forum in which 
protest against government policy could be articulated, as 
well as a medium through which popular opinion could trickle 
up. It is important to note that the market economies of the 
17th and 18th centuries were not really capitalistic in the 
strong sense. By the 19th century, however, full scale 
capitalism, complete with heavy industry and mass production, 
began to dominate the urban landscape in most of Europe. This 
development, and the consequences that obtained for the 
markedly larger working classes, rendered explicit the 
contradictions of a universal sphere of discourse being 
dominated by a single economic class. Further, the economic 
trauma experienced by the working classes, which ultimately 
was neutralized through welfare state interventions, lead to 
a different conception of publicness--one that resonated with 
the mandates of post laissez faire capitalism. 
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In order to defuse the politically volatile implications 
of class conflict, the media through which public opinion is 
shaped and disseminated had to be radically altered. On this 
score Habermas' analysis is masterful. He demonstrates with 
precision a twofold dynamic that effectively annuls public 
debate. On the one hand, the bourgeois family is transformed 
from a private sphere for existential retreat to an 
essentialized domain that serves as a "conduit for social 
forces channeled into the conjugal family's inner space by way 
of a public sphere that the mass media have transmogrified 
into a sphere of cultural consumption. The despecialized 
province of interiority was hollowed out by the mass media; a 
pseudo-public sphere of a no longer literary public was 
patched together to create a sort of superficial zone of 
familiarity" (STP, p. 162) This, Habermas contends, leads to 
an ascetic aversion for both reading and political 
argumentation. In addition, the media form is itself 
transformed by the mandates of commodity exchanged. "Today the 
conversation itself is administered. Professional dialogues 
from the podium, panel discussions, and round table shows--the 
rational debate of private people becomes one of the 
production numbers of the stars in radio and television, a 
salable package ready for the box office; it assumes commodity 
form even at 'conferences' where anyone can 'participate.' 
Discussion, now a 'business', becomes formalized; the 
Presentation of positions and counter-positions is bound to 
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certain prearranged rules of the game; consensus about the 
subject matter is made largely superfluous by that concerning 
form" (STP, p. 164). As such, the free debate of the liberal 
public sphere is shifted into management complexes which serve 
to control critical appraisals of the system and to conform 
behavior to the imperatives of welfare state capitalism. 
Taking these points into account, it is important to 
consider whether Habermas' interpretation of the bourgeois 
public sphere is acceptable. Should we, with Habermas, 
interpret it radically--taking it seriously as a normative 
feature of modern society, if not an empirical reality? Or, 
should we view it as part and parcel of bourgeois ideology--a 
sphere that was from the outset simply exclusive and 
supportive of a repressive economic mode? These are 
essentially the questions that I addressed in the previous 
chapter, only now from a more historically informed 
perspective. Once again, the primary issue is whether or not 
the normative developments that Habermas associates with 
modernity are separable from the economic developments that 
also factored prominently into the emergence of modern 
society. These questions are heightened by the direct 
relationship that Habermas identifies between economic freedom 
and the bourgeois public sphere. If we take the position that 
the radical interpretation is correct, the deterioration of 
this sphere can be viewed as a deviation from a core value of 
modern society: a value which under altered socio-economic and 
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political conditions could flourish. If we take the position 
that the bourgeois public sphere is always already in 
complicity with capitalism, what Habermas describes as 
deterioration, and implicitly deviation, is nothing less than 
the outcome of the fundamental logic of an inherently 
exclusive public sphere. As should be clear from chapter III, 
I lean strongly toward the latter interpretation, and will 
attempt to show how this pertains to constituting public 
spheres in atmospheres hostile to opposition. At the same time 
I do not want to dismiss too quickly the normative importance 
of the former interpretation. If we are interested in 
formulating theories which illuminate the problem of 
constituting public debate, we need to take seriously the 
models that are at our disposal. 
This interpretive debate has more than theoretical 
importance. While it is true that the public sphere is a 
social-theoretic concept, and its status as a concept doesn't 
have a great deal to do with contemporary political 
situations, it is also part of the world view (web of ideas) 
that underpins most Western societies (this is precisely 
Habermas' point about the modern lifeworld). Evidence to this 
effect is presented in the constant appeal to public debate 
when controversial issues arise concerning governmental 
policies and action. What is important about these appeals is 
that their referent is the same idealized conception to which 
Habermas appeals. I will later discuss more directly the way 
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that the rhetoric of public debate stifles real public debate. 
At present, however, I will focus on the question of 
interpretation as it pertains to the specific problem of 
constituting oppositional public spheres. If we can accept 
Habermas' interpretation the following analysis can be 
developed: the public sphere in late-capitalist societies has 
been thoroughly deformed--to the point that what it means to 
have public debate has all but evacuated the consciousness of 
the general populous or the average citizen. What we have in 
place of public debate is media saturation, which is directly 
linked to the steering media that Habermas identifies with the 
system. What was once a vibrant living idea, albeit 
instantiated imperfectly, has been undermined by the 
imperatives that drive advanced capitalist societies: money 
and power. As such, the idea of public debate plays no roll in 
the decision making processes that shape institutionally based 
political practices. 
This seems a plausible enough interpretation. Yet it 
strikes me as one that fails to take seriously the evolution 
and transformation of the idea of public debate--not as an 
empirical reality but as an idea--an element of a world view--
that is malleable enough to be put to ends that run completely 
counter to its original intent. Following the more skeptical 
interpretation, I will focus on the exclusive character of the 
public sphere rather than its principle of openness. Critics 
of Habermas' interpretation have pointed out that this 
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idealization of the bourgeois public sphere is shot through 
with the empirical exclusions that were instrumental in 
establishing the political hegemony of a specific group of 
individuals. Nancy Fraser summarizes the work of these 
"revisionist historians" in her article "Rethinking the Public 
sphere. "11 She points out how the work of Joan Landes12 
illuminates the inherent gender biases that infiltrate the 
bourgeois ideal of public discourse that Haberrnas privileges. 
This analysis is supported and arnplif ied in Geof Eley' s 
"Nations, Publics, and Political Culture." 13 He shows how the 
ideal of public discourse was simply a devise for instituting 
a new elite. Rather than a model to which we should appeal for 
normative purposes, "it was the arena, the training ground, 
and eventually the power base of a stratum of bourgeois men 
who were corning to see themselves as a 'universal class' and 
preparing to assert their fitness to govern" (RPS, p. 60). 
Fraser summarizes the problem as follows: "Now, there is a 
remarkable irony here, one that Haberrnas' account of the rise 
of the public sphere fails fully to appreciate. A discourse of 
publicity touting accessibility, rationality, and the 
suspension of status hierarchies is itself deployed as a 
strategy of distinction. Of course, in and of itself, this 
11 Social Text, 25/26, (pp. 56-80). 
12 Joan Landes, Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of 
.t.he French Revolution, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988. 
13 In Haberrnas and the Public Sphere. 
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irony does not fatally compromise the discourse of publicity; 
that discourses can be, indeed has been, differently deployed 
in different circumstances and contexts. Nevertheless, it does 
suggest that the relationship between publicity and status is 
more complex than Habermas intimates, that declaring a 
deliberative arena to be a space where extant status 
distinctions are bracketed and neutralized is not sufficient 
to make it so" (RPS, p. 60). 
With these observations in mind, I would suggest the 
following interpretation of the bourgeois ideal of publicity: 
Rather than fostering universal participation, the original 
idea of the public sphere served to forge a locus of power 
that could be used to conglomerate influence and protect 
economic interests. 14 The "talk" of publicness was simply a 
devise that facilitated the pursuit of these ends. If this be 
the case, it is reasonable to project that contemporary "talk" 
about public debate is used in a similar manner. What is 
interesting about this interpretation is that it indicates 
that the ideal of publicity which Habermas identifies as 
emerging in the 17th and 18th century actually plays an 
important role in contemporary discourse. While Habermas' 
normal/deviant model would suggest that most contemporary 
discussion departs from the bourgeois ideal, my interpretation 
suggests that this ideal continues to guide the conglomeration 
14 This is essentially the argument that I was presenting 
concerning modern normativity in chapter III. 
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of influence and protection of economic interest. My point is 
that depending on how one reads the development of the idea of 
the public sphere, and the uses that it is put to, the role 
that it plays in current political struggles changes 
significantly. Rather than saying that the 11 ideal 11 has no 
bearing upon the real with respect to current political 
debates, I would suggest that this ideal still has currency 
and is used in manipulative ways that reflect it initial 
exclusive character. 
With Habermas I want to argue that the ideal of 
publicness, which emerged, for whatever reasons, in 
conjunction with early modern society, should not be dismissed 
out of hand, as seems to be the case with some of his critics. 
Contra Habermas, however, I want to assert that rather than 
being in need of a normative revival, this malleable ideal 
needs to be reformed in such a way that it can be used to 
undermine hegemonic public spheres. I will return to this 
later in the present chapter. Before doing so, however, I will 
discuss some of Habermas' own attempts to participate in 
important debates. These debates, I believe, illustrate the 
sort of politics of enlightenment that his normative theory 
gives rise to. My questions will concern whether this sort of 
political action, if I can use those terms, really moves 
toward the goal of emancipation that needs to be basic to a 
critical social theory. 
Juerqen Habermas: Critic in the Public Sphere 
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The point that I have been leading up to in the first 
section of this chapter can be summarized as follows: For 
Habermas' work to be taken seriously as a project within 
critical theory, there has to be a practical dimension that is 
politically oriented, or, stated more strongly, politically 
motivated. If he is strictly interested in providing a 
foundation for a critical theory of society--as could be 
inferred from my discussion in chapter III, then his own work 
is only a useful tool for critical theorists, not a critical 
theory itself. I think it is quite clear that Habermas has 
been, and probably remains, devoted to the idea of developing 
a critical theory that stands on its own. In order to do 
justice to this intent, however, it is necessary to interpret 
his recent work--such as the collection on discourse ethics--
in light of the earlier work on the public sphere. This, at 
any rate, is the approach that I would contend his various 
projects dictate. 
There has recently been several interesting monographs 
and collections of essays that support my position. I have 
already discussed Calhoun's collection on the public sphere. 
In addition to this a volume of Habermas' "political" 
writings, The New Conservatism, appeared in 1991. Finally, two 
books on Habermas, Robert C. Holub's Juergen Habermas: Critic 
in the Public Sphere, 15 and Jane Braaten's Habermas' Critical 
15 The title of this section is clearly borrowed from 
Holub's book. 
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.TJleory of Society, both deal at length with the politically 
significant dimensions of Habermas' writings. Holub's book in 
particular is relevant because he traces from early on in his 
(Habermas') career what I would call Habermas' politics of 
enlightenment. He begins by laying out the relationship 
between Habermas' explicitly theoretical work--particularly 
the theory of communicative action--and the ideal of a 
distortion free public sphere. Holub then shows how there has 
always been a practical side to these ideals which Habermas 
himself has exemplified in various debates that he has 
participated in, including the positivist debate, the Gadamer 
debate, debates with members of the new left student movement, 
the debate with Niklas Luhmann, the debate over postmodernism, 
and finally the debate with revisionist German historians. I 
will take up the latter two of these debates in the present 
section--discussing each in terms of the strengths and 
weaknesses afforded by the approach that Habermas utilizes in 
tacitly propounding a politics of enlightenment. This will 
serve as preparation for my discussion of an important issue 
in progressive american politics that Habermas' approach--
unrnodified--has difficulty contending with. 
My primary concern with respect to the debates that 
Habermas has participated in will be the Historian's debate. 
My emphasis on this particular debate is for two specific 
reasons: First, I think it show Habermas--and what I am 
calling his politics of enlightenment--at his best; second, 
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the case can be made that this debate involves a very 
interesting intersection between philosophy and politics that 
sheds light on the so called postmodernism debate that I will 
discuss next. The texts that I will focus on in this 
discussion first appeared in English in the spring/summer 1988 
volume of New German Critique. The two essays that will 
concern me here concentrate on the interpretation of Germany's 
Nazi past and the impact it should have on national identity. 
While the central aim of Habermas' analysis is to criticize 
the neo-conservative political agenda that is in the backdrop 
of the historiographical method at issue, there is also a 
subtle connection made between the work of the historians in 
question and the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. Elsewhere 
Habermas has conducted careful investigations of the 
relationship between Heidegger's affiliation with the National 
Socialist movement and his philosophical work. His conclusion 
is that the connection is intrinsic, and that those he has 
influenced should be viewed with suspicion (hence the 
connection to postmodernism--particularly the philosophy of 
Jacques Derrida). That a school of historiography swayed by 
Heidegger aims at minimizing the significance of the worst 
aspect of Nazism--the holocaust--seems to lend credence to 
this view. My aim here will be to provide an analysis of the 
relationship between Habermas' critique of revisionist 
historiography in Germany and his assessment of Heideggerian 
philosophy; the two exhibit striking similarities in both form 
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and content. This will serve to illustrate the concerns that 
motivate Habermas' interventions into public debate as well as 
the relationship these debates have to his overall theoretical 
project. Once again, the overall objective is to determine 
whether it makes sense to claim that Habermas' theory contains 
within it a politics of enlightenment, and if so, to establish 
the basic principles and conditions by which it is grounded. 
While I am interested in analyzing Habermas' work, not 
the Historikerstreit per se, a few words on the latter are 
needed to provide a context. According to John Torpey, the 
fundamental issue at stake in the debate surrounding the 
Historikerstreit is the way in which contemporary German 
national identity should be understood with respect to its 
past: "The Historikerstreit, which is in fact more political 
than historiographical, is principally concerned with the way 
in which the understanding of history shapes contemporary 
popular discourse" (Torpey 1988, p. 6--hereafter HH). As 
should be clear from this passage, there is a specific 
political agenda attached to the sought after self-
understanding--that of the German neo-conservative movement. 
The central figures in the Historikerstreit don't attempt to 
deny the holocaust; 16 rather, they seek to cast doubt on the 
responsibility that Germany, as a nation, should bear for this 
16 Most readers will recall such attempts by several 
American revisionist historians in the early 1980 's. The 
revisionists in Germany are nowhere near the fanatical 
positions forwarded by this group. 
228 
aspect of its past. Three basic strategies are employed: l) 
questions are raised concerning the degree of atrocity; 2) 
efforts are made to reduce, or neutralize the relative 
significance of specifically German atrocities; and 3) aspects 
of the German role in WW II that are more easily interpreted 
positively are highlighted (e.g. the stand on the Eastern 
front which is presented as action against "communism"--the 
typical neo-conservative bogeyman). The net result, according 
to critics such as Habermas, is that the negative standard 
against which constitutional Germany must continually measure 
itself is effectively weakened. This in turn serves the 
interests of the German right wing. 
In his contributions to the Historikerstreit, Habermas 
suggests that the aim of the revisionists is to provide a 
historical backdrop for the reinscription of Germany into 
NATO. This takes the form of an abstract subsumption of the 
past with the intent of establishing an unambiguous national 
id entity. In order to achieve such an objective, several 
questionable moves have to take place. Habermas notes the 
following: 
To start with, the memory of recent periods of history 
which is a predominately negative one and which inhibits 
identification has to be bulldozed clear; then, under the 
sign of freedom or totalitarianism, the always virulent 
fear of Bolshevism must be used to keep alive the correct 
image of the enemy (Habermas 1988a, p. 27--hereafter 
KSD). 
As a scholarly exercise, historiographical practices of this 
sort would be dubious enough. What concerns Habermas more, 
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however, is the way that these positions have been publicly 
disseminated. 
Whoever has read Ernst Nolte's level-headed contribution 
in the last issue of Die Zeit and has not been following 
the emotional discussion in the Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung must have the impression that the argument we are 
involved in is about historical detail. In fact, it is 
concerned with a political conversion of the revisionism 
which has emerged in modern historiography and which has 
been impatiently demanded by politicians of the "Wende" 
government ... In the center of his deliberations stands 
the question: in which public consciousness? The 
increasing distance in time, he asserts, makes a 
"historicization" necessary--one way or another ( Habermas 
1988b, p. 40--hereafter CPH). 
In light of these observations, Habermas' objection to the 
revisionists are directed at three aspects of their work: 1) 
their attempt to minimize specifically Nazi war crimes; 2) 
their attempt to solicit an uncritical appropriation of the 
German past; and 3) their efforts to articulate the first and 
second to a political agenda premised on national identity. 
The first of these, the attempt to relativize Nazi 
atrocities, is accomplished by adopting an intimate 
hermeneutic perspective. Rather than assessing the events of 
WW II in retrospect, the revisionist assumes the position of 
participant. By doing so, the historian "wishes to put himself 
in the position of the fighters of the period who are not yet 
framed and devalued by our retrospective knowledge"--"the 
point of view of the courageous soldier, of the desperate 
civilian population and also of the 'tried and tested' leading 
Nazi functionaries" (KSD, p. 30). This generates empathy for 
those who participated in activities which subsequently have 
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been condemned as criminal. In an effort to reduce the 
significance of Nazi atrocities, and the impact that they have 
on German national identity, this period in general, as well 
as the specific crimes associated with it, have to be 
relativized. Nazism cannot be allowed to stand out as uniquely 
abominable. "Its significance has to be leveled out (CPH, p. 
46). Habermas' theoretical objection to this procedure notes 
that a hermeneutic of empathy is impossible; we always view 
the past in light of the present ( KSD, p. 30) . His more 
concrete objection will be discussed below. 
Habermas' second major concern is the attempt by the 
revisionists to encourage the German people to uncritically 
appropriate their past. This is aimed at establishing a 
renewed sense of national identity--one free of guilt. 
Habermas finds this on one hand to be absurd and on the other 
to be dangerous. Concerning the dangers, he points out that 
there is a strong link between tradition and identity. When 
tradition includes a period of institutionalized criminality, 
then this too has to factor into identity. Only under 
conditions of preserving the memory of the victims, and with 
that an awareness of the capacity for horrible actions, can 
identity formation relate legitimately to tradition in the 
Federal Republic. Without the glare of Auschwitz, there can be 
no critical appropriation of tradition; any relationship to 
the past will be a matter of blind faith (KSD, p. 43-46). It 
is at this point that the concrete objections to the more 
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abstract matter of historiographical procedure become 
important. By leveling Nazi atrocities to just another form of 
human violence, revisionist historiography warps the 
relationship between tradition and identity. By encouraging 
the public to internalize this perspective, "the scurrilous 
philosophy" of "nee-conservative modern historians" enters 
into the political arena. 17 
Habermas' third concern is with the politicizing of 
activity that should be restricted to the scientific 
reconstruction of the past. The political agenda is clear: 
anti-communism and pro-NATO. By reducing the status of 
Auschwitz to that of just another unfortunate incident (and 
one that most likely has been "exaggerated"), emphasizing the 
anti-communist strain in National Socialism, and disseminating 
this view of history publicly, the historian in the Federal 
Republic becomes an ideologue. As such, Habermas claims, 
"knowledge" is used as a form of political power (CPH, p. 47). 
These are the three main objections that Habermas levels 
against the revisionist historians. A fourth, less explicit, 
but as I will attempt to demonstrate rather significant, is 
the connection drawn between this form of historiography and 
Heideggerian philosophy. I will now take up an analysis of 
17 Habermas repeatedly refers to the revisionists as 
"modern" historians. My guess would be that such remarks are 
tongue in cheek and that what he really wants to convey is a 
deviation from modern standards. This would further advance my 
view that the Historikerstreit is as much a debate about 
postmodernism as is the postmodernism debate itself. 
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that connection. 
Habermas makes two specific references to Heidegger in 
the articles that I have been discussing. The first, in KSD, 
pertains to Nolte's "philosophical historiography." Habermas 
notes that Nolte is a "former student of Heidegger" and that 
his historiographical theory employs a "curious use of 
Heidegger's concept of 'transcendence'" (KSD, 34). This notion 
of ontological transcendence provides the philosophical 
foundation for the leveling effect that is central to the 
revisionist project. Under such a schema, Fascism and Marxism 
become similar responses to the failure of modernity. Hence, 
the pragmatics of modern progress are cast aside and replaced 
with a Heideggerian notion of identity. "In this dimension of 
profundity in which all cats are grey, he then solicits 
understanding for the anti-modernist impulses which are 
directed against an 'unreserved affirmation of practical 
transcendence'" (KSD, p. 34-5). The second specific reference 
to Heidegger is found in CPH. The concern here is not with 
Heidegger's influence on revisionist historiography, but 
rather with the effect of revisionism on the way that 
Heidegger can be read. 
As long as the appropriating eye of the late-born 
observer is directed towards the ambivalence which 
reveals themselves to him through the course of history 
without personal merit, it will be impossible to make 
even outstanding figures immune to the retroactive power 
of corrupted historical reception. After 1945, we read 
Carl Schmitt, Heidegger, Hans Freyer, and even Ernst 
Juenger in a different way than before 1933 (CPH, p. 46). 
At the same time, however, there is an implicit concern with 
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the way that a Heideggerian notion of tradition gives rise to 
an historiographical, rather than historical, reading of 
figures from the Nazi era. 
Several less explicit references to Heidegger are made in 
the two articles. Habermas notes that the revisionists appeal 
to the centrality of Germany, both geographically and 
otherwise, with respect to Europe in general; he labels the 
revisionists anti-modernists; and he identifies an element of 
nostalgia in their politics. More significant, however, is the 
similarity between Habermas' evaluation of revisionist 
historiography and his reading of Heidegger. I will argue 
below that the former is premised on the latter. 
The same leveling tendency that Habermas detects in 
revisionist historiography is the point from which his 
critique of Heidegger in The Philosophical Discourse of 
Modernity departs. He notes that Heidegger's post-war 
philosophy is rooted in an ontological presupposition: that 
Being is the active 'agent' in history. The movement of Being 
is reflected in the various metaphysical presentations of 
Western thought. This movement comes to its critical 
culmination in the totalitarianism of the 20th century--a 
function of subjectively grounded modern metaphysics. As such, 
reason, which for Heidegger is indelibly bound up in 
subjectivity, must be condemned as a form of thinking that is 
inattentive to the call of Being. Habermas is concerned with 
the way that this assessment reduces all modern cognition to 
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what he would prefer to call "strategic rationality." 
Heidegger hardly pays any attention to the difference 
between reason and understanding, out of which Hegel 
still wanted to develop the dialectic of enlightenment. 
He can no longer gleam from self-consciousness any 
reconciling dimension in addition to its authoritarian 
aspect. It is Heidegger himself--and not the narrow-
minded Enlightenment--that levels reason to the 
understanding (PDM, p. 133). 
Hence, no distinction is made between good and bad 
rationality. Yet, Habermas claims, Heidegger remains indebted 
to an obscure normativity that depends on some form of post-
metaphysical reason (PDM, p. 131-134). 
The task of the post-metaphysical thinker is to return to 
the pre-metaphysical thought of antiquity in search for that 
which was concealed by metaphysical bracketing. This involves 
Being in its withdrawal: a feature of Being that is utterly 
ignored in modern philosophy. According to Habermas, 
Heidegger's ontological blinders prevent him from connecting 
his critique of metaphysics with the reality of everyday 
existence. This follows from his wholesale rejection of 
modernity, including modern science. As such, any insights 
from the social sciences that might supplement his 
historiographical critique are swept aside. "To make this 
claim of necessity, of a special knowledge, that is, of a 
privileged access to truth plausible, even if only 
superficially, Heidegger has to level the differentiated 
developments of the sciences and philosophy after Hegel in 
bewildering fashion" (PDM, p. 136). 
This clearly indicates that Habermas' concern with 
235 
leveling in revisionist historiography is likewise a point of 
contention with Heideggerian philosophy. More recently 
Habermas has argued that this leveling tendency in Heidegger's 
later writings serves as a mechanism for distancing himself 
from his Nazi past. Had Heidegger seen fit to comment on the 
crimes of Auschwitz, it is claimed, he would most likely have 
reduced these events to a particularly unfortunate revealing 
of Being in its final metaphysical hours. This in fact is how 
he dealt with Nazism in general. The operation that enables 
the revisionist historians to characterize the holocaust as 
one among numerous manifestations of the current 'will to 
power' is already well developed in the philosophy of 
Heidegger. "That is how it was in 1945, and that is how 
Heidegger always repeated it: abstraction by essentialization. 
Under the leveling gaze of the philosopher of Being even the 
extermination of the Jews seems merely an event equivalent to 
many others. Annihilation of Jews, expulsion of Germans--they 
amount to the same thing" (Habermas, 1989, p. 453--hereafter 
WW). 
Habermas' evaluation of Heidegger's appropriation of 
tradition is also a central feature of the critique sustained 
in PDM. While it is not as obviously linked to his assessment 
of the neo-conservative traditionalism of the revisionists, a 
connection can definitely be made. In recalling Habermas' 
concerns in this context, two general points are worth noting: 
1) that neo-conservatism uncritically embraces tradition in 
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its entirety; and 2) in doing so a uniform tradition is 
created by selectively editing that which doesn't fall neatly 
into the conceptual framework and political agenda that is at 
stake. In his reading of Heidegger, Habermas identifies these 
moves in reverse form: the metaphysical tradition is rejected 
in wholesale fashion; and in doing so, key elements that 
enable this move are covertly retained. This aspect of his 
thought became dominant at about the same time that Fascism 
broke out in Germany. Habermas claims that during the early 
days of the Nazi period, Heidegger began to mix philosophy and 
ideology (WW, p. 439). The section of Being and Time that 
gives rise to this is number 6 in the introduction: "The Task 
of Destroying the History of Ontology." 
In Being and Time Heidegger ran up against a dilemma. In 
his effort to break with philosophical subjectivity, Habermas 
claims, Heidegger merely stood Husserlian phenomenology on its 
head. As such, he is saddled with an ego-centric concept of 
the world which ignores the networks of intersubjectivity that 
are fundamental to being-with-others. In order to preserve the 
radical voluntarism that, according to Habermas, lies at the 
heart of Being and Time, Heidegger needs the very 
transcendental ego that the philosophy of Dasein aimed at 
overcoming. Habermas argues that Heidegger recognized this 
dilemma and opted for an alternative notion of transcendence 
rather than a revised doctrine of being-in-the-world 
(constructed more intersubjectively). Hence, the "turn"--
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prompting a shift in the interpretation of destining from that 
of an active Dasein to a quietistic shepherd who, "hanging on 
in spite of fate yields to self-surrender to the destining of 
Being" (PDM, pp. 149-52). This move finds its impetus in the 
destruction of the history of ontology. "According to the 
self-understanding of Being and Time, it belonged to the 
province of a phenomenological destruction of the history of 
ontology to loosen up rigid traditions and to awaken the 
contemporary awareness of problems to the buried experiences 
of ancients thought" (PDM, p. 153). As such, Heidegger's 
leveling of the history of metaphysics, and his renunciation 
of that tradition as a source pool from which appropriate 
responses to present conditions can draw, is rooted in this 
section of Being and Time. 
The above characterizes Habermas' dispute with Heidegger 
concerning his rendering of a diffuse tradition in uniform 
fashion and judging it on the basis of sweeping 
generalizations. As was the case with the revisionist 
historians, doing so has an ideological function. It also 
requires some selective editing, which in Heidegger's case 
takes the form of covert appropriation rather than conspicuous 
denial. What he sneaks in from tradition, according to 
Habermas, is the philosophical subjectivity with which he 
attempts to break. Habermas notes this early on in his 
critique of Heidegger in PDM (136) and attempts to 
substantiate it at a later point in the analysis (PDM, pp. 
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151-2). As I noted above, Habermas contends that in his later 
works, Heidegger, in response to this dilemma, merely inverts 
"Ursprungphilosophie." Hence, the later writings are premised 
on the same subjectivism that stifled Being and Time. 
At the heart of Habermas' assessment of revisionist 
historiography and his critique of Heideggerian philosophy is 
an implicit, but deeply felt, concern with nihilism 
(ungrounded or falsely grounded thought and action). Nowhere 
in his discussions of Heidegger does he explicitly accuse him 
or his thought of being nihilistic. Implicitly, however, this 
seems to be his concern (see WW, pp. 448-456, and PDM, pp. 
155-160). By rejecting the modern tradition uniformly, while 
still relying on one of its most questionable features 
(subjectivity), Heidegger's thought is rendered inherently 
indeterminate. This sets the stage for the turns and denials 
that Habermas notes. As it is the ramifications of this for 
politics that are most disturbing, I will proceed to discuss 
the political agenda with which Habermas associates Heidegger, 
and implicitly the revisionist historians. 
While the contrast between the political implications of 
Heidegger's thought and the work of the revisionist historians 
is notable (Heidegger's post-war politics were passive while 
the historian's are clearly active), it is the similarities 
that are most striking. In both cases, the fundamental problem 
is that of the meaning of the constitution of history. "The 
more real history disappeared behind Heideggerian 
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'historicity' the easier it was for Heidegger to adopt a 
naive, yet pretentious, appeal to 'diagnosis of the present' 
taken up ad hoc" (WW, p. 434). Habermas' criticisms are not 
aimed at Heidegger's Nazi alliances. Rather, he condemns 
Heidegger for his failure to make amends for this obviously 
mistaken association (WW, pp. 435-6, PDM, 155-6). Further, 
Habermas claim~, his reasons for not doing so are justified by 
an appeal to his own philosophical position. The development 
of that position is characterized in terms of three key moves. 
First, Heidegger the philosopher wrote the monumental Being 
and Time. This work, removed from the context of subsequent 
historical events, could have had a wide range of 
philosophical impacts. Second, Heidegger the philosopher/Nazi 
propagandist, interpreted the main features of Being and Time 
such that they were compatible with National Socialism. This 
is most evident in An Introduction to Metaphysics. Finally, 
insofar as Heidegger had committed himself both politically 
and philosophically to National Socialism, he needed an escape 
that didn't threaten the integrity of his thought. This was 
the political factor that prompted the turn. Rather than 
address the issue of responsibility directly, Heidegger hid 
behind ontological generalizations. This preserved his 
significance as a philosopher and sidestepped the question of 
political accountability. The nihilistic implications of this 
should be clear: when responsibility is dismissed through an 
appeal to an abstract notion of the history of Being, then 
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anything will be permissible and nothing will be learned from 
past errors. Habermas' implicit claim is that this is 
precisely what is taking place with the activist 
Heideggerianism of the revisionist historians. 
Rather than draw any substantive conclusions from this 
particular aspect of my analysis, I would like to move 
directly into a brief discussion of the so called 
postmodernism debate. I want to stress here, however, that 
there is a continuity between the seemingly concrete debate 
over national identity and the apparently abstract concern 
with postmodernism. 
attempted to show, 
The bridge between the two, as I have 
is Heidegger: both politically and 
philosophically. Habermas' concern, then, should be clear: 
modernity provides us with resources that protect against the 
deviations that can lead to fascism. This is true both 
practically and theoretically; and it is a strain that I have 
tried to show runs through Habermas entire literary corpus. If 
enlightenment is the source of continuity, which I believe it 
is, and, if the politics of fascism represents the alternative 
to a politics of enlightenment, then Habermas' engagement in 
debates, both philosophical and political, have to be 
understood as enlightenment informed interventions. If this 
isn't true, then it seems impossible to count Habermas as the 
most eminent critical theorist of his generation. 
As I have been indicating all along, the most important 
nexus in Habermas' more recent work is that between his 
defense of the 
postmodernism. It 
closely related 
Enlightenment and his 
should be clear by now 




that these are 
for Habermas, 
represents three basic values: truth, freedom, and justice. As 
r noted in chapter III, each is associated with a particular 
relationship between a speaker and the world domain that is 
thematized in specific types of speech acts. Truth has to do 
with our orientation to the objective world; freedom has to do 
with our orientation to the social or intersubjective world; 
and justice has to do with our orientation to the world of 
responsible individuals or the subjective world. It is 
Habermas' aim to show that any possibility for emancipatory 
action has to be rooted in these values. Habermas finds these 
values grounded in the modern lifeworld, and figured in a 
specifically modern fashions; were this not the case his 
theory would amount to an a-historical defense of values that 
are, by necessity in his analysis, linked to the 
Enlightenment. 
The crucial point here, in linking his defense of the 
Enlightenment with his rejection of postmodernism, is the 
rootedness of these values in distinctly modern forms of life. 
Claims that we have moved beyond modernity seem to dismiss 
this point in rather cavalier fashion. This amounts to a 
celebration of the impossibility of emancipatory action. Being 
party to this, Habermas would claim, involves engaging in a 
performative contradiction. Beyond this rather superficial 
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postmodernism, which is prevalent enough, there is a more 
sophisticated theoretical development--neither modern nor 
postmodern in any conventional sense of the terms--that wants 
to engage in a rigorous analysis of the values that Habermas 
sees as thoroughly intertwined with modern forms of life, that 
is, truth, freedom, and justice. It is the latter type of 
postmodernism that seems to bother Habermas the most; and it 
is with these thinkers--spanning from Nietzsche to Derrida--
that Habermas has his "debate. 1118 
The question that Habermas never really gets around to 
asking is whether or not these "postmodernists "--the more 
sophisticated types-- are really postmodernists at all. With 
respect to those that celebrate postmodernism--most notably 
Lyotard and Baudrillard--Habermas is for all intensive 
purposes silent. The most vivid example of this is The 
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. Where, for instance, is 
the chapter on Lyotard? Habermas ignores him with the 
exception of the following remark in the preface: "Its theme 
(the project of modernity), disputed and multifaceted as it 
is, never lost hold on me. Its philosophical aspects have 
18 It is important to note that the debate to which I, and 
other authors are referring, is not really a debate at all. It 
has tended to be rather onesided--with Habermas writing 
extended polemics against the so called postmodernists, and 
with them making brief and merely occasional responses. 
Authors such as Holub, and Kellner and Best extend Habermas' 
comments on Derrida, Foucault etc. to Lyotard--the only self 
proclaimed postmodernist that Habermas even mentions--but in 
fact it is with Lyotard that there has been the least 
engagement. 
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moved even more starkly into public consciousness in the wake 
of the reception of French neo-structuralism--as has the key 
term 'postmodernity' in connection with a publication by Jean-
Francois Lyotard." Beyond this not an explicit word on the 
most activist of the French thinkers associated with 
postmodernism. It could be claimed that the entirety of The 
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity is aimed at the 
repercussions of the condition that Lyotard assesses. Insofar 
as Lyotard has, in a sense, written two books on Habermas (The 
Postmodern Condition and even more so The Differend--see my 
discussion in chapter II) with only a few veiled references to 
the subject of his critique, it is possible that Habermas is 
playing a similar game. But while Habermas isn't entirely 
above this, he seems more genuinely concerned with the 
implications of what he might call the really dangerous 
postmodernists: the lineage which leads from Hegel, through 
Nietzsche, to Bataille and Foucault on the one hand, and, more 
importantly, to Heidegger and Derrida on the other. 
Why, then, do these thinkers concern Habermas more than 
the straight forward postmodernists? This question is 
particularly important in light of the fact that none of them 
write about postmodernism, or identify with it. Here is where 
the problem of the Enlightenment comes back into play. It is 
Habermas' point, I believe, that the work of these theorists 
throws into question the validity of values such as truth, 
freedom, and justice, without taking seriously the 
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implications of doing so or even being aware that this is what 
they are doing. So the fact that these philosophers don't 
write about the postmodern condition does not make them less 
postmodernists in Habermas' view. They are, in one sense, 
substantive evidence for the point being made by Lyotard and 
the likes. 
Kant's rather stern essay (as discussed in chapter I) on 
the question of enlightenment seems to serve as a point of 
departure in Habermas' analysis of the "postmodernists" in The 
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. This is most evident in 
his polemic against Derrida. He begins by accusing Derrida of 
being a unrepentant, or "orthodox" Heideggerian. As he states 
in the very first sentence of "Beyond a Temporalized 
Philosophy of Origins": "Insofar as Heidegger was received in 
postwar France as the author of the 'Letter on Humanism', 
Derrida is correct in claiming for himself the role of an 
authentic disciple who has critically taken up the teaching of 
the master and productively advanced it." This remark situates 
Derrida in two precarious positions vis-a-vis Heidegger: 
first, he is an immature follower of the pied piper of Nazism; 
and second, he has mimicked this dimension of the Heidegger 
"scene", cultivating his own network of followers. The main 
difference being that Heidegger yearns for premodern 
simplicity while Derrida strives for postmodern complexity. 
Habermas frames this in specifically political terms: "Whereas 
Heidegger decks out his history-of-Being fatalism in the style 
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of schultze-Naumburg with its sentimental homely pictures of 
a preindustrial peasant counter world, Derrida moves about 
instead in the subversive world of the partisan struggle--he 
would even like to take the house of Being apart and, out in 
the open, 'to dance ... the cruel feast of which the Genealogy 
of Morals speaks.'" This characterization (and even Habermas 
would probably admit that it is more caricature than 
characterization) renders Derrida susceptible to an anti-
enlightenment reading: one which is, of course, somewhat 
plausible. As Kant put it: "Enlightenment is man's emergence 
from his self-imposed immaturity. Immaturity is the inability 
to use one's understanding without guidance from another. This 
immaturity is self-imposed when its cause lies not in lack of 
understanding, but in lack of resolve and courage to use it 
without guidance from another." Plugging Habermas' account of 
Heidegger and Derrida into this equation, we come up with 
Heidegger representing pre-enlightenment authority and Derrida 
representing post-enlightenment playfulness. What washes out, 
for Habermas, is a mature concern for those enlightenment 
values that, when dispensed with in either direction, turns 
into atrocity. 
If we forgive Habermas for not really taking seriously 
Heidegger's important contributions to contemporary thought, 
and for taking a considerable amount of interpretive license 
with Derrida, the questions that frame the relationship 
between postmodernism and enlightenment come into focus. 
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Taking these caricatures of Heidegger and Derrida as signs 
operating within a rather tense economy of meaning (which is, 
ironically, what I perceive Habermas to be doing in The 
philosophical Discourse of Modernity>, Heidegger's character 
represents traditional conservatism while Derrida's represents 
young conservatism. Neither, as emblem, has the maturity to 
realistically address questions about the need for 
emancipation or the value of democratization, much less 
something as hopelessly "metaphysical" as revolution. As such, 
the former will nostalgically yearn for a higher order 
authority structure while the latter will rip away at any type 
of structure through an academically sedated version of 
terrorism. What Habermas hopes to show is that there are a lot 
more signs circulating in this economy thap the 
"conservatives" would have us believe, and that under certain 
conditions these emblems, or values, could possibly be brought 
into the forefront of human-being. This leads into the other 
side of the "debate", one that has been carried out by 
"continental" philosophers in the United States and England 
for the most part. These "interlocutors" hold up Habermas as 
a sign for the sake of protecting against a fearful encounter. 
Habermas' sign value, which is set up to a certain extent by 
his own rhetorical stylizations, is that of a staunchly 
traditional rationalist who can't quite keep pace with the 
fast moving French scene. This caricature requires a 
selective, and often blatantly wrong, reading of Habermas' 
247 
work. As is the case with Habermas' reading of postmodernism, 
however, there are strategic gains to be made in doing so. By 
writing off Habermas (and I will admit that he invites this on 
a certain level), it becomes a whole lot easier to write off 
his concern with questions of value. It is always 
uncomfortable for someone who prefers to wax poetic about "the 
political" to have to address questions concerning action 
oriented toward political emancipation. By simply dismissing 
this as a "Habermasian", read metaphysical, or modern, or 
enlightenment, question, it is easier to pass on into the real 
business of praising Heidegger or imitating Derrida. 
At the risk of being redundant, I would like to spell out 
explicitly the connection between the question of 
enlightenment and the view that is presented by the postmodern 
side of this debate. Both of these problematics are linked to 
what Habermas has termed the completion of the project of 
modernity. Two basic approaches are taken when attempting to 
philosophically engage the question of enlightenment. The 
first, which tends to be done in the name of Habermas, and up 
to a point by Habermas, appeals to clear and distinct 
principles of the Enlightenment that can be construed more or 
less independently of actual deviations that have emerged in 
the course of their development. At the center of this 
analysis is both the ideal, and concrete public sphere as the 
cite of a politics of enlightenment. This approach, which 
advocates the Enlightenment, tends to seek closure on the 
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question of enlightenment by theorizing its completion. The 
other approach tends to assume that the Enlightenment has been 
thoroughly discredited and as such we no longer need to talk 
about the question of enlightenment at all. This tact likewise 
appeals to a closure of sorts: enlightenment is a problem that 
has already been attended to. As I noted, the former approach 
tends to operate under the banner of Habermas; the latter, 
however, operates within the mainstream of continental 
philosophy but needs Habermas--as the objective enemy--just as 
much as the former. Both ignore that impulse in Habermas' work 
which asserts that we simply cannot relinquish the question of 
enlightenment (I believe Habermas himself ignores this himself 
at times). Kant has a strong riposte to all of this: "Laziness 
and cowardice are the reasons why so great a proportion of 
men, long after nature has released them from alien guidance 
(naturaliter maiorennes), nonetheless gladly remain in 
lifelong immaturity, and why it is so easy for others to 
establish themselves as their guardians. It is so easy to be 
immature." 
Such is the state of the debate between postmodernism and 
Habermas. It is somewhat odd that schools of thought that are 
known for their intensive self-reflexive critiques (critical 
theory), and their rigorous denial of the possibility for 
final closure (deconstruction or, more generally, 
postmodernism) are so quick to sign, seal and deliver the 
question of enlightenment. This in itself raises questions 
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about the normative status of the public sphere from the 
perspective of both camps. I would like now to conclude this 
section with some general comments about the relationship 
between enlightenment and the public sphere with respect to 
these two key debates. This will serve the purpose of moving 
in the direction of a reformulated notion of the public 
sphere. 
In this summation I want to stress the importance of 
context. I began my discussion of the politics of 
enlightenment in chapter I by placing at the heart of the 
problem Horkheimer's and Adorne's Dialectic of Enlightenment. 
This text, I argued, is so important because of its 
thematization of the problem of enlightenment in terms of the 
rise of fascism in Europe. I argued further that this text, 
and its focus on fascism, offers an interesting interpretive 
perspective from which the development of Habermas' social 
theory can be engaged. This is most obvious in his theory of 
language and communication which is at the core of his theory 
of society. Taking this interpretive perspective, once again, 
as our point of departure, a number of interesting theoretical 
and political moments begin to converge. 
In analyzing the objective of the historians debate, it 
seems clear that Habermas is concerned with recidivism. A neo-
conservative political climate obtained in Germany at that 
time which wished to formulate a post-Nazi nationalism that by 
necessity had to normalize the period of atrocities so as to 
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factor them unproblematically into a renewed conception of 
national identity. Habermas intervenes against this by 
pointing out how the historiographical procedures are 
politically motivated. He in turn casts his objections in 
political terms: anti-neo-conservative and pro-enlightenment. 
The point of engagement, or location of the debate, serves to 
enforce this claim. It was conducted within a literary public 
sphere which enabled the thematization of issues that resided 
at the heart of Germany's collective self understanding. 19 A 
similar claim can be made about the other important debates 
that Habermas has participated in: the positivism debate, the 
Gadamer debate, the debate with Luhmann, and the debate over 
the student movement. Each was situated within a context that 
enabled either face to face cornmunication--ala' the coffee 
houses or salons--or some form of literary exchange. Likewise, 
in each of these earlier debates we observe conditions 
governed by something like the enlightened discourse which is 
central to Habermas' normative theory. 
The Historikerstreit, however, is somewhat more complex 
than the earlier debates. It is more infiltrated with power 
relations than are the others and tends to contain the 
potential for greater degrees of distorted communication. 
Habermas seems aware of this and notes himself how the debate 
19 Habermas' first intervention into the Historikerstreit 
took place at the Romereburg Colloquium. His comments here 
made explicit his efforts to link revisionism to 
Heideggerianism. See The New Conservatism, pp. 207-211. 
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rnore or less dwindled into a series of polemics. 20 His 
challenge here is that the historians which he contested did 
not take up the substantive claims that he was presenting and 
that they resorted to politically motivated polemicizing. In 
rny discussion of his role in the debate I argued that Habermas 
himself had a political axe to grind which lead him to link 
this specific sphere of discourse, to another (the "debate" 
over postmodernism) via his frequent nemesis Heidegger. This 
move, I would argue, brings his enlightened conception of 
proper political procedures down to a level that forces him to 
accept certain terms of debate which run contrary to his own 
normative statutes. In short, Habermas himself indulges in 
polemic and questionable association (revisionism equals 
Heideggerianism equals fascism) which is part and parcel of 
attempting an enlightened form of discourse in unenlightened 
discursive arenas. 
This is perpetuated by the association that he makes 
between revisionism and postmodernism. As I noted above, 
Habermas' discussions of the key figures which he attacks in 
The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity are sometimes little 
more than crude caricatures of complex thinkers--regardless of 
the political implications of, and motivations behind, their 
thought. Habermas feels compelled--I would argue politically 
compelled--to paint his "interlocutors" in the most 
~ See "Closing Remarks", in The New Conservatism, pp. 
241-248. 
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reductionist fashion possible. As I also noted above, there 
are good reasons for developing the line of argument that he 
pursues in PDM. These are not, however, legitimate excuses for 
setting up a discursive forum that sets up straw opponent 
simply for the sake of blowing them over. This is a politics 
of enlightenment that defies its own leading principles: one 
that we might even say involves a performative contradiction. 
This dilemma, which results in using enlightenment 
politics in unenlightened spheres, leading to doubly distorted 
communication, illustrates both the need for a rejuvenated 
politics of enlightenment and for a deep concern with the 
problem of the aftermath of modernity. Bill Martin refers to 
this condition as the impasse of postmodernity. 21 While I take 
issue with the designation of the present as postmodernity, 
this is primarily a question of terminology. Martin accounts 
for this impasse in terms of a flattening out of 
consciousness, or loss of the capacity for generating meaning. 
This condition is bound up in the very sorts of things that 
I have been associating with the aftermath of modernity: media 
saturation, meta-consumption, crises in identity, and a 
general feeling of malaise. Another way of putting this might 
be that the aftermath of modernity represents a profound sort 
of illiteracy. I don't mean this in the sense that less people 
are able to read and to write. Rather, my point is that the 
critical acuity which is necessary for public discourse has 
21 Bill Martin, Matrix and Line, 1992. 
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somehow been transformed beyond the point at which it can be 
salvaged by a regenerated version of the traditional politics 
of enlightenment. This is a structural as well as a normative 
question. The normative side of the coin has been dealt with 
in chapter III. I will now turn to the structural side, which 
r introduced in chapter two, with a case study in failed 
enlightenment politics. The interpretive context for this is 
Habermas' recession into the polemicizing that he so adamantly 
opposes in "postmodernists". 
A Case Study in Post-Enlightenment Public Spheres: 
The Anti-War Movement of 1991 
In August, 1991, the government of Iraq invaded its 
neighboring country Kuwait for the purpose of gaining both 
economic and military hegemony in the Persian Gulf. For 
various reasons--primarily, I would argue, to establish its 
military power in the Gulf region--the United States 
government swiftly moved large numbers of troops and armaments 
into the arena. This prompted an immediate response among 
political progressives in the United States which converged 
into an anti-war movement. In spite of the efforts of the 
anti-war movement, however, a very destructive war came about 
that temporarily elevated the United States to the status of 
international protection force. A primary objective of the 
movement had been to bring into forums of public debate issues 
that are crucial to the determination of what the war was 
about and whether the American people should have supported 
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it. Unfortunately, access to existing forums, such as the mass 
media, was all but impossible to obtain and the constitution 
of alternative forums was met with systematic opposition. In 
effect, the anti-war movement confronted a carefully 
constructed and controlled public sphere, and was unable to 
gain an adequate hearing, either within the existing sphere or 
through the construction of alternative spheres. As such, the 
movement, in spite of being large and well organized, failed 
to have an appreciable impact on any of the policy decisions 
related to the war: decisions to send troops, to increase 
troop strength, to start the war, and to go to a ground war. 
This is not to say that the movement went al together 
unnoticed. On the one hand, the movement was unable to break 
into the public sphere constructed and engineered by the 
government in support of the war; nor was it able to construct 
an effective alternative public. On the other hand, the 
movement represented a potential to bring radically into 
question the status quo, a potential which conditioned the 
nexus in which all the decisions relating to the war were 
made. My analysis here will focus on the role played by the 
media or what might be referred to as the contemporary version 
of a literary public. 
It is helpful to begin an analysis of the role played by 
the media in the Gulf war through a consideration of the 
media's role during the Vietnam era and the changes that have 
taken place in the intervening years. A commonly held view of 
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the anti-war movement of the Vietnam era claims that the war 
was lost by the media. However, analyses of the anti-war 
rnovernent of the Vietnam era must first consider that the 
popular recollections of the movement today are mediated by 
the same forces whose effects need to be analyzed, i.e. the 
rnedia influenced and controlled by governmental and economic 
interests (money and power in Habermas' analysis). In other 
words, the standard view of the protest movements of the 
Vietnam era itself needs to be called into question. While the 
popular recollection of this era has the media playing a roll 
fiercely critical of government policy, a closer look reveals 
that it took the media a considerable amount of time to 
achieve this position of independence. It was not until after 
the January 1968 Tet offensive, many years into the war, that 
they began to present something other than the official 
version of the war's progress and, in order to back their side 
of the story, bring into the living room pictures and stories 
relating the full extent of the war and its destruction. When 
senior correspondents, and even anchors, found themselves 
reporting, from bunkers under siege in the middle of the Tet 
offensive, that American victory was close at hand, the media 
was confronted with the enormous distance between the official 
version and reality. The media faced a decision: to continue 
reporting the official version of the war and risk losing all 
credibility, or to adopt a critical stance. This was prompted 
by a critical attitude that was already relatively widespread 
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amongst the American public: an attitude bolstered by the 
peace movements reasoned analyses of the conditions that 
obtained in Vietnam, a growing revulsion for the carnage of 
the war, reports from returning soldiers, and openings that 
occurred in the media. These factors, along with the general 
state of social unrest prompted largely by the civil rights 
movement, effectively forced the media to become critical. 
While it would be a mistake to discount the positive 
effect of the media, once it turned critical, it is equally 
important to disregard claims that it is the media which 
subdued the war effort. The media was only responding to 
social pressures that would other wise have resulted in it 
becoming marginalized. In effect, the media had no choice but 
to become critical. Given this analysis, the Gulf war anti-war 
movement was naive in its surprise at the enthusiastic 
coverage conducted by the mainstream media; there was 
relatively little pressure to behave otherwise. One of the 
lessons of Vietnam is that the media, when covering the 
government, is a docile creature until forced by the public to 
take a critical stand; the subsequent development of the media 
makes this all the more true today. In one sense I think we 
could say that the Vietnam era anti-war movement represented 
an expression of the classical politics of enlightenment. 
Operating against the grain of the structurally transformed 
public sphere, opposition movements which formed within the 
textures of a re-politicized civil society gained a certain 
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amount of control over information media--the 20th century's 
version of a literary public. Dramatic changes, however, have 
taken place in the media since then. These changes correspond, 
I would argue, to the increasing forces that have moved us in 
the direction of the aftermath of modernity. 
During the inter-war years, the various media, as 
businesses, did for the most part what other businesses did: 
they grew enormously. Through fiercely competitive times, a 
long series of mergers and acquisitions has resulted in fewer 
people owning a much larger share of the media. 22 It has 
become far more likely "that the American citizen who turns to 
any medium--newspapers, magazines, cassettes--will receive 
information ... controlled by the same handful of corporations, 
whether it is daily news. . . or a text book. 1123 Newspapers, 
radio and television stations are no longer, for the most 
part, individually owned and operated but rather part of a 
conglomerate. These larger units are more appreciative of the 
perspective of the forces of money and power because they 
themselves operate within the spheres of these steering 
mechanisms (or, using more telling terminology, "media"). In 
other words, the media's critical stance has been undermined 
to the extent that it has become more of an interested player 
22 See Ben Bagdikian, "The Lords of the Global Village", 
The Nation, Vol 248, No. 23, 12 June 1989, pp. 805-820. See 
also his The Media Monopoly 3rd edition, Boston: Beacon Press, 
1990. 
23 Bagdikian, 1990, p. ix. 
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in what it was previously criticizing; their ability to 
threaten the system was diffused by pulling them into the 
system. I don' want to present this as some sort of conspiracy 
theory as it strikingly non-conspiratorial. Rather, the shifts 
that I am noting seem to be on a continuum with the structural 
transformation of the public sphere, albeit in more 
contemporary forms. 
The growth of the media was facilitated by governmental 
deregulation, the same factor acting in other sectors of the 
economy. But in addition to the changes in investment laws 
that permitted any large accumulation of wealth to grow all 
the more rapidly, the media were the beneficiaries of changes 
in a different body of laws--laws that had previously 
regulated who could own how much of the media. These laws had 
taken seriously the intentions of the Communication Act of 
1934 which had declared the media a public good to be watched 
over by government regulators. 24 Such laws have since been 
considerably weakened. 
Finally, beyond the economic and legal changes that 
brought about a fundamentally different point of view on the 
part of the media, there has been one very specific 
development relating to the ability of the media to cover a 
particular type of story: the advent of pool reporting to 
cover actions of the U.S. military. Pool reporting was the 
24 Douglas Kellner, Television and the Crisis of 
Democracy, Boulder: Westview Press, 1990, p. 34. 
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arrangement put forth by the Pentagon after the press 
protested being left out of the Grenada invasion. Field tested 
during the invasion of Panama, by the time the war in the Gulf 
was launched the restrictions placed upon the press had been 
highly refined. 25 Sydney Schanberg sums up the restrictions as 
follows: 
The only way a reporter can visit a front-line unit is by 
qualifying for the "pool" system ... Only a fraction of the 
reporters, mostly from the largest news organizations, 
can qualify ... The rest are permitted to forage on their 
own but the rules ... warn that if they make the attempt 
(to go to the forward areas) they will be "excluded"--
taken into custody and shipped back. By February 12, as 
this article went to press, at least two dozen 
journalists had been detained ... ~ 
Once assembled in a pool, typically six reporters and a camera 
operator, reporters could go only where the military escorts 
( Schanberg calls them "baby sitters") took them, and interview 
only those people chosen by the escorts while the escorts 
listened in. And then, the finished story had to be presented 
to military authorities where it was held, sometimes for days, 
for final "editing" before its transmission to the U.S. 
25 The New York Times had a number of articles dealing 
with pool reporting in the first three weeks of January 1991, 
none of them complete and none of them publishing the actual 
regulations. Once the war began, there was a small notice in 
each edition of the paper, buried in the middle pages of the 
war coverage, titled "Censors Screen Pooled Reports." however, 
in stating that the "system" was "worked out beforehand", the 
notice leads readers to believe that 1) the media participated 
in drawing up the guidelines (which is false); 2) that a paper 
as respected as the Times does not object to the arrangement 
(which may well be true); and 3) that, therefore, the 
arrangement is not problematic. 
26 Sydney Schanberg, "A Muzzle for the Press", collected 
in M. Sifry and C. Cerf Eds. The Gulf War Reader, p. 369. 
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The restrictions governing where reporters can be and to 
whom they can speak amount to prior restraint; the requirement 
to submit all stories to military authorities for editing 
amounts to censorship. Why didn't the media react more 
strenuously than they did against these infringements on the 
first amendment? One can only imagine how quickly these 
regulations would have disappeared in the following scenario. 
A relatively small number of players (e.g. the three major 
networks, the New York Times, Washington Post, and L.A. Times) 
simply announce, on the first day of the war, that they will 
use no pooled sources and, instead, will leave large sections 
of their papers and programs blank or, better fill them with 
stories about the requirements of the pool system--presented 
in a critical fashion. There in fact was a lawsuit filed 
against the government's pool service by eleven small 
alternative news organizations and five writers charging 
infringement of the first amendment. In spite of their 
knowledge of this suit, none of the major networks either 
joined it or lent it their support. 27 This further illustrates 
the extent to which the public sphere was occluded by 
systematic imperatives which convened against critical 
perspectives on the war. When conventional 11 enlightenment 11 
type oppositions were undertaken--such as appealing to rights 
or attempting to open up dialogue--these were thwarted by 
powerful political and economic structures which denied them 
v Schanberg, p. 373. 
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access to potentially critical spheres of discourse. This, I 
would contend, represents a further structural shift from the 
already transformed, but nonetheless latent, bourgeois public 
sphere that Habermas discusses and which still might have been 
somewhat intact during the Vietnam era. Further economic and 
political conglomeration, combined with technological and 
psychical shifts, rendered the classic politics of 
enlightenment employed by the anti-war movement more or less 
ineffective. 
The Future of the Public Sphere? 
I would now like to tie together some of the strains of 
thought that run through this chapter. I began by discussing 
Habermas' analysis of the bourgeois public sphere which I 
argued serves as his model for a politics of enlightenment. 
This, I suggested is a double edged sword: on the one hand, we 
can't really get along, either theoretically or politically, 
without the ideal of publicity that he holds in such high 
regard; on the other, these ideals were used strategically 
from the outset and continue to be used as such in 
contemporary contexts. I further discussed Habermas' own 
application of his version of the politics of enlightenment 
around two key issues which illustrate both the strengths and 
weaknesses of this approach. My conclusion in this context was 
that as we move further into the aftermath of modernity, the 
classical politics of enlightenment becomes less effective and 
more compromised. In the next section I showed further how 
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very recent changes in the "literary public" have rendered the 
classical politics of enlightenment rather ineffective. I 
selected what I consider to be a watershed political event, 
where progressive opposition was systematically shunted away 
from the mainstream, as a case study. As has been the case, to 
greater or lesser degrees, throughout the history of the 
bourgeois public sphere, who was able to "speak" was largely 
determined by positional status, economic power, and media 
access. 
Habermas' analysis of the rise and fall of the early 
modern public sphere showed quite nicely what happens when the 
revolutionary class becomes the hegemonic class; the sphere of 
publicity that they have created becomes an arena that they 
dominate. As I have attempted to show, this was precisely the 
case with the Gulf war. My position has been that this is part 
of the logic of the early modern ideal of publicness: a logic 
that uses the rhetoric of publicness to constitute, even 
determine, actual public opinion. Yet, this does not seem to 
be a totally coherent logic. There are gaps--such as those 
that Habermas' himself has exploited and those that occurred 
during the Vietnam war--which shed light on the possibility 
for uncontrollable, or unmediatable publics to emerge. I will 
now suggest some ways that these gaps can be expanded in the 
aftermath of the gulf war, and, more generally, in the 
aftermath of modernity. 
The Gulf war was fought with the threat of "another 
263 
Vietnam" influencing military strategy in very important ways. 
In this particular situation, the centers of power clearly had 
the upper hand. The system seemed to learn a great deal more 
from Vietnam than did the opposition. Even this formulation 
seems symptomatic of the problem. In the 60's, it was 
considerably easier to define the system and to constitute 
opposition. In the 90's, the system is both more diffuse and 
more consolidated: diffuse in the sense that it has branched 
out, into the world, in ways that are difficult to track 
quickly; consolidated in the sense that internal pressure has 
been all but annulled. Given these systematic changes, it is 
not at all surprising that today's version of 60 's style 
opposition was ineffective; it was neither very diffuse or 
very consolidated. As such, this suggests that the 
system/opposition dichotomy is inappropriate to contemporary 
progressive politics. It assumes that both poles are operating 
in the same public sphere. This seems to be the assumption of 
theorists such as Habermas as well. As his later debates 
suggest, however, this assumption breaks down under the 
pressure of the distorted world that it finds itself in. If 
this is the case, then opposition must, in one sense, stay out 
of the official public domain. This would require that a 
politics of enlightenment be formulated that would extend 
outward into the margins of society. Now the question is, can 
this be accomplished through reformist measures, or is 
something more radical needed? 
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The reformist, Habermasian, approach would require a 
government truly representative of all the people, not just 
the constituencies of money and power, that would then 
maintain the public sphere. However, there is a chicken and an 
egg problem here: to reform the government we need access to 
the public sphere. Hence, the need for a more radical 
approach, one that takes advantage of the gaps in the existing 
public sphere, aiming to re-invigorate the possibility of 
expanding it. Such an approach would employ a strategy of 
disruption in order to create enlightenment possibilities in 
the aftermath of modernity. It must be guided by the same 
ideals that direct the reformist approach but with a different 
understanding of the communicative possibilities afforded by 
the lifeworld and with a more flexible approach to normative 
structures. To theorize this would be to theorize a politics 
of enlightenment suited to the aftermath of modernity. In the 
final chapter of this work I will attempt to initiate such a 
theory, focusing on a version of discourse ethics that 
supplants a radically egalitarian theory of communicative 
action. 
CHAPTER 5 
ETHICAL DISCOURSE AND RADICAL EGALITARIANISM 
TOWARD A TEXTUALIZATION OF THE LIFEWORLD 
During the past fifteen years a number of important 
rifts have developed within continental philosophy that can be 
loosely organized under the general debate between modernism 
and postmodernism. I have spent a great deal of the space 
provided by this book discussing these rifts. My claim 
throughout has been that there is potential for more fruitful 
intersections between thinkers such as Derrida and Habermas 
than has taken place. In this final chapter I will attempt to 
demonstrate this within the thematic boundaries of the 
politics of enlightenment. I will begin with a discussion of 
the ethical theories of Habermas and Emmanuel Levinas. The 
purpose in doing so is to develop the ethical content that is 
necessary for a politics of enlightenment. Habermas clearly 
sees the need for this, but his discourse ethics are overly 
influenced by the modernist tradition. I will use Levinas' 
theory of alterity to flesh out some of the implications of 
discourse ethics that are suited to the aftermath of 
modernity. From these I will turn to lifeworld theory, which 
serves as the basis for a politics of enlightenment. I will 
argue that Derrida's notion of textuality serves the purpose 
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of fleshing out the more radical implications of Habermas' 
lifeworld theory. Finally, I will conclude with a general 
discussion of the relationship between politics and ethics in 
the aftermath of modernity. 
Communicative Ethics in the Face of Alterity 
Habermas has expounded at great length on the 
relationship between discourse and the establishment of 
ethical norms. It is his contention that the inherent telos of 
ethical discourse is to establish norms of action that attain 
universal status. The deep ground of this theory is located 
in what I would describe as a linguistif ied or textualized 
theory of the lifeworld: a theory which in my estimation does 
not compliment the formalistic aspirations of his 
communicative ethics. It does, however, establish a framework 
within which the question of alterity can be problematized. 
Levinas, on the other hand, develops a relational view of 
ethical conduct that is located in the ineradicable difference 
between "I" and "another." The ethical relation is one in 
which the other is passively granted his/her alterity. The 
language of this relationship is pre-systematic, pre-rational, 
and operates solely on the basis of response-ability. I am in 
an ethical relation when I respond to the other qua his/her 
alterity. 
These are radically different ethical notions. The former 
starts with the assumption that alterity can be subsumed in 
forums of discourse--producing consensus based ethical 
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standards. The latter denies that subsumption of this sort can 
be characterized as ethical in any sense. While in general I 
am more sympathetic to Habermas' agenda, the prospect of 
factoring radical alterity into a communicative theory of 
ethics is intriguing. I will attempt here to use Levinas and 
Habermas in conjunction with one another and begin to 
formulate some of the tenets of a post-conventional discourse 
ethics. I will thematize this project in terms of the 
relationship between alterity and authority, and legitimacy 
and authority. My aim is to sketch consensual legitimacy and 
incommensurability into an ethical network that is radically 
post-conventional. Or, in the terms I have been developing: a 
notion of discourse ethics that is suited to the aftermath of 
modernity. 
The place of ethics and the place of language in 
Habermas' social theory can be situated in terms of the two 
key essays discussed in Chapter III: "On Systematically 
Distorted Communication" and "Towards a Theory of 
Communicative Competence." I will briefly review these essays 
in order to provide a context for the ensuing discussion. 
Habermas' objective is to show how irregular communicative 
patterns can develop into dangerous norms of conduct. The 
problem lurking in the background of these essays (one dealt 
with more explicitly by Adorno and Horkheimer) is that of 
manipulative propaganda. Habermas' aim is to show how language 
can be abusively employed in discourse such that unethical 
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standards of action follow. 
The key development in SDC is the connection that is 
drawn between modes of discourse, the language of discourse, 
and norms of action (which are in fact ethical norms). It is 
Habermas' objective to demonstrate that the language of 
discourse is not only commensurate with, but naturally suited 
for, establishing ethical norms. Further, insofar as the mode 
of discourse is determined to be the source of communication 
distortions that translate into normative distortions, it is 
necessary to develop a theory of discourse that enables 
language to operate in accordance with its design. As we saw 
in Chapter I I I, Habermas begins this work in 11 Towards a Theory 
of Communicative Competence: 11 an es say in which Chomsky's 
theory of generative linguistics 1 and Austin's speech act 
theory is employed. 2 From Chomsky he adopts the view that 
linguistic experience is disproportionate to linguistic 
knowledge; we know more about how to use language than can be 
accounted for by our experiences, indicating the existence of 
an a priori language faculty. 3 From Austin he borrows the 
1See Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1968. 
2See Austin, How To Do Things With Words, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1962. 
3 Habermas criticizes Chomsky's monological conception of 
intersubjectivity and proposes a modification of generative 
linguistics that accounts for both a priori and a posteriori 
universals. A priori universals provide the foundation for 
communicative and interpretive schemes; a posteriori 
universals are contingent but apply trans-culturally. 
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analysis of performative verbs, which is based on a 
distinction between locutionary and illocutionary meaning. 
Locutionary meaning is solely a function of the propositional 
content of an expression; illocutionary meaning is a 
combination of propositional content and the general notion of 
a speech situation. This draws together universality 
(Chomsky), the language of discourse, and modes of discourse 
(Austin) under one heading: universal pragmatics. The theory 
of communicative competence, and as such, the theory of 
ethical normativity, must be premised on a theory of universal 
pragmatics. This will reveal that linguistic utterances are 
rooted in intersubjective a priori semantic structures which 
are, in a sense, linguistically determined. As such, the 
foundation of communicative ethics is the hypothetical ideal 
speech situation (TTCC, 365-370). 
Habermas realizes that the ideal speech situation--a 
forum of discourse which provides for pure intersubjectivity--
cannot be established. Nevertheless, the analysis of 
communicative competence does indicate the presence of ideal 
structures in the rational deployment of speech acts. The 
model of ideal speech establishes a standard against which 
asymmetries that distort communication can be measured. With 
this addition to the theory of systematically distorted 
communication, Habermas provides a tool for rehabilitating 
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communicative abnormalities. 4 
The formal work in the essays that I have discussed is 
put to normative work in Legitimation Crisis and The Theory of 
communicative Action. Habermas' aim is to develop a theory of 
action in terms of the semantic structures of language and an 
ideal speech situation. If universal validity is built into 
the structures of language, and can be realized in certain 
discursive situations, then normative claims concerned with 
truth, freedom and justice can be universalized. Habermas 
takes it upon himself to argue for this in vol. 1 of The 
Theory of Communicative Action. His primary concern is to 
formulate a theory of action synchronization that hinges on 
clear, unrestrained communication. This requires the 
development of a schema for distinguishing between strategic 
and communicative action. Rather than depending on an analysis 
of psychological states, this schema relies on knowledge of 
the structural foundations of "reaching understanding." 5 
Reaching understanding involves a rational process of 
argumentation that culminates in consensus among 
interlocutors. Habermas stresses that this process must be 
4 For a good summary of "On Systematically Distorted 
Communication" and Towards a "Theory of Communicative 
Competence" see Fred Dallmayr, Language and Politics, Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984, pp. 123-125. 
5 This is an extremely important move as he does not want 
to root his theory in subjectivity. In spite of this his 
theory of intersubjectivity seems to rely on an unproblematic, 
almost Kantian, view of the subject. As such, he still has an 
idealized subject as the basic unit in his theory of 
communicative action. 
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free of coercion; understanding has to be arrived at through 
free and open discussion. For him this is "the inherent telos 
of human speech." 6 
In order for action coordination to be communicatively 
orchestrated two conditions have to be met: first, there must 
be a speech act uttered by a speaker; and, second, that speech 
act must be received and affirmed by a hearer. This roots the 
speech act in a relationship between rational agents that 
assumes the truth of the propositional content of the 
utterance, the authenticity of the speakers intentions, and an 
obligation on the part of the receiver to respond with the 
appropriate action. Insofar as semantic content is a function 
of the process of understanding--the utterances meaning is 
partially determined in the discursive arena--the speech act 
is now formulated in such a way that it can coordinate 
domination free action. In chapter III I pursued this by 
investigating precisely what Habermas means by a validity 
claim and what criteria determine whether that claim should be 
accepted or rejected. In the present context, however, it 
6 Juergen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action 
Vol. 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society, Thomas 
McCarthy trans. Boston: Beacon Press, 1984, pp. 284-288 
(hereafter TCA:l). Certain types of strategic action are of 
course necessary. It is when strategic reasoning factors into 
normative discourse that problems arise. Here again, 
considering the use of propaganda by various political regimes 
is useful. In such cases language is used coercively to bring 
about a certain desired end. It is such political mythology 
that Habermas seeks to avoid. It would seem that for Habermas, 
any mythos within the political or moral logos is 
illegitimate. 
272 
suffices to note that the overarching concern is with 
categorizing various types of social action such that whether 
or not those actions are legitimate can be determined. 7 
It is on this theoretical platform that Habermas develops 
the more specific tenets of discourse ethics. 8 This project 
bears certain resemblances to Kantian ethics and social 
contract theory in that ethical determinations are internally 
formulated and subject to validation by a group of 
participants that will be affected by those determinations. It 
breaks with both of these traditions, however, in that the 
moral subject is not presupposed; she or he is always 
conceived relative to a linguistic community. Seyla Benhabib 
sums this up as follows: "Instead of asking what an individual 
moral agent could or would will, without self-contradiction, 
to be a universal norm, one asks: What norms or institutions 
would the members of an ideal or real communication community 
agree to as representing their common interests after engaging 
in a special kind of argumentation or conversation." 9 
7 For a detailed discussion of the relationship between 
the theory of communicative action and Habermas' theory of 
communicative competency see David Ingram, Habermas and the 
Dialectic of Reason, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987, 
PP 32-42. 
8 Habermas lays out the historical background for and 
basic tenets of discourse ethics in "Diskursethik, Notizen zu 
einen Begrundungsprogramm," Moralbewusstein und kommunikati ves 
Handeln, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1983. 
9 Seyla Benhabib, "In the Shadow of Aristotle and Hegel: 
Communicative Ethics and Current Controversies in Practical 
Philosophy," The Philosophical Forum, Vol. xxi. No. 1-2 (Fall-
Winter 1989-90), page 1. 
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The participant in ethical discourse is embedded within the 
communicative framework provided by a common language. As 
such, the subject is both shaped by the common denominators 
established by a shared language and affirmed as an individual 
located in the networks of reciprocity which develop within 
ethical communities. 10 Habermas situates this in terms of 
the relationship between justice (autonomy) and solidarity. He 
contends that in order for the principles of autonomous 
morality to obtain, they must be undergirded with a cohesive 
sense of communal solidarity. Under such conditions the 
purposes of justice (moral autonomy) are to preserve 
inviolable respect for socialized individuals and to protect 
the structures of intersubjectivity that provide the 
foundation for solidarity. "Justice concerns the equal freedom 
of unique and self-determining individuals, while solidarity 
concerns the welfare of consociates who are intimately linked 
in an intersubjectively shared form of life--and thus also to 
the maintenance of the integrity of this form of life itself" 
(JS, 47). Benhabib calls this "the principle of egalitarian 
reciprocity" which necessarily attends "the principle of 
universal moral respect." 11 Discourse ethics presents a 
10 Juergen Habermas, "Justice 
Discussion Concerning Stage Six, 11 
trans. The Philosophical Forum, Vol. 
1989-90) pp. 46-51 (hereafter JS). 
and Solidarity: On the 
Shierry Weber Nicholson 
xxi. No. 1-2 (Fall-Winter 
11 In "Toward a Discourse Ethic of Solidarity, 11 Praxis 
International, Vol. 8, No. 4 (January 1986) pp. 425-429, Nancy 
Fraser criticizes Benhabib's earlier attempt to square 
discourse ethics with Carol Gilligan's ethic of care. It is 
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solution to the problem of preserving autonomy under 
conditions of communal solidarity by claiming that language is 
the source of both. As Habermas summarizes: "Thus, the 
procedure of discursive will formation takes account of the 
inner connection of the two aspects: the autonomy of unique 
individuals and their prior embeddedness in intersubjectively 
shared forms of life" (JS, 49). 
While this discussion is a bit too compressed, it should 
provide the basis for a preliminary investigation of the 
relationship between Habermas' work and Levinas' reflections 
on ethics. The most obvious point of contact is the centrality 
of language for each; although as soon will be apparent, 
Habermas and Levinas have radically different views concerning 
language. Another point of contact is contact itself. Both 
Habermas and Levinas insist that the substance of ethics is to 
be found in a certain form of relationality, of contact with 
another. Further, both are at great pains to characterize this 
interaction as one that is by necessity free of domination. 
Finally, both place a great deal of weight upon conditions of 
response and responsibility. I will return to these common, 
her position that this results in autonomy being privileged 
over solidarity. Her call is for an ethical discourse that is 
more attentive to existing "socio-cultural means of 
interpretation." From this she develops a more intersubjective 
concept of autonomy. I think that this problem exists in both 
Benhabib' s and Habermas' most recent formulations. Habermas in 
particular attempts to deal with this problem but seems to be 
reluctant to go far enough. My suspicion is that the modes of 
alterity that would have to be contended with in a radically 
embedded discourse ethic are what hold him back. 
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although minimally so as stated, denominators in short order. 
At this point, however, it is necessary to move into some of 
Levinas' work in order to further establish basis for 
comparison. 
My discussion of Levinas will attempt to do one of the 
things that Levinas seems to resist. That is, I will try to 
map his work onto the framework provided by Habermas. While 
this might not be entirely fair to Levinas, I think that it is 
a philosophically valuable project. If, as seems to be the 
case, Levinas' work is concerned with problems of domination, 
industrialization and the use of systematization to coerce 
"beings," then it should be useful to read his work in the 
light of others with similar concerns. 12 I will begin by 
discussing Levinas' notion of the face to face relation. From 
there I will consider the connection between this relationship 
and ethics. Finally, I will situate this in terms of Levinas' 
view of language and the ethics of proximity. 
Levinas states the following about the face to face 
relationship: "The face is present in its refusal to be 
contained. In this sense it cannot be comprehended, that is, 
encompassed. It is neither seen nor touched--for in visual or 
12 One hint that this is what Levinas is really concerned 
with is the stunning dedication that sets off Otherwise Than 
Being: "To the memory of those who were closest among the six 
million assassinated by the National Socialists and of the 
millions on millions of all confessions and all nations, 
victims of the same hatred of the other man, the same anti-
semitism." Also, see "Ideology and Idealism," "Difficult 
Freedom," and "Ethics and Politics" in The Levinas Reader, 
Sean Hand ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989. 
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accomplishes a relation between terms that breaks up the unity 
of a genus." It is this interlocutionary relationship, prior 
to thematic unity, that annotates the ethical. "The formal 
structure of language thereby announces the ethical 
inviolability of the Other and, without any odor of the 
'numinous, ' his 'holiness. '" In other words, the ethical 
relationship is one that is utterly independent of any active 
force. As such, ethics is situated in terms of domination free 
speech (TI, 194-198). 
This of course bears certain resemblances to Habermas' 
ideal speech situation. Further, I think that Levinas would 
want to say that, in a sense, this is an idealization. 14 
Nevertheless, on the specific content of the ideal the two 
part company. For Habermas the ideal is domination free 
intersubjectivity. For Levinas, the "inter" of 
intersubjectivity is already a violation. Interlocution in 
Levinas' 'ideal speech situation' is always concerned with 
inter-rupting that in subjectivity which permits the "inter"--
the bringing together of I and Other under a single conceptual 
rubric. 15 When I faces Other, I is called into question. This 
14 See Levinas' discussion in "Ideology and Idealism" in 
The Levinas Reader. 
15 My reference here is Maurice Blanchet' s 
"Interruptions," The Sin of the Book, Edmond Jabes ed. Here 
Blanchet identifies four types of communication. The first 
three, as he puts it, "tend toward unity." The fourth, 
however, involves "no unifying effort." In this mode of 
communication there is no attempt to establish common ground. 
"Now, what is at stake is the strangeness between us, and not 
only that obscure part which escapes our mutual knowledge and 
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questioning, Levinas maintains, is the original ethical 
gesture. The call of the Other is not an attack on 
subjectivity but rather a mandate to which I must respond. 
"The 'resistance' of the other does not do violence to me, 
does not act negatively; it has a positive structure: 
Ethical." Given this, the question that Levinas must address 
concerns the status of the ethical structure (TI, 196-197). 
The face to face encounter involves two surfaces coming 
into contact with one another. This coming into contact 
establishes a relationship--one without depth or content. As 
such, it has only form; and this form is ethical. For Levinas, 
the form of the face to face relationship is ethical in the 
sense that it represents a resistance to power. "The face 
resists possession, resists my power." This, however, is not 
resistance which requires action in opposition to that which 
seeks to dominate: an annulment of power through the exercise 
of power. Rather, it is a resistance which resists the 
category of power. For the other to resist my power by 
is nothing but the obscurity of being within the 'I"--a 
strangeness which is still relative (an 'I' is always close to 
another 'I,' even in difference, competition, desire, and 
need). What is at stake now and has to be accounted for is all 
that separates me from the other, that is to say, the other 
insofar as i am infinitely separate from him: separation, 
cleft, gap which leaves him infinitely outside me, but also 
claims to found my relation with him on this very interruption 
which is an interruption of being--of otherness through which 
he is, I must repeat, for me neither I, nor another existence, 
nor a modality of universal existence, nor a superexistence 
(god or non-god), but the unknown in its infinite distance" 
(48). This seems to nicely summarize Levinas' ethical 
relationship. 
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exercising her/his power would be to accept the terms of a 
power relationship. This in turn involves an inevitable 
usurpation or subordination; conceptual unification--either 
total or through compromise--always falls from a power 
relationship. The other calls to me, requests my response, in 
a space that is outside of any totality or ontological 
fabrication. Here my power is inoperative; I just 'am,' in the 
proximity of the other (TI, 197-199). 
For Levinas the ethical form of the face to face 
relationship serves to neutralize power. This in turn 
establishes a sphere of discourse. "But thus the epiphan~ of 
infinity is expression and discourse." Here again, some 
similarities with Habermas' ideal speech situation emerge. For 
both, the domain of ethical discourse lies within a formal 
sphere that is free of power relations. But the status of both 
formal and power is quite different. For Habermas, the formal 
aspect of the ideal speech situation is a construct which uses 
the resources that are available in natural language. For 
Levinas, ideal discourse precedes natural language. It is not 
concerned with the content of speech acts as it is necessarily 
prior to the possibility of speech acts. As such, his appeal 
is to a peculiar sort of transcendence: not to a 
transcendental philosophical a priori, but rather to a 
transcendence that is intricately intertwined with immanence. 
"The absolutely other, whose alterity is overcome in the 
philosophy of immanence on the allegedly common plane of 
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history, maintains his transcendence in the midst of 
history ... Transcendence designates a relation with reality 
infinitely distant from my own reality, yet without this 
distance destroying this relation and without this relation 
destroying this distance, as would happen with relations 
within the same; this relation does not become an implantation 
in the other and a confusion with him, does not effect the 
very identity of the same, its ipseity, does not silence the 
apology, does not become apostasy and exstasy" (TI, 40-42). 
There are actually some very interesting resonances here 
between Levinas' view of transcendence and what Habermas often 
refers to as the quasi-transcendental character of ordinary 
language. With respect to the operational features of 
discourse, however, the similarities drop out. This situates 
the difference between the two concerning power as well. For 
Habermas, power involves the use of unreasonable tactics for 
gaining an advantage in negotiation. For Levinas, relations of 
reason and negotiation are relations of power, and the 
vocabulary of such discourses is inherently tainted with 
structures of domination (conceptualization). As such, the 
formal character of the ideal speech situation and the face to 
face relation represent two poles of formality: form prior to 
the possibility of content and form that rarefies content (TI, 
200-201). (This polarity will be important in my discussion of 
Authority, Legitimacy and Alterity in the following section.) 
Given this polarity, and what has already been noted 
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about the role of language in Habermas' formal discursive 
arena, what sort of language operates within Levinas' formal 
structure? Levinas states the following: "This bond between 
expression and responsibility, this ethical condition or 
essence of language prior to all disclosure of being and its 
cold splendor, permits us to extract language from subjection 
to a preeminent thought, where it would have but the servile 
function of translating that preexistent thought on the 
outside or of universalizing its interior movements" (TI, 200-
201). This states negatively the role of language in the face 
to face relationship. It is not, as for Habermas, a medium 
through which content is expressed, a way to fill in the space 
created by an empty formality; nor is it matter that can be 
formed into universal norms. Rather, as Levinas states 
positively in "Language and Proximity," the language of the 
face to face relationship, the language of ethical discourse, 
is an-archical; it is proximity without cognition. "This 
relation of proximity, this contact unconvertible into 
noetico-noematic structure, in which every transmission of 
messages, whatever be those messages, is already established, 
is the original language, a language without words or 
propositions, pure communication. "16 This is the language of 
ethical discourse--the pre-systematic array of material 
signifiers that originate in the "human face and skin." 
16 Emmanuel Levinas, "Language and Proximity," Collected 
Philosophical Papers, Alphonso Ling is trans. Boston: Martin us, 
Nijhof Publishers, 1987, page 119. 
282 
These last remarks seem completely outside of the 
framework provided by Habermas' universal pragmatic schema. In 
fact, they call into question the possibility of situating 
ethical discourse in terms of any type of schema. 17 Yet I 
think that an interesting connection can be drawn. Habermas 
situates his schematic theory of communication and discourse 
in terms of a historical theory of language that is associated 
with the development of lifeworld structures. This, in a 
sense, frames the ideal features of language which ground 
communicative ethics in terms of a material substructure. 
Habermas notes that within this substructure there is a 
considerable amount of shifting and disruption which results 
in semantic ambiguity. At the same time, however, there is a 
considerable amount of continuity and evolutionary refinement. 
The universal pragmatic analysis attempts to demonstrate how 
these structures of continuity and refinement can be drawn 
upon in formal spheres of ethical decision making. 
What Habermas seems to ignore is that the language needed 
to construct a universal pragmatic schema is always already 
laced with the disruptive movement that operates within the 
lifeworld spheres. This is where Levinas' notion of alterity 
becomes extremely interesting. If the disruptive movement that 
Habermas detects in lifeworld structures, from which the 
17 Levinas was already developing a discourse on the 
impossibility of critical discourses on discourse in the 
1950's. See in particular "The Ego and Totality" in Collected 
Philosophical Papers. 
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language of ethical discourse must be drawn, is traceable to 
the radical alterity of the face to face relation, then a 
constructive theory of ethical discourse will always be 
susceptible to the disruptive features of its medium of 
exchange. Or, in other words, the material, marked by 
alterity, will always break up the unity of the ideal. This 
claim depends upon the sense in which, for both Habermas and 
Levinas, Transcendence and immanence are historically related. 
I would like to advance this claim, although with certain 
reservations. I support Levinas' view that the materiality of 
the face to face relationship has ethical significance. And, 
with Levinas, I would claim that the importance lies in the 
way that alterity--as a structural feature of language--annuls 
conceptual hegemony. Contra Levinas, however, I would argue 
that this does not begin to exhaust the possible 
manifestations of ethical discourse. In fact, I think that 
there is much to be said for the procedural-schematic model of 
discourse that Habermas has developed in great detail. What is 
most interesting, and for the purposes of a post-conventional 
critical theory of ethical discourse most useful, about 
Levinas' 11 analysis 11 is the way that it, in a sense, gets 
behind discourse, identifying a problem area that a theory 
such as Habermas' has difficulty contending with. 
Nevertheless, Levinas doesn't develop this analysis in a 
manner that is particularly useful to critical theory. In much 
the same way that Habermas develops an ethical theory that 
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attempts to eliminate the problem of radical alterity, Levinas 
gestures away from concrete situations in which alterity can 
actually play a role in the disruption of structural 
domination. For both, the role of power and ideality in 
ethical discourse is characterized in an extremely limited 
way. In the remainder of this essay I will attempt to define 
these established limits and consider the ethical space that 
lies between them. 
Earlier I alluded to poles of formality that distinguish 
between the modes of ideal discourse that are central to 
Habermas' and Levinas' respective views on the ethical. As is 
the case with any polar opposition, there is an interesting 
terrain lying between these two extremities. I would 
characterize this terrain as a field of power. Both Habermas 
and Levinas attempt to exclude power from the domain of ideal 
speech; but in my estimation, neither thinks power very 
carefully. In general, for Habermas, power is anything that 
falls outside of rationality. This is not entirely true as he 
recognizes that in institutional contexts rational forms of 
power have to be used for the sake of expedient operations. 
But this type of rationality is fundamentally strategic--
rather than communicative--and as such does not pertain to the 
domain of ethical decision making. For Levinas, power is 
anything that attempts to circumscribe alterity. I would like 
to advance the position that power should be used as a 
heuristic term: that there are various forms of power, some of 
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which are ethically useful and others which are ethically 
neutral or destructive. Further, excluding power from arenas 
of ethical discourse necessitates the strategic deployment of 
a specific mode of power. The mode of power deployed by both 
Habermas and Levinas, albeit in quite different ways, is 
authority. In the following section I will attempt to 
establish this by drawing upon Habermas' and Levinas' 
respective analyses of power, and turning them against one 
another in order to identify the act of authoritarian 
exclusion. 
As I noted above, Habermas' theory of communicative 
normativity ultimately takes recourse in his theory of the 
lifeworld. 18 He describes the lifeworld as the historically 
developed condition that allows for various forms of 
communication. It transcends particular discursive situations 
yet provides the linguistic patterns that enable communicative 
exchange. Likewise, it is composed of shifting structures that 
are in a constant process of transformation which is rooted in 
the historical relationship between a pool of discursive 
resources and specific contexts of discourse. Hence, the 
18 It is well beyond the limits of this paper to go into 
the details of Habermas' lifeworld theory. I think that it can 
be established that this theory is not completely compatible 
with the schematic theory that it supports. The lifeworld has 
a textured, multi-dimensional quality that the universal 
pragmatic analysis seems to try to iron smooth. For Habermas' 
discussion of the lifeworld see Vol. 2 of The Theory of 
Communicative Action, Thomas McCarthy trans. Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1987, pp.119-153 (hereafter TCA:2), and The 
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Frederick Lawrence 
trans. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987, pp. 294-327. 
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lifeworld serves as a pre-conceptual, pre-thematic mesh of 
communicative possibilities, a reserve that can be drawn upon 
in a manner tailored to specific discursive situations. "The 
background of a communicative utterance is thus formed by 
situation definition that, as measured against the actual need 
for mutual understanding, have to overlap to a sufficient 
extent" (TCA:2, 121). As such, the communicative reserve is 
always overdetermined; it exceeds the specific determinate 
situation in which ethical norms are established. 
It is this overdeterrninedness that Haberrnas needs to 
contend with if he is to successfully defend the claim that in 
ideal forums of discourse, universal norms can be established. 
In other words, it is necessary to provide an analysis of the 
conditions that generate surplus and to demonstrate how, 
within rational discourse, what is excessive in language can 
be filtered out. Habermas seems unconcerned with the first 
problem and as such does not provide a satisfactory response 
to the second. His attempt at a solution involves an appeal to 
stable structures in language that are easily transferred from 
the linguistic pool to specific discursive situations. "From 
a perspective turned toward the situation, the lifeworld is a 
reservoir of taken-for-granteds, of unshaken convictions that 
participants in communication draw upon in cooperative 
processes of interpretation. Single elements, specific taken-
for-granteds, are, however, mobilized in the form of 
consensual and yet problematizable knowledge only when they 
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become relevant to a situation" (TCA:2, 124). The question 
that Habermas ignores, the difficult question, concerns the 
linguistic material that lies behind the taken-for-granteds 
which become reified in historical languages. Is there 
disruptive movement within language that always stands in 
opposition to the unshaken? I will develop this in greater 
detail in the section that follows. What is important to 
emphasize in the present context are the problems that 
Habermas has in accounting for the_relationship between the 
"transcendental" (loosely speaking) character of language and 
the immanent situations in which language is employed in moral 
decision making. If, as his analysis suggests, the 
transcendental is somewhat indeterminate, then one would 
suspect that indeterminacies would show up in ethical 
determinations. My suggestion is that this has a bearing on 
the normative status of such determinations. 
This is where I would argue that Levinas' concern with 
the an-archical disruptiveness of the language of alterity 
upsets Habermas' determinate situations of discourse. The 
materiality of the face to face relation--unthematizable, pre-
conceptual dif f erentiation--overdetermines the ethical 
relation in such a way that unity, consensus, can only be an 
aberration. As such, disturbances will be etched into the 
normative accord produced under the conceptual rubric of ideal 
speech. In order to neutralize the effects of this etching, 
tactics of exclusion have to be deployed. In Habermas' case 
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this involves an appeal to the authority of coercion free 
argument. But here, Levinas would claim, a power strategy is 
enacted. By introducing content into the discursive 
relationship between I and the other, and by formulating that 
content in such a way that it can be shared, the alterity 
which originally situated the relationship is excluded. By 
appealing to the authority of "we," the other to whom I am 
responsible becomes mine. 
Stating the Levinasian objection quite explicitly: 
Habermas' normative accord involves a political subsumption of 
alterity into rational agreement. It is the absolute authority 
of reason that is of concern. Rational consensus seems to 
close off, conceptually, the possibility of dissent, 
resistance, alterity. In Habermas' own terms, the determinate 
conditions of a discursive situation eliminate the possibility 
of radical difference. Further, the intrinsic connection 
between rational agreement and legitimacy strategically roots 
legitimacy within a power structure: that of authority. In 
order to preserve the pure domination free aura of ideal 
speech, Habermas has to exclude the play of alterity which is 
situated within the language of discourse. This is achieved by 
appealing to the unmitigated authority of reason. As such, his 
attempt to exclude power from communicative ethics is itself 
premised on a power move. 19 
19 The political element in Habermas' communicative ethics 
is what would strike Levinas as being most problematic. 
Political decisions always, for him, involve exclusionary 
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While this anti-authoritarian strain in Levinas' 
conception of the ethical is a very useful critical tool, it 
only applies to one end of the pole of formality. Further, it 
rests on another type of authority which strike? me as being 
even more problematic than that upon which Habermas relies. My 
critique of Habermas' rational discourse ethic is not directed 
so much at rational discourse per se but rather at the 
authoritative application of the concept of universality (the 
power move that lends dominion to consensus) with which it is 
attended. In fact rational discourse, conceived in a certain 
way, seems to be one situation in which alterity can have its 
say. For Levinas, however, there is no place for having a say. 
There is only obligation to the other--regardless of what the 
other demands. Insofar as the other cannot be known, cannot be 
negotiated with, cannot be spoken to in the language of 
concepts and consent, I can only respond passively. In a word, 
the other always already has authority. Levinas seems to 
justify this position by claiming that there is something 
about otherness which is absolutely unspeakable; to speak 
back, or engage in discussion, is to annul alterity. As 
Lyotard puts it: "The irony of the commentator goes as far as 
persecution; the less I understand you, he or she says to the 
Levinasian (or divine) text, the more I will obey you by that 
unity (see in particular "Ethics and Politics"). This is a 
point upon which I disagree adamantly with Levinas. The 
political sphere, I would argue, under certain conditions, is 
where alterity can be most effectively expressed. 
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fact; for, if I want to understand you (in your turn) as a 
request, then I should not understand you as sense."~ 
The authority at work in Levinas' text is more absolute 
than that operating in Habermas.' In the same manner, although 
by implication more problematically, that the rational 
subject, within the mediating context of intersubjective 
discourse, is hegemonic for Habermas, it is the aboriginal 
subject, the subject of the an-arche, that establishes 
hegemony for Levinas. The I which cannot articulate itself 
determines, through passive self negation, a structure of 
relational alterity. And since the other can't be known in any 
sense (and particularly not as another subject) I can only 
respond. It is this ineffability that is authoritative in 
Levinas' ethics of proximity. In order to maintain the 
ineffable status of the other, the possibility of a mediated 
subject--constituted in a network of forces that might be 
compared to Habermas' lifeworld--has to be excluded. It is 
this gesture, which I would characterize as a power strategy, 
that is necessary if the powerless authority of the ineffable 
other is to be preserved. 
In between these two poles of authority, both of which 
stand in opposition to power but which are formed through the 
deployment of power, is a terrain that I stated above could be 
viewed as a field of power. The power in this field is 
20 Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Differend, George Van Den 
Abbeele trans. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1986, page 116. 
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generated through the exclusionary strategies that 
instantiated the powerless authority which reigns at either 
pole. Each of these poles, I would contend, contains certain 
elements of both conventional and postconventional21 notions 
of the ethical. The conventional in each is represented in 
terms of the authority structures that I have identified; for 
Habermas this involves an appeal to a mediated Kantian 
subjective rationality while for Levinas it involves a gesture 
toward the absolute transcendence of an otherwise than being. 
The post-conventional is represented in each as the space in 
which alterity can be freely expressed. While free expression 
takes on a considerably different meaning for Habermas and 
Levinas, this difference constitutes a field of power that is 
the terrain of post-conventional discourse. I will now advance 
some tentative comments concerning the characteristics of this 
ethical space, before turning to analysis of its conditions of 
possibility in the next section. 
The post-conventional condition, and the role of 
universal moral norms, is in a sense the primary concern of 
Habermas' systematic social theory. With the term post-
conventional, Habermas refers to the modern epoch in general 
and the ongoing project of Enlightenment in particular. With 
the rise of rationality and science, and the decline of 
21 The term postconventional is one Habermas borrows from 
Kohlberg. He uses it to define foundational devices that do 
not appeal to some form of metaphysical authority. I will use 
the term in a somewhat similar fashion, but will alter it 
slightly. 
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traditional religion, an entirely new problematic emerged 
concerning the foundation of ethical norms. No longer could an 
appeal be made to the authority of a metaphysical being that 
possesses the power of life and death. Either morality had to 
be grounded in something universal that was other than God, or 
the very concept of morality would have to be radically 
altered. 
The most important ethical theory that developed in 
coincidence with the post-conventional problematic was Kant's. 
Kant opted to ground morality in a non-divine universality: 
human reason. This is the project taken up by Habermas. Quite 
aware of the radical critiques of rationality that have 
developed in the wake of the Enlightenment, Habermas' 
objective is to develop a theory of rationality that avoids 
the pitfalls noted by Nietzsche, Heidegger and the like. 
Hence, he developed the cornrnunicative-intersubjective 
rationality that I discussed above. In this final sub-section 
I would like to consider whether Habermas' communicative 
ethics are as post-conventional as he claims. This will once 
again involve the problem of authority, legitimacy and 
alterity. 
The convention that dominates Habermas' post-conventional 
ethics is that of modernity. Modernity for Habermas is not 
simply an historical epoch; it is also a conceptual schema. As 
I noted in chapter III, the element of this schema that 
appeals to Habermas is its universality. Modern ideals of 
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scientific truth, political solidarity and individual autonomy 
all aspire to universality. But is this aspiration post-
conventional or a reformulation of more conventional 
approaches to these questions. My position is that the latter 
is, to a certain extent, the case. 
The trace or surplus that carries over from the pre-
modern to the modern In Habermas' discourse ethic is reflected 
in his interest in providing a philosophically cogent defence 
of ethical closure or totality. This in itself seems neutral 
enough; there are certainly good reasons for pursuing the 
possibilities available for a universal ethic. But when this 
project becomes excessively bound up with the political 
economy of modernity, and the way the way its ethical 
codifications shape various spheres of life, it brings with it 
problematic elements of the conventional. This would include 
the "ethics" of profit, production and aggregated power that 
I discussed in chapter III. The point is that while modern 
ethics, and modernity in general, move initially in the 
direction of post-conventionality, the logic of 
conventionality resurfaces and draws the sequence back into a 
metaphysics of authority which, as I have been arguing, is 
rooted in the capitalist mode of production.~ For this 
22 Benhabib criticizes the view that the telos of ethical 
discourse should be consensus. "If I am correct that our goal 
is the process of such dialogue, conversation, and mutual 
understanding, and not consensus, discourse theory can 
represent the moral point of view without having to invoke the 
fiction of the homo economicus or homo politicus" (22-23. Her 
call is for "ongoing moral conversation" (12-13). 
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reason the terrain of post-conventional ethics must 
accommodate the movement of alterity: the disruptive 
resistance that defies the tendency to lapse back into 
conventionality. At the same time, however, it would be a 
mistake to valorize alterity at the utter expense of 
rationality and conceptual thought. The role of alterity in 
post-conventional ethics is procedural. It checks, so to 
speak, the authoritarian tendencies which operate at the 
formal pole of rationality. Construed as such, the terrain of 
post-conventional ethics is a field of power in which the 
poles of authority contest one another for hegemony. In this 




hammer out ethical 
field, alter the 
circuitry of power, and fall themselves into the economy of 
reason and alterity. As such, the universal authority of 
reason and the an-archical authority of alterity operate upon 
one another in an indeterminate field that produces tentative 
ethical determinations. 
An example of the operations that take place within this 
field would have to take into consideration the various social 
movements that have responded to specific concerns related to 
what some have called the postmodern condition. Groups 
composed of feminists, African-Americans, gays and lesbians 
and other marginalized sectors of this political-economy have 
thematized their alterity (which is of course outside the 
spheres of rationality) in terms of rational strategies of 
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action. In deference to both Habermas and Levinas, however, 
their struggles have been conducted from localities on the 
post-conventional terrain that allow them to exercise power. 
When one positional strategy is exhausted, another is 
thematized and deployed. Ethical norms are tentatively formed 
in a field of political contestation, and are in turn re-
formed as the terrain of that field assumes a different 
contour. Hence, the aftermath of modernity demands an ethical 
discourse that works both within and around the problematic of 
universality: a politics of relationality that has the 
fortitude to face up to alterity. 
Textualizing the Lifeworld 
As is indicated by the closing remark in the previous 
section, my conception of a politics of enlightenment is 
rooted in the convergence between universalistic normative 
ethics--in the tradition of Kant--and a notion of politics 
that is appropriate to the concrete conditions that face late 
20th, and even early 21st, century actors with progressive 
agendas. While it is certainly beyond the scope of this work, 
and quite possibly beyond the scope of social philosophy, to 
lay out specific strategies that can be taken up by said 
actors, it is unquestionably within the domain of a critical 
social philosophy to outline the conditions of possibility 
that enable such strategies to take shape. I will be dealing 
with this problem on a rather abstract level. In doing so, 
however, I hope to situate further discussions that can become 
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more concrete: those dealing with the nature of public debate 
and societal transformation. My assumption is that Habermas is 
correct to approach these questions with language and 
communication as his starting point. 
As I indicated in chapter one, this concluding section 
will utilize the work of Jacques Derrida. Critical theorists 
up to this point have not been particularly sympathetic to 
Derrrida's work; one might even say they have been generally 
quite hostile. This has always seemed to me an attitude that 
runs counter to the spirit of critical theory. First 
generation critical theorists appropriated Nietzsche, Freud, 
and a whole gamut of other controversial thinkers, in such a 
way that their most important insights were incorporated into 
radical analyses of the contemporary condition. Derrida, while 
not a social philosopher per se, seems a likely candidate to 
be appropriated in similar fashion. Before turning to the 
primary issue of this section I would like to briefly respond 
to several critical theorist who have take a somewhat 
dismissive view of Derrida. 
Habermas himself has been at the forefront of these 
attacks. At the core of his concern with Derrida is the 
omnipresent Heidegger controversy. Derrida, being under the 
inf 1 uence of Heidegger, is viewed with considerable suspicion. 
This suspicion seems to be prompted by early Frankfurt school 
attacks on Heidegger. Both Adorno and Herbert Marcuse put a 
great deal of energy into more or less successful efforts to 
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link Heidegger's philosophical work with his participation in 
the National Socialist movement. 23 As I discussed in chapter 
IV, Habermas has followed up on these critiques and extended 
them to Derrida, who he considers to be an unreconstructed 
Heideggerian: "Derrida is correct in claiming for himself the 
role of an authentic disciple" (PDM, p. 161). Habermas' main 
concern with Derrida in particular and those that are located 
under the banner of postmodernism in general, is the way in 
which their anti-foundational tactics and critiques of 
humanism disavow the possibility for political projects with 
emancipatory aspirations. "In his opinion, the worst of these 
implications is their rejection of freedom, individuality, 
communal solidarity, and democratic self-determination. For 
him, these are the very values underwriting opposition to 
totalitarianism."~ 
Habermas' critique is, in many respects, an important 
one. His concern is to show how a flippantly postmodern 
approach to questions of truth, emancipation and rights is 
irresponsible and dangerous. As I noted in Chapter IV, his 
general strategy is to locate key thinkers that he identifies 
with postmodernism in a generalized discourse that is about 
the business of undermining Enlightenment rationality. 
Derrida, according to Habermas, is representative of this 
23 See Adorno, The Jargon of Authenticity, and Marcuse 
Negations: Essays in Critical Theory. 
24 David Ingram, Critical Theory and Philosophy, p. 204. 
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trend. While these concerns are very important, it is not 
clear that Derrida fits unambiguously within this 
discourse. 25 In fact, he finds it necessary to give a 
caricatured account of Derrida in order to make his point. 
While the point is of considerable value, the representation 
of Derrida is misdirected and has contributed to an unduly 
negative perception of his work in political and social 
theory. 
Habermas has not been the only, nor was he the first, 
critical theorist to attack the political implications of 
Derrida's work. Nancy Fraser, for example, in an article 
published first in 1984, 26 offers a report on the 'Ends of 
Man' conference held in Paris in 1981, which attempts to 
undermine the social theoretic value of Derrida's work, as 
well as the research of those that operate within the 
framework of his central concerns. 27 She establishes the tone 
of her analysis with this series of rhetorical questions: 
Does deconstruction have any political implications? Does 
it have any political significance beyond the byzantine 
~ See Christopher 
Postmodernism, Chapter. 
Norris, What's Wrong 
26 Reprinted in Nancy Fraser, Unruly Practices. 
With 
27 While I don't want to accept the implication that 
Derrida's work can only be put to spurious use in social 
theory, I do agree with Fraser that the participants at this 
conference have generally produced what I consider to be 
useless "interventions" into "the political." So up to that 
point I agree with Fraser. It strikes me as a bit reductive, 
however, to take the position that this is the only route that 
one can go in using Derrida within the framework of social 
theory. 
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and incestuous struggles it has provoked in American lit 
crit departments? Is it possible--and desirable--to 
articulate a deconstructive politics? Why, despite the 
revolutionary rhetoric of his writings circa 1968 and 
despite the widespread assumption that he is "of the 
left" has Derrida so consistently, deliberately and 
dexterously avoided the topic of politics? Why, for 
example, has he danced so nimbly around the tenacious 
efforts of interviewers to establish where he stands vis-
a-vis Marxism? Why has he continued "to defer 
indefinitely" the encounter of deconstruction with "the 
text of Marx" that he has on occasion promised? (Fraser, 
p. 69). 
Fraser suggests that two predictable "gestures" emerge out of 
this set of problematics: the marxist gesture, which is 
represented by Gayatri Spivak, and the Hegelian gesture, which 
is represented by Jacob Rogozinski. The former is radical, 
revolutionary and anti-establishment; the latter is 
conservative, individualistic, and suspicious of fundamental 
ruptures of any sort. Derrida himself, characteristically 
according to Fraser, 28 couldn't accept either of these 
positions and as such "deferred" taking any position at all. 
Fraser proceeds by tracing this lack of positioning, as 
she might call it, through the rise and fall of the Center for 
Philosophical Research on the Political. 29 She focuses her 
analysis on the way that Heidegger and Arendt came to play an 
increasingly important role in the work of the center's 
members and how this lead to an a-political neoliberalism 
28 Here again, I agree with Fraser for the most part. The 
fact, however, that Derrida has ignored a good deal of the 
more important political implications of his work doesn't 
render them any less important. 
29 An organization that formed as a result of the 'Ends 
of Man' conference. 
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which ultimately undermined the centers aims and aspirations. 
The following remark summarizes her critique: " ... it is 
telling that ... they do not debate their opponents on the 
latter's own--political--terms. Rather, they refuse the very 
genre of political debate and in this way, too, maintain the 
ethos of deconstruction. For there is one sort of difference 
that deconstruction cannot tolerate: namely, difference as 
dispute, as good old-fashioned political fight" (Fraser, pp. 
81-82). A leap in logic is made by Fraser in this poignant but 
questionable assertion. Her point is that certain quasi-
Derridean intellectuals (Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe) are 
unwilling to go to bat for their political leanings does not 
warrant the claim that deconstruction is anti-discursive or 
that a Derridean orientation is non-argumentative (one of 
Habermas' main complaints) . As is the case with Habermas, 30 
Fraser uses polemic and rhetorical gestures to undermine what 
she considers to be a critical approach that is dangerous 
because of its retreat into polemic and rhetorical gestures. 
As such, she employs the very strategy that she seeks to 
discredit, utilizing what she considers to be suspect tactics. 
In the words of Habermas, this amounts to a performati ve 
contradiction. 
More recently another important American critical 
theorist, Thomas McCarthy, has entered into the act. This 
~ See George Trey, "The Philosophical Discourse of 
Modernity: Habermas' Postmodern Adventure." 
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began with a debate between Derrida and himself in which he 
clearly represented the absent Habermas. 31 Later this was 
developed into a more detailed analysis in an article titled: 
"The Politics of the Ineffable: Derrida's 
Deconstructionism. 1132 McCarthy takes great pains to quote 
frequently from remarks perrida has made in interviews as well 
as from his various writings. In doing so he hopes to protect 
himself from the claim that he is misunderstanding Derrida. 33 
McCarthy reprimands Derrida for not having a systematic 
analysis of social institutions, law, or rights. Likewise, he 
points out that when Derrida does comment on political issues 
he appeals to the very concept that his "deconstructionism" 
leads him to undermine. Finally, McCarthy makes every effort 
to identify Derrida with Heidegger (as do Habermas and 
Fraser). These points lead him to the following conclusion: 
I have found nothing in Derrida's writings to persuade me 
that his quasi-apocalyptic, near prophetic mode of 
discourse about politics should displace the more prosaic 
modes available or constructible in our tradition. Even 
if his heart is in the right place and even if his 
"anarchy" is meant to be "responsible," we know from 
experience that the devaluations of these modes opens a 
space, or rather creates a vacuum that can be filled in 
quite different ways, for instance by Heidegger's call 
31 This took place at the eastern division meeting of the 
American Philosophical Association in 1989. 
32 In Thomas McCarthy, Ideals and Illusions. 
33 This is a typical charge made by Derrideans against 
people who disagree with Derrida. The upshot is if you are not 
a zealous follower of Derrida, it must be because you are 
incapable of understanding his work. Such charges usually do 
nothing more than to encourage a less than serious reading of 
Derrida's books and articles. 
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for submission to some indeterminate authority (McCarthy, 
p. 118). 
Putting aside the questionable attempt to make a Nazi out 
of Derrida, McCarthy's arguments hinge on two assumptions: (1) 
That in order to have pertinence to political and social 
theory, one's work must be that of doing systematic social 
theory. While clearly systematic social theory, such as the 
type that Habermas does, is very important and highly 
commendable, it doesn't follow that this is the only way in 
which ethical and political questions can be broached. (2) 
That Derrida's critique of Western rationality is totalistic; 
Derrida can't legitimately undermine, or even question, 
certain aspects of reason without demolishing it altogether. 
It seems that even a cursory reading of Derrida's work would 
notice that this is not the case; yet when Derrida indicates 
as much quite straight forwardly, McCarthy accuses him of 
contradicting himself. In addition to these two fundamental 
problems, the same point that I made with respect to Fraser 
applies to McCarthy. At the very moment that he lauds rational 
discourse, he relies on rhetorical operators, such as the 
appeals to Heidegger and the loaded claims about totalistic 
(read totalitarian) critique. As is the case with Habermas and 
Fraser, these comments are far less the product of serious 
criticism than the mark of those who either have an axe to 
grind or a cross to bear. 
While Habermas obviously has a highly developed theory of 
communication, and has shown carefully, if not utterly 
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convincingly, that there are important ethical implications to 
be drawn from this theory, it is not at all clear that the 
concept of language to which he continually appeals is fleshed 
out in a theoretically satisfactory manner. Jonathan Culler 
makes this point in Framing the Sign where he develops a 
I 
succinct analysis of Habermas' "norms of language." Culler 
states that Habermas constructs, rather than derives, the 
normative features that he claims are rooted in the structures 
of language. It is his contention that Habermas begins with 
norms that serve his project and proceeds to systematically 
bracket off exceptions, labeling them parasitic deviances. The 
most notable of these, Culler suggests, is literature, which 
by Habermas' own standards is communicative, yet does not 
aspire to mutual understanding. By excluding modes of language 
usage that escape his normative framework, Habermas 
presupposes and applies norms in the course of his analysis 
that are supposed to be derivatives of the analysis. While 
Habermas chooses "norms that we all would admire," his method 
of legitimating them is exclusive and ultimately circular. 34 
Culler argues that at the heart of Habermas' account is 
a universalistic ideology, not an analysis of language. 
"Discussion of these matters does not belong in an account of 
presupposed norms, as Habermas conceives it, but perhaps to 
say this is to indicate that what he is analyzing is not 
34 Jonathan Culler, Framing the Sign, chapter 11 
(hereafter FS). 
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language so much as ideologically restricted notions of 
understanding, communication, rationality, or more generously, 
a philosophical conception of communication that goes with the 
value choice he wishes to make normative" (FS, p. 199). 
Habermas, in a sense, naturalizes a specific mode of discourse 
and assigns the norms that are fundamental to this mode 
universal status. 
Culler is quite correct in his assertion that Habermas' 
norms are implausibly derived from natural language and that 
mutual understanding is not a constant presupposition of 
participants in communication situations. At the same time, 
however, he provides little defense of his own view of 
understanding which is premised on the "frequently 
counterfactual assumption of the possibility that the reader 
can see and grasp what the speaker failed to see and even what 
the author failed to see" (FS,p. 193). Culler makes a sweeping 
reversal of Habermas' privileged category (symmetry) and 
assigns universal status to his own choice. "Communication, 
one might say, is structurally asymmetrical, and symmetry is 
an accident and a myth of moralists, not a norm" ( FS, p. 193) . 
Culler's bracketing and marginalizing of features of language 
that are at odds with his theory bears striking resemblances 
to Habermas'. This reflects a tendency on the part of 
theorists steeped in deconstruction to ignore the 
communicative possibilities that are afforded by language. As 
was the case with Habermas, Culler sidesteps issues that pose 
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serious threats to the universality of his central thesis. 
This view of communication, as structurally fixed 
(whether symmetrical or asymmetrical), denies the force of the 
theory language that Culler is tacitly defending: that the 
structures of language are always shifting and that this 
movement disrupts the structures of various modes of 
discourse. 35 It is not incompatible with this view to hold 
that symmetry is just as possible as asymmetry when language 
structures and discursive contexts adhere, although it does 
problematize the possibility of arranging universal mutual 
understandings in these contexts. 
In contrast to Culler, Derrida, no champion of the 
inherent transparency of language, notes that under certain 
conditions a normatively moderated symmetrical discourse is 
quite realizable. In an afterward to Limited Inc. Derrida 
states the following: "And within interpretive contexts (that 
is, within relations of force that are always differential--
for example, socio-political institutions--but even beyond 
~Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction, chapt 2. "And what 
is true of a word is true of language in general: the 
structure of a language, its systems of norms and 
regularities, is a product of events, the product of prior 
speech acts. However, when we take this argument seriously and 
begin to look at the events which are said to determine the 
structures, we find that every event is itself already 
determined and made possible by prior structures. The 
possibility of meaning something by an utterance is already 
inscribed in the structure of language. The structures 
themselves are always products, but however far back we try to 
push, even when we try to imagine the "birth" of language and 
describe an originary event that might have produced the first 
structure, we discover that we must assume prior organization, 
and prior differentiation" (p. 95-6). 
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these determinations) that are relatively stable, sometimes 
apparently unshakable, it would be possible to invoke rules of 
competence, criteria of discussion and of consensus, good 
faith, lucidity, rigor, criticism, and pedagogy. 1136 While 
this confirms my point that symmetrical discourse under 
certain normative standards is not precluded by a 
deconstructive theory of language, it is nevertheless a far 
cry from Habermas' teleological universalism. In fact it is 
premised on the following: 11 In the analysis of so called 
normal cases, one neither can nor ought, in all theoretical 
rigor, to exclude the possibility of transgression. Not even 
provisionally or out of methodological considerations. It 
would be a poor method, since the possibility of transgression 
tells us immediately and indispensably about the structure of 
law in general 11 (LI, 133). This point applies to both Habermas 
and Culler. Once the contextually desirable case is 
normatively naturalized, incipient and ensuing transgression 
is denied--leaving only obscure, irrelevant deviances in the 
margins. 
While Habermas argues convincingly that under certain 
conditions symmetrical communication is possible, Culler 
argues with equal persuasiveness that the rules governing 
these conditions don't translate into universal norms. Culler, 
however, falls back on a normal/deviant distinction that is 
every bit as problematic as Habermas'. I have introduced 
36 Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc., p. 146 (hereafter LI). 
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Derrida to indicate why mutual understanding in symmetrical 
discourse is neither a "myth of moralists", nor "intuitive 
knowledge of participants themselves." As I noted in Section 
(A), Habermas elsewhere develops the framework for a theory of 
language that is more sensitive to these problems. At the base 
of this framework is his theory of the lifeworld. As it 
stands, this theory both includes and denies the 
deconstructive impulse that I think can serve his social 
theory. In the following subsection I will argue that a 
Derridean "textualizing" of Habermas' lifeworld provides a 
more acceptable bas.is for a theory of communicative action. 
The first step in this portion of my discussion is to 
argue for a linguistic interpretation of the lifeworld. As I 
noted above, Habermas' semantic theory is rooted in three 
participant-world relations. These three "worlds "--the 
subjective, objective and intersubjective--intersect and 
intermingle to constitute the lifeworld. Habermas seems to 
have recognized that the criticisms of the sort discussed 
above would be addressed to his abstract analysis of 
communicative competence. In particular he is sensitive to 
Culler's point that an adequate theory of language is missing. 
In response, Habermas develops a theory of the lifeworld that 
attempts to meet this deficiency. Insofar as the lifeworld is 
constituted by the intersecting components of speech acts, it, 
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like language, is foundational for communication. 37 
Habermas establishes the connection between language and 
the lifeworld as follows: 
It is not my intention to carry further our formal-
pragrnatic examination of speech acts and of communicative 
action; rather, I want to build upon these concepts so 
far as they have already been analyzed, and take up the 
question of how the lifeworld--as the horizon within 
which communicative actions are "always already" moving--
is in turn limited and changed by the structural 
transformation of society as a whole (TCA:2, p. 119). 
Characterized as such, the lifeworld is the historically 
established precondition for any form of language usage; it is 
the trans-situational compilation of syntactic, semantic and 
grammatic structures that enable communication. Likewise it is 
an ever shifting, ever moving, dynamic of transformations that 
reflect the historical relationship between the "always 
already" and the immediate. 
By taking this position, Habermas invalidates the type of 
universality that he wishes to attribute to redeemed validity 
claims. Insofar as validity claims are ultimately language 
dependent, and linguistic configurations are framed by 
shifting horizons of meaning, the only grounds for claiming 
universality would be to establish that the residual meaning 
which sustains horizon or boundary shifts has universal 
content. This is tantamount to saying that linguistic 
mechanisms which produce semantic fluidity are the only 
universal features of language. Clearly Habermas does not want 
37 Culler pays little attention to the role played by the 
lifeworld in the theory of communicative action. 
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to accept this. It nevertheless seems to follow from his 
theory of language. In order to make this case I will focus on 
the shifting horizons of the lifeworld and trans-situational 
differences which inevitably factor into specific lifeworld 
structures that ground contingent speech situations. 
It is first necessary to specify with as much precision 
as possible what I mean by 11 language. 11 At a very primary level 
language is that which enables communication of various sorts 
and modes. For this to take place language must have certain 
consistent features but at the same time must be malleable 
enough to accommodate changing communicative demands. These 
demands are constituted by the material, political, legal, 
cultural and moral reproduction of the conditions which 
preserve and transform communities of language users. As is 
evidenced by history, both in the broadest sense and in 
numerous contemporary instances, there is a tremendous amount 
of tension between preservation and transformation. The 
fundamental medium by which and within which these tensions 
are played out is language; it gives rise to and limits the 
range of solvent activities. Likewise, these activities, which 
take the form of the above mentioned modes of reproduction, 
feed back into language--disrupting and transforming its 
structural makeup. One can assume that since these tensions do 
not lead to final resolution, that history doesn't really ever 
end, tension itself is a constitutive feature of language. As 
such, I will define language as a dynamic network of 
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constellations and transgression which reflect socio-
historical conflicts, partial resolutions, further conflicts 
and so forth. 
With this in mind, the connection between language and 
Habermas' lifeworld can be neatly drawn. The reproductive 
matrix that I identified above as being both dependent upon 
and constitutive for language reproduction, encompasses the 
actor-world relations that Habermas claims are dependent upon 
and constitutive for the lifeworld. As a mesh of overlapping 
communicative possibilities, this matrix serves as a source 
pool that can be drawn upon in particular situations. "The 
background of a communicative utterance is thus formed by 
situation definition that, as measured against the actual need 
for mutual understanding, have to overlap to a sufficient 
extent" (TCA:2, p. 121). Situations geared toward mutual 
understanding cannot be sharply delineated; there is always a 
certain amount of shifting that accompanies situation 
definition, depending on the complexity of the theme that is 
explicated. "A situation is a segment of lifeworld contexts of 
relevance that is thrown into relief by themes and articulated 
through goals and plans of action; these contexts are 
concentrically ordered and become increasingly anonymous and 
diffused as the spatiotemporal and social distance grows" 
( TCA: 2, p. 122-23). This seem like a correct description, 
although the metaphor of concentric circles could be replaced 
with a more appropriate one such as intersecting threads. 
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Habermas proceeds to describe the degree to which lif eworld 
horizons shift relative to the thematic complexity of the 
particular situation and how as the linguistic demands placed 
on lifeworld resources intensify, the effect of shifting, both 
immediate and embedded, is felt. This reflects the 
constellational-transgressional dynamic that I attributed to 
language. In order to accept such an implication, however, 
Habermas would have to abandon his truth-productive semantic 
theory: meaning would be subject to degrees of indeterminacy 
that run along a spectrum ranging from something close to 
semantic transparency to a fairly radical polysemia. 
In an attempt to avoid the repercussions that this would 
have on his normative theory, Habermas suggests that lifeworld 
(language) appropriation be carefully tailored to the specific 
communication situation. 
From a perspective turned toward the situation, the 
lifeworld as a reservoir of taken-for-granteds, of 
unshaken convictions that participants in communication 
draw upon in cooperative processes of interpretation. 
Single elements, specific taken-for-granteds, are, 
however, mobilized in the form of consensual and yet 
problematizable knowledge only when they become relevant 
to a situation (TCA:2, p. 124). 
As such, the "problem" of semantic indeterminacy is overruled 
by a political decision: that of defining the situation. This 
move fails to take into consideration the flexible-reflexive 
character of language, a significant feature of Habermas' own 
semantic theory. While political moves of this nature are 
appropriate in some situations, perpetually - forcing 
determinacy on fluid semantic structures will build up tension 
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in the linguistic networks of the lifeworld. Insofar as these 
networks serve as the source pool from which the resources for 
further political decisions are drawn, built up tension or 
neutralized transgression will resurface with greater 
intensity. This, in brief, is the problem with a conventional 
appropriation of the politics of enlightenment. Traditional 
understandings of key enlightenment categories lead to their 
ossification rather than dynamic reproduction. I will return 
to this with respect to the concept--democracy--that covers 
heuristically Habermas' categories of truth, freedom and 
justice. 
Habermas insists that this tension is not a problem. 
Appealing to his view that the natural end of language usage 
is mutual understanding, he states the following: 
So long as participants maintain their perf ormati ve 
attitudes the language actually in use remains at their 
backs. Speakers cannot take up an extramundane 
positioning relation to it. The same is true of culture--
of those patterns of interpretation transmitted in 
language. From a semantic point of view, language does 
have a peculiar affinity to linguistically articulated 
worldviews. Natural languages conserve the contents of 
tradition, which persist only in symbolic forms, for the 
most part in linguistic embodiment. For the semantic 
capacity of a language has to be adequate to the 
complexity of the stored-up cultural contents, the 
patterns of interpretation, variations, and expressions 
( TCA : 2 , p . 12 5 ) . 
Every situation either comes preinterpreted or with an 
unproblematic negotiable interpretation ready at hand. Insofar 
as language is essentially geared toward mutual understanding, 
it is this stable medium that undergirds processes of 
negotiation and interpretation. Language always provides 
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common ground: "Communicative actions can no more take up an 
extramundane position in relation to their lifeworld than they 
can in relation to language as the medium of processes of 
reaching understanding through which their lifeworld maintains 
itself. In drawing upon a cultural tradition they continue it" 
(TCA:2, p. 125). In other words, the movement of language is 
always coherent with respect to its determinate end: 
transparent communication. 
Language-lif eworld development is continuous and 
unproblematic in that it adheres to a teleological principle--
that of rational speech. In order to sidestep the implications 
of his own lifeworld theory, Habermas has to take refuge in 
the most problematic aspect of his semantic theory: the 
natural primacy of mutual understanding. As I pointed out via 
Culler, this view is highly dubious. Hence, a number of 
questions can be raised concerning Habermas' linguistif ied 
lifeworld. What are the adaptive mechanisms that facilitate 
horizon movement? Is there within language a provision for the 
transgression of established boundaries? How can semantic 
evolution and linguistic paradigm shifts be explained? 
Habermas' response to all of these questions would involve an 
appeal to a continuous intersubjective development that has 
refined language to the point that all changes can occur 
smoothly and unproblematically. While this concurs with his 
theory of communication, I think that it is at odds with the 
theory of language which is embedded in his conception of the 
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lifeworld, not to mention his analysis of late-capitalism's 
systematic destruction of social communication. Further, r 
think that altering this conception of the lifeworld by 
fleshing out the implications of the implicit theory of 
language will markedly improve the theory of communicative 
action as a theory of a politics of enlightenment. In order to 
establish this I will now turn to Derrida for some suggestions 
as to how Habermas' lifeworld could be "textualized." 
Derrida's theory of language draws upon Saussure's 
observation that language is fundamentally composed of 
arbitrarily established differences. These differences, for 
example between signifier and signified, create spaces or gaps 
within the fabric of language: areas that shift and move, 
rendering meaning and truths ultimately undecidable. Derrida 
characterizes this as a textual or intertextual phenomenon. 
Texts, or textual "situations", provide evidence of this as 
they reflect the intertextual networks that operate under, 
above, around, and within the apparent boundaries that suggest 
distinctions between text and context. This intermingling of 
text and context brings into textual situations the spatial 
gaps in language that generate play or indeterminacy. As such, 
any concrete, definite, manifestation of language is rife with 
its own de-formation. 38 
As was the case with Habermas' lifeworld, Derrida's 
38 Derrida develops this theory in a number 
writings. For a useful discussion of text and 




"text" is a loosely woven, historically structured matrix of 
overlapping linguistic components. Likewise, the text and the 
lifeworld are both fluid: shifting in compositional form with 
respect to factors that contribute to their fabrication. 
Further, both remain in the background--a quasi-transcendental 
foundation, although not solid ground--serving as the reserve 
from which textual instances or defined communicative 
situations are drawn. 39 They diverge sharply, however, with 
respect to the relationship between the reserve and the 
situation or instance. Habermas, as I noted above, contends 
that the shifting within the reserve does not effect properly 
defined situations. Derrida, on the contrary, claims that the 
"differance"--" 'active' moving discord of different forces and 
of differences of forces"--of the intertextual reserve factors 
into every textual situation, leaving traces which seed that 
structures disassembly.~ Hence, the excluded other, or 
marginalized, that which has to be politically neutralized in 
39 Habermas notes this transcendental character of 
language in several places. By transcendental he does not mean 
something metaphysical; rather, language is transcendental 
insofar as it survives or transcends the immediate, contingent 
forms that it takes in discourse. It is somewhat more 
controversial to claim that Derrida has a transcendental 
theory of language. Nonetheless, I would hold that he does--in 
the same sense as Habermas. I am confirmed in this view by 
Gasche in "Joining the Text." I would formulate this as a 
temporal, rather than spatial, type of transcendence. 
~ I hesitate to use the term "differance" as it is rather 
silly and has been appropriated by Derrideans in sickening 
ways. I prefer to call what Derrida labels "differance" 
intertextual differentiation. I think that such a term is more 
descriptive and less subject to ontological hyperbole. 
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a defined or textual situation, is never quite flushed out, as 
the text and its situations are inseparable. 41 
Critics of Derrida have suggested that this theory of 
textuality-language reduces all of reality to the status of a 
big, self-animating book--denying real conflict, historical 
changes and concrete social-political relations. 42 Derrida 
refutes this by indicating that the catch phrase of 
deconstruction, "there is nothing outside the text," means 
simply that "there is nothing outside context" and that this 
"concept of the text ... does not exclude the world, reality, 
history" (LI, pp. 136-7). 
Derrida summarizes as follows: 
Once again (and this probably makes a thousand times I 
have had to repeat this, but when will it finally be 
heard, and why this resistance?): as I understand 
it ... the text is not the book, it is not confined in a 
volume itself confined to the library. It does not 
suspend reference--to history, of the world, reality, 
that they always appear in an experience, hence in a 
movement of interpretation which contextualizes them 
according to a network of differences and hence of 
referral to the other, is surely to recall that alterity 
(difference) is irreducible. Differance is a reference 
and vice versa (LI, 137). 
As such, the text, like the lifeworld, is always in the 
backdrop of the subject matter that is central to critical 
theory. It is within this text (language), albeit in a "highly 
unstable and dangerous" fashion, "that responsibilities jell, 
political responsibilities in particular" (LI, pp. 136-37). 
41 Jacques Derrida, "Differance", pp. 20-25 (hereafter D). 
42 McCarthy serves as a primary example of this line of 
critique. See also Habermas' analysis in PDM. 
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Given that the material of the text and the lifeworld is 
essentially the same, the importance of the difference between 
Habermas' and Derrida's respective views on the relationship 
between the general and the specific comes into focus. Here I 
think Derrida has a decided advantage. Habermas argues that 
the situations defined in specific instances of communicative 
action are the natural product of a language designed with 
this purpose in mind. As such, under the right definite 
conditions, language fulfills itself in universal validity 
claims. Derrida, on the other hand, claims that "there is 
always something political 'in the very project of attempting 
to fix the contexts of utterances'" (LI, p. 136). Such 
political actions attempt to bracket off spheres of meaning or 
truth production, marginalizing the intertextual movement that 
threatens them with disruption. It is not Derrida's point that 
attempting to contextualize spheres of discourse is wrong; he 
in fact notes that doing so is necessary if there is to be 
political action (my term, not Derrida's). Rather, his 
contention is that the borders which define these contexts are 
never impervious to intertextual movement or differentiation. 
"Hence, no context is saturable any more. No one inflection 
enjoys any absolute privilege, no meaning can be fixed or 
decided upon. No border is guaranteed, inside or out"~ It is 
not clear that Derrida does not want to deny the possibility 
of political decision making; his point is that these 
~ Jacques Derrida, "Living On" p. 78. 
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decisions are never final due to contextual instability. What 
marks the difference between Derrida and Habermas in terms of 
the questions that I am pursuing revolves around the 
difference between thinking in terms of modernity and thinking 
in terms of the aftermath of modernity. For Habermas, the 
contextual boundaries of a politics of enlightenment are fixed 
insofar as they are exclusively modern. In terms of the type 
of politics of enlightenment that I am concerned with, Derrida 
is more appropriate as his theory doesn't limit the meaning of 
the term enlightenment, nor the type of values that are its 
spinoff, to a fixed historical epoch. As such, this 
textualized version of the lifeworld is more in line with a 
politics of enlightenment in the aftermath of modernity. 
In order for Habermas to maintain the view that in 
communicative action, redeemed validity claims achieve 
universal status--in the modern sense of the word--his thesis 
on the "telos of speech" or the natural propensity for 
communication to be transparent would have to be grounded in 
his theory of language. But as I have attempted to 
demonstrate, his theory of language or lifeworld acknowledges 
the same tensions and movements as does Derrida's theory of 
intertextuality. It seems implausible to move from a general 
condition of instability to specific instances of universal 
stability. As such, Derrida's conception of ultimately 
unstable textual situations is the more viable theoretical 
derivative. 
In my estimation Habermas carefully avoids 
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the 
implications of his linguistified lifeworld in order to 
preserve the contextual stability provided by the normative 
structures of modernity. Instability, in this situation, 
translates into tragic loss. This position has a long history 
in both political theory and practice; and on the surface it 
seems correct. In other words, it makes sense to stick with 
the values that seem unambiguously worth retaining. Yet as I 
have argued, the values of modernity are not as unambiguous as 
Habermas suggests. Sticking with them in an unmodified fashion 
could quite plausible lead to problems that far outreach the 
already near crisis conditions that Habermas has shown 
permeate modern societies. The sorts of pressures that build 
up in communities that are undermined by the cynical 
appropriation of modern values (and I am not implying in any 
way that Habermas' appropriation is a cynical one) are more 
likely to come chaotically unglued than are those that 
recognize their ultimately undecidable, read infinitely 
redefinable, status. A sanguine example of this is the riots 
which broke out as a result of the cynical appeals to justice 
in the Rodney King case in may of 1992. The pressure that 
builds up when such cynical notions of justice, or truth or 
freedom, are reactionarily perpetuated will disrupt the 
borders of the political context in violent fashion. This, in 
fact, seems to be the most appropriate response under such 
conditions: conditions under which discursive asymmetries are 
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so vast that radically different modes of communication become 
necessary. In other words, intertextual differentiation, in 
the form of the politically marginalized, will respond 
forcefully to domination in situations defined by manipulated 
values portrayed as achieved absolutes. 
For both Derrida and Habermas, language qua language is 
that which transcends any particular linguistic establishment. 
Similarly, they both recognize that language, whether as text 
or lifeworld, is constantly shifting, bending, and contracting 
the horizons which establish its limits. Where they diverge 
pertains to the degree that movement within the transcendental 
impacts the concrete. Habermas believes that this movement can 
and should be politically neutralized while for Derrida the 
politics of speaking or writing internalize the play of 
differences native to language. I have argued that Habermas' 
view that the meaning of truth, freedom and justice can be 
determined within the horizon of modernity is both 
theoretically untenable and politically undesirable. My 
suggestion is that a textualized theory of the lifeworld, 
complete with the extensional properties of intertextuality, 
would provide the basis for a more vibrant theory of 
communicative action. 
Politics, Ethics, and the Aftermath of Modernity 
In order for this to begin taking form, it is necessary 
to flesh out what can be meant by the ter.m "theory" as well as 
the modifier "vibrant." A critical theory, by definition one 
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might say, can never be detached from contexts of political 
action. That is not to say that anything like an identity 
relationship between theory and practice is sought; but 
rather, that theory must be sensitive to the possibilities and 
limits presented by situations which define political 
movement. The modifier "vibrant" serves as an indicator which 
seeks to identify the most radical possibilities that are 
availed by such situations. In my estimation this indicator 
points in the direction of radical egalitarianism rather than 
disciplined formal democracy. 
It can be argued that Habermas has been driven throughout 
his career by the tensions that exist between radical 
egalitarianism and formal democracy. From The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere to Legitimation Crisis, 
and beyond that in The Theory of Communicative Action and in 
his recent work on discourse ethics, Habermas has struggled 
with what can simply be characterized as a form/content 
distinction. Another way to put this is that there is tension 
between Habermas the radical and Habermas the liberal. That 
tension is captured in the following remark: "The challenges 
of the twenty-first century will be of an order and magnitude 
that demand answers from Western societies which cannot be 
arrived at, nor put into practice, without radical-democratic 
universalization of interests through institutions for the 
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formation of public opinion and political will." 44 On the one 
hand radical democracy is deemed necessary if the 
revolutionary potential that has been brought about by the 
breakdown of bureaucratic communism in Eastern Europe is to be 
fulfilled; on the other, the radicality of this democratic 
thrust has to be checked by an institutional framework. One 
might surmise that this is simply an acknowledgement of the 
need (a need I would neither deny nor bemoan) for 
institutionalized decision making procedures in any large 
political body. As will be argued below, however, I think 
there is more at stake than just that. 
In order to determine what is at stake it is necessary to 
consider democracy as a fundamental modern political value. 
One of the key developments that marks the shift from 
premodern to modern forms of political life is the linkage 
established between legitimation and democratization. In a 
very unusual sense this imperative was first formulated, on a 
theoretical level, in Hobbes' proclamation that all rights 
must be sacrificed to the sovereign. This move, and here 
again, in a very unusual sort of way, paves the way for models 
of political legitimation that are not attached to an 
explicitly metaphysical conception of sovereignty. Habermas 
would identify this as movement in a "post-conventional" 
direction. In short, political authority is legitimate only 
44 Juergen Habermas, "What Does Socialism Mean Today? The 
Rectifying Revolution and the Need for New Thinking on the 
Left," p. 21. 
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insofar as in some way it can be traced to a point of public 
consent. One can of course find better (although I often 
wonder how much better) theoretical models for this in 
Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel. The point in any case is that it 
became necessary in early modern political theory, as well as 
in the constitutional democracies that emerged in Europe and 
America, to sustain some type of claim to being democratic. 
Whether anything like substantive democracy, or what I 
prefer to call political egalitarianism, has ever existed in 
modern societies is another question. If the modern conception 
of democracy is salvageable in any form, it is necessary to 
demonstrate that at some point it either operated effectively, 
or at least seemed to contain egalitarian possibilities. 
Habermas, who is currently the most renowned defender of 
modernity, while at the same time a rigorous critic of the way 
that in late-modern societies the possibilities for democracy 
have been leveled, is keenly aware of this need. In some of 
his more recent work he has attempted to defend modernity on 
the grounds that the universal normative ideals--truth, 
freedom, and justice--which distinguish modernity as a post-
conventional epoch, reflect a substantive shift that can be 
viewed as fundamentally egalitarian. This analysis, in my 
estimation, has as its reference point Habermas' empirical 
work on the operatives of the early modern public sphere. As 
I discussed in chapter IV, whether this defense works is 
contingent upon the separability of those normative ideals, 
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and that public sphere, from the economic and political 
imperatives which colonize the lifeworld, eliminating the 
possibility for substantive democracy. I have argued in both 
chapter III and IV that this separation cannot be sustained. 
As such, the tension that I noted above, that between 
radical egalitarianism and formal democracy, expresses itself 
as a dilemma: the dilemma of modernity. Insofar as we are 
dealing with an historical period (and while recognizing the 
problems with periodizations I still think there are good 
reasons for speaking of periods, not to mention commas, semi 
colons and other types of grammatical apparatuses which 
delimit and structure) that can be legitimately characterized 
as forcing us to confront democracy (often in spite of 
itself), while at the same time systematically, in the systems 
theory sense, preventing the realization of democracy, a 
contradiction emerges. This internal contradiction is likewise 
reflected in Habermas' formulation of communicative action, 
severely limiting its political impact. For these reasons I 
have suggested that communicative action would take on a new 
vibrancy if given a Derridean, "post" modern, twist. 
I would like to draw this analysis together by discussing 
the conditions for solidarity, the possibility for discourse, 
and the framework provided by political struggle. With respect 
to each of these important elements of any critical social 
theory I think that Habermas is correct to focus on the 
lifeworld. But here again, the tensions in his work, which I 
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would now like to formulate as the tension between political 
movement and interpretive work which is shaped by modernity 
versus that which is shaped by the aftermath of modernity, 
presents difficulties. As I have argued, Habermas is leery of 
the more radical implication of his linguistic turn with 
respect to lifeworld theory. While he implicitly acknowledges 
the heterogenous character of the lifeworld's linguistic 
substrata, he denies that this will have a significant effect 
on the discursive arrangements that are lifeworld derivatives. 
In other words, he wants to derive relative homogeneity with 
respect to speech situations from a language medium that is 
differential and in a constant state of transformation. That 
enables him to view the discourse situation as prior to, and 
constitutive of, political solidarity: "Owing to the fact that 
communication oriented to reaching understanding has a 
validity basis, a speaker can persuade a hearer to accept a 
speech-act off er by guaranteeing that he will redeem a 
criticizable validity claim. In doing so, he creates a 
binding/bonding effect between speaker and hearer that makes 
the continuation of their interaction possible. 1145 If the 
argument that I have presented concerning the textual 
character of the lifeworld is accepted, this priority is 
necessarily placed in question. 
For Habermas the only kind of struggle that factors into 
45 Juergen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Cornrnunicati ve 
Action, p. 59. 
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solidarity formation is that found in argumentative discourse. 
This, once again, hinges upon a relatively homogeneous view of 
discursive situations. But if one takes seriously Habermas' 
recognition of the heterogenous character of language, as well 
as the fractured state of public discourse which results from 
systematic colonization of the lifeworld, it would seem that 
a prior form of struggle is necessary if solidarity is to be 
achieved. In other words, when conditions are such that shared 
meaning cannot be accounted for either linguistically or in 
terms of existing social unity, the establishment of 
discursive situations would necessarily involve struggling 
within and against those conditions. Hence, solidarity, 
established in the context of oppositional struggle, must 
precede situations in which reciprocal discourse is possible. 
The direction in which I would like to push this analysis 
is toward thinking about the possibilities for radical 
egalitarianism in the aftermath of modernity rather than 
accepting the limits of modern democracy. My claim is that the 
lifeworld, even in its heterogeneity, can be thematized in 
relation to specific political objectives which disclose a 
certain set of possibilities. As even Habermas has recently 
acknowledged, it is this world disclosing feature of the 
lifeworld that provides alternatives to established forms of 
life. In this manner the lifeworld provides a matrix within 
which struggles can emerge that attempt to overcome the 
impoverishment of modes of disclosure which are systematically 
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restrained by imperatives that are external to those situated 
in positions of subordination. Through such struggles, which 
are initially aimed at negating existing forms of hegemony, 
solidarity can develop in such a way that new egalitarian 
possibilities emerge. 
My suggestion is that the lifeworld in the aftermath of 
modernity is textured in such a way that articulations of 
possible new configurations are delimited by the framework 
within which opposition is conducted. The instantiation of 
these possibilities needs to resonate with the concerns of 
those engaged in opposition. Through this, discursive 
configurations will emerge that must be measured against their 
capacity to empower those that intervene into established 
discursive regimes. The term "configuration" is useful in that 
it acknowledges the need for solidarity without assuming that 
the conditions within which it can be established are 
fundamentally in tact. The objective must be to develop out of 
an existing lifeworld matrix discursive situations in which 
radical democracy can operate. As such, the criterion of 
empowerment, checked by the need to resonate with the 
objectives of oppositional politics, situates the possibility 
for egalitarian community. In the final analysis I think this 
is only possible if we give up on the modern ideal (which in 
some ways Habermas embraces) that there can be a final 
analysis or an end of history. Hence, the radical 
egalitarianism, which can be shaped out of the textualized 
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understanding of the lifeworld that I have been putting forth, 
would be construed in terms of a politics of enlightenment 
geared toward the aftermath of modernity. 
Having laid out, in the most basic of terms, the 
political dimension of this theory, it is necessary now to 
return to the discussion of ethics that serves as its point of 
departure. I began this book with a discussion of the 
relationship between Kantian ethics and a theory of 
enlightenment. I have attempted to keep the spirit of this 
discussion in the forefront of the analyses that have 
followed. My position, as articulated in the first section of 
this chapter, is that Habermas' discourse ethic is the version 
of Kantian ethics most relevant to the project that I have 
elaborated. By way of the modified version that I have put 
forth, I have argued that there are important social and 
political implications of this ethic. I don't, however, want 
to subordinate ethics to politics. This has proven in numerous 
instances to be detrimental to the aims and aspirations of 
political movements that have laudable goals but loose sight 
of those ends in the process of the means that I referred to 
immediately above as political struggle. In other words, the 
question that remains pertains to the ethical backdrop that 
must be firmly in place if the politics of enlightenment is 
not to deteriorate into an unenlightened form of solidarity. 
While I am not prepared to spell this out at length, I will 
conclude with some remarks which will serve as points for 
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further discussion. 
First, I will restate what I mean by the aftermath of 
modernity. This formulation, as I noted in chapter II, is an 
attempt to move beyond postmodernists such as Lyotard and Jean 
Baudrillard--those whom I would call the cynical 
postmodernists. According to their characterizations, the 
emancipatory content of the Enlightenment has been thoroughly 
depleted. This leaves us in a vacuum of sorts, insofar as the 
great thinkers of emancipation--Kant, Hegel, Marx, etc.--were 
all products of this tradition. While accepting that we are in 
a vacuum of sorts, I want to resist the conclusion that 
cynical postmodernists draw from this: that the best we can 
hope for politically is an aestheticized liberalism which 
celebrates incompatibility, meaninglessness and, in a sense, 
confused enslavement to the mediations of post-industrial 
capitalism. From this perspective, the vacuum of postmodernity 
is not a temporally specific stage that is open to an array of 
possibilities; it is an a-temporal state of ontologically 
determined despair. I don't want to belittle the observations 
that have contributed to this conclusion--only the conclusion 
itself. It stalls at the point of giving consideration to what 
it might take to bring an end to the end of history. As such, 
my terminological break with postmodernism is first and 
foremost a break with cynicism. 
My characterization of the aftermath of modernity begins 
with, and stays with, the conditions of anomie and 
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helplessness that lead to communicative breakdown at the 
societal level. Such a breakdown eliminates the possibilities 
for a radical egalitarianism. In summary of points that I have 
developed throughout this work, there are a number of 
imperatives that operate vis-a-vis the late-modern lifeworld 
which indicate that things can't be other than what they are. 
Habermas himself is at times vulnerable to this sort of 
conclusion. What this amounts to is the recognition that the 
human condition suffers from an 11 energy crisis, 11 and as a 
result of being de-energized, it is difficult to conceive of 
alternative fuels. I attribute this to a communicative 
breakdown in that due to the massiveness of societal problems 
(as analyzed by Habermas and others) our resources for 
commitment, achieving solidarity, and resisting violent 
fragmentation have been all but depleted. As I noted in 
chapter IV, Bill Martin describes this as the flattening of 
consciousness which results in the impasse of postmodernity. 
But he also looks at the possible conditions of moving beyond 
that impasse--an aftermath of postmodernity or a resumption of 
history. While I want to stick with the spirit of this 
vision, I wish to depart from the terminological letter. 
Rather than trying to breathe new life into what I consider to 
be a devalued term--postmodernity--I prefer, rather, to 
attempt to broaden the terminological and descriptive horizons 
with the hope of stretching our capacity to think in terms of 
future possibilities. 
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If communicative breakdown is, as I have suggested, at 
the heart of the problem, then fostering solidarity needs to 
be at the heart of the solution. My suggestion for pursuing 
this involves thinking of ethically based discourse as a 
resource for recovering those elements of the lif eworld that 
have been distorted by postmodern malaise. I would argue for 
this being an ethics on the grounds that a politics of 
recovery could not be readily distinguished from cynical 
postmodernism. I would argue for this being a recovery on the 
grounds that ( 1) the communicative breakdown is something that 
political consciousness needs quite literally to recover from, 
and (2) that insofar as we are in the aftermath of modernity--
in a vacuum, but one with far reaching horizons--our best bet 
is to reclaim values and traditions that have been devalued 
and disintegrated due to the colonization of the lifeworld and 
the imperatives of steering media. 
Reclaiming involves revaluing, and possibly even 
renaming. In order to recover the various devalued ideals and 
forms of life that will help us move in the direction of 
radical egalitarianism we must reconfigure, reconceptualize 
and reevaluate the key enlightenment ideals that serve as our 
most important resources. As I have argued against Habermas, 
however, this cannot be achieved by defending a set of values 
that are more or less in place. It also requires more than 
substituting terms such as radical egalitarianism for 
democracy. It is necessary to go beyond putting a new handle 
332 
on a battered old cup; the cup must also be filled with new 
meaning which displaces its previous semantic content. In the 
case of ethically grounded solidarity it would require that 
invaluable enlightenment ideals be reinscribed into the 
textures of a reinflated lifeworld. Of these, the most 
important, and probably most devalued, is democracy. My 
suggestion is that we consider radical egalitarianism as an 
alternative to the ideals of formally democratic society. How 
this would differ from democracy would depend on its 
institutional base and the forms of consciousness that it 
allowed and nurtured. In other words, for such a model to be 
formulated it would by necessity take into account the radical 
differences that would have to come into contact in order for 
solidarity to congeal. For this reason, a communicative ethic 
that is sensitive to the question of alterity can contribute 
to the recovery of communicative possibilities necessary to 
the achievement of radical egalitarianism. 
The danger of operating politically within the vacuum 
characteristic of the aftermath of modernity should be quite 
clear. When meaning has been seriously deformed, any positive 
articulation runs the risk of being strategically assimilated. 
I take this to be one of Habermas' foremost concerns and 
uphold his hesitancy to break with values that are 
indispensable to the emancipatory thrust of critical theory. 
Yet if reforming these values is what it takes to move beyond 
the disaffection that is endemic in the societies that 
333 
Habermas concerns himself with, than the risks that this 
entails must be explored. I would be the first to admit that 
there is no ethical principle that can protect against this 
completely. But rather than acquiescing to the conservative 
tendency in Habermas, I urge for the exploration of a revalued 
notion of enlightenment that has the potential to generate 
possibilities in the aftermath of modernity. The most concrete 
way to pursue this is initiated by my attempt to rethink 
democracy under the rubric of radical egalitarianism. If we 
are to survive the impasse of postmodernity, we need to 
develop such a model that is rooted in ethically based 
solidarity and sensitive to radical difference. This, I have 
argued requires a politics of enlightenment in the aftermath 
of modernity. 
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